

SAFE FILE: BUSH, VANNEVAR

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From the Office of

file V. BUSH *file*

March 16, 1942.

Mr. Rudolph Forster,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

I hand you a report for the President. It contains secret and confidential material which should be securely guarded, for much is here summarized.

2 I have thus far transmitted no copies of this report, and I will appreciate it if you will advise me if the President indicates his wishes in this regard. He may wish to see me to have certain points expanded, and, if so, I am always at his call. This week I plan to be in New York on Wednesday and Thursday, but I can always cancel when needed.

VB.
V. Bush.

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PST-Safe: Turk

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. VANNEVAR BUSH

I have read your extremely interesting report and I agree that the time has come for a review of the work of the Office on New Weapons. I think you had better go ahead and work this out with the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations -- confining the whole thing to a very small number of people.

I am returning the report for you to lock up, as I think it is probably better that I should not have it in my own files.

F. D. R.

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~~SECRET~~

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
1530 P STREET NW.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

VANNEVAR BUSH
Director

March 16, 1942.

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AEC to Director FDRL
2-12-70

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith a report on the operations of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

This consists of a brief statement of the status of research on new weapons in various fields. The opinions expressed in regard to relative importance and promise are my own, not the results of study by a group. Medical research is summarized very briefly: the principal point here is that the work is proceeding entirely harmoniously. Appendices give the usual summaries of organization and operations.

Nearly all of the relations of my Office with the Armed Services are on the tactical level, and are cordial and effective on this basis. Much is being done. In my opinion, however, the time has come for a complete review of the work of this Office on new weapons, for the scientists of the country skilled in the necessary ways are limited in number. This review should be on the strategic level, to determine emphasis and be sure that striking opportunities are not being overlooked or inadequately pushed. If there are steps which you wish me to take in order to bring this about, or if you would care to have me express more completely my thoughts on the matter, I await your instructions.

Respectfully yours,



V. Bush,
Director.

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CASA

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
1530 P STREET NW.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

VANNEVAR BUSH
Director

July 16, 1941.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to submit herewith a report of operations of the National Defense Research Committee for the first year of its existence during which I was Chairman of the Committee.

This I have purposely made brief. The detailed reports of results obtained from the Committee's activities are placed in the hands of the Army and Navy as rapidly as they are obtained, and the full detailed record is thus available. I have hence confined this summary report to the more important programs, and have treated these generally. I shall of course be glad to extend this report to any extent you may wish.

The scientists of the country realize keenly their responsibilities in the present emergency, where the adequacy of new and sometimes intricate techniques have already profoundly influenced the course of events. They continue to be anxious to put forth their best efforts under your leadership.

Respectfully,



This page and pp 34, 35
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Vannevar Bush,
Director.

RECORDED
AEC to Director FDRL
2-12-70

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

R E P O R T
of the
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH COMMITTEE
for the
First Year of Operation
June 27, 1940 to June 28, 1941

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Date- MAY 28 1974

Signature- *WBS*

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1. Scope of the Committee's Activities.

The Order of the Council of National Defense of June 27, 1940, charged the Committee with the duty of supplementing the activities of the Army and Navy in the development of instruments of war*.

In carrying out this duty the Committee has set up an organization, divided into Divisions and Sections in accordance with subject matter, in which are included a large proportion of the outstanding scientists of the country, especially in physics, chemistry, and allied sciences⁺. These scientists, like the members of the Committee, serve on a voluntary part-time basis without pay. They are aided by a small number of paid Technical Aides. They take the responsibility for formulating and guiding the programs, and for rendering the results available to the Army and Navy and to the British. They are in constant close touch with skilled officers of the armed services[#].

The method of operation is by means of contracts with colleges, universities, scientific institutions, and industrial laboratories. These contracts are on

* Complete text on p.61.

⁺ Lists on p.38.

[#] System of liaison on p.48.

a cost basis. It has been the aim to provide arrangements by which university and other laboratories may proceed energetically, without gaining or losing financially in the process. The laboratories are in general contributing the use of their facilities, and are often making other contributions, as by the services of senior scientific staff for consultation and advice. There about 200 contracts in effect* covering a large range of effort. In the interests of speed, and to gather scientific groups of diverse talents, it has been necessary in some cases to concentrate work in universities and institutions having large facilities, but the work is spread all over the country. The Committee also utilizes the services of government laboratories, notably the Bureau of Standards, and transfers funds to provide for such work.

Great care has been taken to ensure proper secrecy in regard to operations. Many of the matters with which the Committee deals are of such nature that information should be securely guarded. Scientists and

* List on p.56.

others are carefully investigated before being taken into the organization. Highly secret matters are handled by carefully restricted special groups. There is a rule that no man in the organization learns of confidential matters except as is necessary to his proper functioning. Proper rules in regard to the handling of documents, etc., are enforced. There has been no evidence of any leak of important information through the Committee's operations.

(In the Sections of the Committee there meet together scientists and engineers especially skilled in the subject matter with which the Section deals, together with officers of the Army and Navy having knowledge and responsibility in the field under study. This has resulted in desirable interchange between the two services in numerous instances. It also ensures that problems are approached with a due regard to the practical military needs. The Army and Navy have welcomed the organization of the Committee, and have cooperated wholeheartedly with it.

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The Committee has close relations with the British Central Scientific Office. It also maintains a London office, and sends scientists there to interchange information with British scientists and to study problems under field conditions. This interchange has proved to be highly important.

While the Committee has carried on research on a wide variety of problems, it has kept keenly in mind the necessity for concentrating effort on those matters of great and pressing importance. On these it has strained every facility to obtain practically useful results in time. Research, by its very nature, takes time; and there are many steps from the conception of an idea to its practical utilization. The task of compressing into months a development which, in normal times, would take years is strenuous. Nevertheless, out of the work of the Committee, there are already coming some results which can now be applied in practice to great advantage. More are on the way, and the effect will become cumulative as the work of the Committee proceeds.

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2. Summary of the More Important Programs of Research
and Development and Progress thereon.

The subjects chosen for summary are the
following:

- a. Aircraft detection, and its result-
ing developments.p. 7.
- b. Gun control.p.19.
- c. Proximity fuses.p.24.
- d. Anti-submarine devicesp.28.
- e. Explosives and gasesp.31.
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Aircraft Detection and its Resulting Developments

When the war started both the Army and Navy had already developed radio devices for aircraft detection in their own laboratories, and so had the British. These were all very similar.

It is exceedingly fortunate that this was the case. When the air assault upon England occurred last summer and fall, as a prelude to invasion, it was repelled with heavy losses because of the effectiveness of air defense. No small part of this was due to the fact that the British were forewarned by their detectors of each assault, and could order their fighters into the most advantageous position to intercept it. This experience impressed all thinking men with the importance of radio devices of this general nature, and there has been rapid development since that time. It also convinced the Committee that it could contribute to defense in an almost immediate manner by concentrating on this problem. Hence this field has been the one in which the Committee's efforts have been greatest. The outstanding scientists of the country, of such background as to work effectively in this field, have been

gathered together, largely at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since the best facilities for their work were already there, and supplied with organization, materials, and technical assistance. The great electrical research laboratories of industry have worked closely with this group. This has occurred, not in the usual manner where each commercial company pursues its independent development, but on a definite basis of pooled information, and a subdivision of development for its most advantageous distribution. Close liaison has also been maintained with Army and Navy, and with the continuing work of their laboratories.

In nine months a new art has been advanced to a degree which would ordinarily have taken years. The matter has now progressed to the point where both the Army and Navy are placing large production orders for equipment of this type, much of which is of a form which was unknown a year ago.

It is a remarkable thing that a radio pulse detector can work at all. A radio station, somewhat like a broadcasting station, sends out a pulse of radiation lasting for only about a millionth of a second.

A few millionths of a second later it "hears" an echo come back, reflected back to it from an airplane in the distance. That this can still be done, and the echo distinguished from all those coming from the immediate neighborhood, when there is to be detected a single small airplane 150 miles away, is uncanny. Yet physicists can compute and design such equipment, and be sure that it will work. The equipment can be sufficiently rugged and reliable to operate under practical conditions in the field. From the elapsed time before the echo returns, the distance of the plane can be precisely indicated, and its direction can be found from the direction from which the echo returns. It is even possible to obtain a measure of the altitude at which the plane is flying.

All this was accomplished before the Committee came into existence. There was, however, one great difficulty. The apparatus worked on relatively long wave lengths, and was hence cumbersome. There were many evident applications, if the equipment could be rendered compact and very precise, such as to use it for direct control of the firing of guns. There is a

general relation that, the shorter the wavelength, the smaller the corresponding equipment. Hence it was highly necessary that devices be developed which would enable the wavelength to be reduced to about a tenth of that then used. Herein resided a serious difficulty. Equipment for these ultra-short wavelengths was indeed known in a few laboratories and by a few men. But it was very feeble, and great power was necessary for success. Moreover the entire behavior of electric circuits at ultra-high frequencies was not understood, and the parts of it that were known were treated by only a few scientists whereas the combined work of many was necessary for success.

Fortunately the early interchange with British scientists gave the subject a great impetus. It appeared that the British had gone far on transmitting tubes, whereas the Americans had produced advanced receivers.

The rest of the story is one of hard scientific analysis, experiment, and test. Inventions have been made, numbers of them, and been freely made available

to all investigators. But this has been no sudden brilliant flash of an individual. It has been the result of teamwork of the highest order.

As soon as equipment can be made compact and rugged for field use, many applications appear.

One of these is the ground control indicator. A piece of this radio-reflection equipment constantly scans the entire sky about it. Wherever it detects a plane it automatically places a dot on a map to indicate its position. The map is the top of a cathode ray tube, and the dot is a small glow of light. Other equipment, used in conjunction, can reveal whether any particular dot indicates a friend or foe. A series of such stations, which have a lesser range than the simpler long-range detectors, can cover an entire area with their maps overlapping, with telephone communication so that knowledge is passed on from one to the next, and to a central control station. Auxilliary devices also provide for obtaining the altitude of any particular plane under observation. The device works just as well at night or through clouds, as in

full daylight. No plane can fly higher than it can reach. Such devices are now in use, mostly at high, but not ultra-high frequencies. The present effort is to render them more powerful, smaller, more precise, and this is best done by increased frequency. Their great use is of course to control the defense fighters so that they may intercept the enemy even at night. They can, by radio communication with fighters, bring them into the general neighborhood of the enemy under the most advantageous conditions for contact. Something more is needed at night for the final contact, and more on this appears below. Advanced equipment of this sort is ready for final engineering attention and production.

The same general sort of equipment is also of great value at sea. In fact it is rapidly revolutionizing the strategy and tactics of naval warfare. When a warship can know the precise location at all times of every ship out to the horizon, and apparently even somewhat beyond, in night or haze, with directions somewhat approximate, and range very precisely, there

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are evidently new conditions and it is important to be in the forefront of advance. More on precise direction will be stated below. Again, the situation is one of development for compactness and power, for the Navy has long been working on this matter. A recent test on the Semmes, using ultra-short wavelength equipment which is readily installed at the top of the mast, and which scans and plots positions automatically, has given excellent results, and the improved equipment is moving into production.

Evidently, if a plane's position can be precisely determined from the ground, a navigating system is available, especially over water. The need here is for very long ranges, and so the device is modified somewhat from the usual echo scheme. This has not been as pressing a problem as some others; however equipment for this purpose will be tested this summer and promises well.

It has long been realized that it would be exceedingly valuable if devices of this sort could be built to be mounted directly on aircraft. This has in fact been done in England using high but not ultra-high frequencies. With this equipment a pursuit plane, placed in the general neighborhood of a bomber by ground control,

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can then "see" the enemy. The device has indeed already produced striking results. With the usual frequencies, however, there are strict limitations. In particular the field of view is restricted and the bomber can evade pursuit by maneuvering, if it realizes it is being followed. The need for more compact apparatus, of adequate range, automatic scanning, and large field of view is hence intense; and these results are best attained by going to ultra-short wavelengths. The Committee's work has concentrated on this problem more than on any other. Two leads are being followed, one at 10 cm. which produces equipment which will readily go in the nose of a two-engined fighter, and the much more difficult task at 3 cm. which holds promise of producing equipment which can even be placed in the wings of a single-engined fighter. The research and development work on the former is practically complete, and what remains is engineering refinement and production which can proceed simultaneously under orders being placed. Sets have been tested in this country and England. With one of these, when the pilot is put

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within a few miles of his target by ground control, he sees a dot on a screen which tells him the target location in elevation and azimuth, and its distance away. He can "see" through a horizontal angle of 180° and a vertical angle of 60° , and can hence readily maneuver into position. When he gets close enough he can often actually make out the target against the sky and fire. Here there is a hitch. It would be preferable if he could, at the final instant, get the exact direction and range with sufficient promptness and convenience to be able to fire without taking his eyes off of his instruments. The laboratory is intensely engaged in an added auxilliary which promises to accomplish this very thing. Even without it, the the 10 cm. AI set, as it is called, is capable of rendering it exceedingly uncomfortable for night bombers. It is being pushed to the utmost.

An auxilliary device which promises well in this connection has very recently appeared from another section of the Committee's work. This is a night glass, which appears to be a radical advance over anything previously available. With it planes can be seen on

dark nights much further than before. It is the result of combined efforts of optical scientists and experimental psychologists. Right now it is undergoing its first tests. If completely successful it will supplement rather than supersede, radio devices.

The mounting of radio echo devices in aircraft is of as great importance to the Navy as to the Air Corps. In particular it is of great importance for combatting submarines. In fact, the location of submarines on the surface by patrolling aircraft is one of the most promising methods in sight for overcoming the submarine menace. The Navy has long been alive to this matter, and has developed energetically. The successful use of extremely short waves, in the Committee's laboratories, supplements this work well, for the equipment becomes more compact and versatile. Devices embodying the most recent scientific results are now moving into production for this purpose.

The devices described give the direction of a plane or ship only somewhat roughly. It is entirely possible to construct devices along these lines which give direction with considerable precision, in fact with sufficient precision to directly control gunfire. Such

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devices have been built, and are in preliminary use. The same considerations as to compactness, ruggedness, and power apply. Recently there was constructed an ultra-high frequency device for this purpose which, when directed at a plane target, will automatically continue to point at that target with sufficient precision to control anti-aircraft fire. The plane cannot evade the beam, once it is directed on it, by the most violent maneuvering, and of course it would not ordinarily know it was being followed at all. Such devices, now approaching wide use, are capable of greatly improving the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire. The ultra-short wavelength types are being energetically developed.

The use of such devices at sea is of evident importance, and is being similarly furthered.

It would evidently also be useful to mount this sort of equipment on planes, to aid in controlling their fire. One aspect of this has already been mentioned. Other aspects are still in embryo.

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In spite of the fact that much has been accomplished in this field of radio pulse reflection, the whole science and its applications are in the early stages of a great development.

In particular, it must be remembered that counter measures are often possible. Thus, if a ship uses a radio range-finder, it is possible for the opposing ship to jam this and prevent it from being used. It is also possible to so design the range-finder that jamming is very difficult, and perhaps practically impossible. A target can hardly jam the equipment by which its direction is indicated without setting up a radio disturbance which itself renders location in direction relatively easy. Thus as the art advances, if adversaries are both scientifically and technically able, there will occur a race between techniques. It is important to be somewhat ahead. The Committee has recognized this aspect of matters. Early in its development of radiation devices it set up a separate group of scientists with instructions to develop equipment aimed at counteracting the efforts of the main group. Increasing attention to counter measures will become necessary as the work proceeds.

It is, however, entirely evident that there is no counter to radio devices as a whole. They will continue to increase in importance. They will probably constitute the outstanding new military device of the present war. They are already completely modifying methods of fighting.

b. Gun Control.

Some of the modern radio aspects of gun control have already been mentioned. There is, however, an aspect beyond that of merely knowing the target's position at all times. This is the job of applying the corrections to the gun control so that the shell and the target will arrive at the same position at the same time.

This matter has a long history, and there are industrial laboratories which have been in close contact with Army and Navy along these lines. Hence the Committee's activities in supplementing have been to perform auxilliary tasks of analysis and scientific experimentation, rather than to launch new broad developments. Nevertheless, there is important work going on under Committee auspices.

The automatic predictor for long-range naval fire has been highly refined over many years. The advent of the airplane brought in a parallel development of predictors for fire against high-altitude aircraft. The use of the airplane at low altitudes, and for dive bombing, requires very rapid predictors and flexible gun controls. Fortunately the corrections do not need to be highly refined for this short-range work, and hence the devices may be relatively simple. They are, however, needed in great quantity, and they must be sufficiently fast and accurate for their intended purpose.

The field may be divided into three ranges. First there is the point-blank range, under which a simple sight, aided by tracer bullets, suffices. This has been the usual condition thus far in plane-to-plane fire. Second there is the intermediate range, up to two or three thousand yards, where rapid fire cannon are still effective, but where corrections are highly necessary. Third, there is long-range fire, with complete corrections, which is an advanced art. In the intermediate range there is now rapid development.

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The simplest and most interesting development in this field is the device by which the line of sight is itself shifted, by means of a small gyroscope mounted directly on the sighting bar, in such manner as to give the approximately correct lead. There is an interesting British development along these lines, and several in this country. The precision is good enough for relatively close-in machine gun fire, or the control of aircraft turrets. Range can be inserted roughly, and, for aircraft work the correction for trail, or the effect of the plane's own speed through the air. These devices are ready for production, and will be useful. They are an improvement for use in the borderland of the point-blank field.

More complete correction is, however, necessary in intermediate ranges. For use on land, against low-flying aircraft, the British have an excellent device, containing a much simplified predictor. With a special use of tracers it is effective. Known as the Kerison director it provides a device for this purpose which can be produced readily in quantity.

When used on shipboard a more elaborate device is needed. Angular changes need to be referred to a gyroscope instead of to the ship, and the servo mechanisms which move the gun need to be rapid and precise enough to overcome the ship's roll. For intermediate ranges the device can be simpler than the elaborate mechanisms used against high-altitude targets. There are excellent developments of such devices, and what is needed is their production in quantity. They are highly necessary for ship protection against low-flying aircraft.

The placing of adequate controls of this sort on aircraft is of great importance. A plane which can fire accurately at 2000 yards may never be forced to conduct close-in firing. The problem is difficult but can be solved, and a complete solution might be highly significant in connection with control of the air. Both the Army and Navy are engaged in developments along these lines. There are involved gyroscopically stabilized sights, adequate but simple correction computers, and servo-controlled turrets. The Committee is aiding in this work by bringing scientific talent to bear on analysis of the problem and in other ways. This type of device is of such importance that it should be expedited in every way.

Ultimately it is to be expected that, in connection with all devices of this sort, visual sighting will be replaced to some extent by automatic radio sighting. There is close contact between the scientific groups working in the two fields.

Mechanical predictors, especially of the complex type needed for long-range work, are expensive and hard to produce in adequate quantity. The Committee has hence instituted a development of electrical predictors. It appears possible to secure adequate precision in this way, at decreased cost and decreased burden on manufacturing facilities. The development is in a relatively early stage.

Rocket fire against aircraft has been greatly developed in England. The Committee is cooperating with the Navy in rocket development for this purpose. The advantage is, of course, that a rocket device is much easier to build than a gun and its ammunition, for the same calibre. The disadvantage is lack of precision and range. This development will be again mentioned below.

c. Proximity Fuses.

A proximity fuse is a device incorporated in a shell or the like which will detonate it when it is in the proximity of the target.

This would be a very significant device, if it could be successfully developed, to improve the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire. A high explosive shell, in order to wreck an aircraft, must go off within a short distance of the plane. However, with ordinary fusing, the indeterminateness of the fuse is such that the explosion may occur anywhere along a thousand feet of the shell path, so that, even if all other factors are favorable, the chances of a hit are low. If it could be arranged so that the explosion would occur at just the right point, high-altitude anti-aircraft fire might be ten times as effective, perhaps more. Where, under the best conditions today, about 2500 shells are used per hit, this might be very much reduced, and anti-aircraft fire might furnish such protection that it would not pay to fly bombers over protected areas adequately protected by anti-aircraft batteries capable of effective fire to the maximum altitude at which planes fly.

With other improvements in anti-aircraft artillery and controls that are coming into use or in sight, this subject of proximity fuses takes on great importance. Hence, even although it appeared exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to attain the desired result, the Committee early instituted a considerable program aimed at this objective. Success is now in sight.

The difficulty resides, of course, in constructing sensitive instruments which can stand the enormous stresses imposed by gunfire. When it is realized that a piece of equipment, weighing an ounce, will be subjected to a force of over 1000 pounds during the acceleration of the shell in the gun, the magnitude of the difficulty becomes apparent.

In spite of the difficulties in the way the program was launched with the thought that, even although success with shell was not attained, the devices might be used in bombs and rockets where conditions are less severe. In fact a device has been produced which operates successfully when tested in bombs, and it is being applied to rockets. The use of the bomb against formations of aircraft has diminished in importance as tactics have altered. The rocket still seems to have real importance.

There are several ways in which a device may be caused to become actuated when in proper proximity to a plane. Methods depending upon the noise of the plane, or its electrostatic charge, have been examined and abandoned. There remain the photoelectric and radio types, both of which have been very considerably developed.

(The photoelectric type "watches" the sky, by means of a plastic lens and photocell, and gives its impulse when the plane cuts off part of the sky light. It is hence limited to daylight use, and only at proper angles to the sun. However it is relatively simple and has been developed first. It is this type which has been successful in bombs.

The radio type is of two sorts. In one the shell carries an actual radio transmitter, and the reactions of this when near a plane provide the impulse. In the other the shell carries a radio receiver, and it is set off at the correct instant by a radio pulse from the ground. Both types are of interest, and each has its own advantages, so they are being developed together.

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The first task was to develop radio tubes and batteries which would stand the shock of shellfire. After much effort this has been successfully accomplished.

Next it was necessary to incorporate these into a rugged radio set small enough to go inside a shell. The present units are about half the volume of an ordinary 12 oz. bottle, containing tubes, batteries, and the rest of the equipment of a radio set.

To determine whether the unit was sufficiently rugged one of them, arranged as a transmitter, was fired in a 5 in. shell. During its flight the signals it sent out were successfully received on the ground.

This proved that the most difficult part of the problem had been solved. The arrangement of the equipment to detonate the shell at the right distance from the plane has also been tested under static conditions. Hence, while severe problems undoubtedly will still be encountered, a successful outcome is now probable. For this reason the work is being expedited by increasing the scientific group at work on it, and in other ways. It is hoped to have units for actual test in two months.

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d. Anti-Submarine Devices.

One aspect of hunting submarines, by means of radio devices on ships or planes, to detect them when on the surface, has been mentioned above.

The principal method of detection has, however, been the use of supersonic echo devices. These were developed in the years before the war, both in this country and in England. When interchange occurred the two developments were found to be very close together. The supersonic device is excellent when it works. Unfortunately, under certain conditions of the water, it works with extreme difficulty or not at all. This occurs when the water is much disturbed by propellers, or especially by depth charges; but it also occurs when the temperature gradients in the water are severe.

The Committee early instituted oceanographic work on the subject of temperature gradients in this connection. It is desirable to know the conditions in various ocean regions at various times of the year, in order to be able to predict in advance the likelihood

of successful operation of supersonic devices in the region. An instrument has been developed which will take the necessary readings without stopping the ship, and these are being installed on many ships to collect the desired data in the course of their regular activities. This instrument will also enable the commander of a ship, equipped with a supersonic device, to determine whether the absence of a signal means that there is no submarine in the vicinity, or whether it may mean simply that conditions are unfavorable for detection.

About two months ago the Navy requested the Committee to greatly enlarge its anti-submarine investigations. Accordingly, scientific groups are starting work in connection with two new Navy stations for anti-submarine investigations, at New London and San Diego. It is of course too soon to expect results from this new effort, where many new lines of research are being started.

However one result has recently appeared from work started by the Committee at Woods Hole in connection with the oceanographic study. It has been found that, in deep water, it is sometimes possible to detect

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the presence of a submarine by simply exploding a small charge under water and listening with a suitable microphone. There is much indication that this will work even when conditions are unfavorable for supersonic searching. The position of the submarine can be determined by using two charges. Tests so far has been made with the listening ship stationary, but this may not be necessary after further development. It is too soon to know whether this device is capable of filling in the blanks left by supersonic searching. If it will, it is of such nature that it could be built relatively rapidly. The study is being pursued vigorously.

The submarine depends entirely upon concealment under water. However, sound will penetrate water, and there are many kinds of sound and devices for dealing with them. There are also possible optical methods. Moreover, the submarine comes up to breathe, and it can then be detected on the surface by radio means which can sweep large areas in a night. When once found, if it can be followed with assurance, and its position

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accurately determined, it is relatively easy to destroy. By a sufficient development of devices of various sorts the submarine can undoubtedly be overcome, provided there is sufficient time in which to develop and get into operation devices to supplement in one way and another the excellent devices already in use.

e. Explosives and Gases.

A valuable military explosive must meet many requirements. It must be capable of production in large quantity, it must be reasonably safe to handle, and it must not deteriorate too rapidly. There are explosives known which are more powerful than those in present extensive use, but they are deficient in other respects.

It is not possible in a brief non-technical summary, to treat adequately the research being carried on in this field. The Committee has many chemists at work on various phases. Apparently there were very few chemists indeed in this country having a knowledge of military explosives, which is quite a different subject

than commercial explosives. Hence it has been necessary for organic chemists to learn a somewhat new art. The work concerns the stabilization of materials otherwise apparently satisfactory, and the investigation of new methods for producing the materials out of which explosives are built.

There has been developed a theory of explosives which appears to offer a means for determining in advance the properties of suggested substances. Also there has been organized, in cooperation with the Bureau of Mines, a station where explosives can be adequately tested. The means of production of explosives of promise has been examined into.

Propellants have also been studied. This is of importance, for one reason, in connection with rockets. At present there is no good American source of some of the best propellants for this purpose, and these may be of value in connection with assisted take-off of aircraft, as well as for rockets used against low-flying aircraft.

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Fortunately in this war, thus far, gases have not been used on a large scale. However it would be very unwise to assume that they will not be.

The work of the Committee along these lines is concerned with possible new gases, and new methods of using old gases, as well as with methods of protection. New absorbents, methods of rendering absorbents ineffective, and methods of preventing this from occurring are being intensively studied, in close collaboration with the Chemical Warfare Service. It would be a very serious matter if there were gas attack methods against which the gas masks in use would be ineffective. Much attention is being devoted to this angle of the subject.

The chemists associated with the Committee have carried on many researches outside of the fields of explosives and gases. One of these has to do with oxygen supply for aircraft personnel and submarine crews. In particular, in collaboration with medical men and physiologists, there has been developed an oxygen mask for use at high altitudes which appears to be a distinct advance over masks previously available. It is so arranged as to avoid difficulty from the freezing of exhaled moisture.

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f. Uranium

Early in the war the question arose whether it might be possible to obtain large sources of power from atomic fission, or even to create an explosive of tremendous power in this manner. The subject is highly abstruse, but one thing is certain: if such an explosive were made it would be thousands of times more powerful than existing explosives, and its use might be determining.

When the Committee was formed there was already in existence, in collaboration with the Navy Department, a special committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Briggs of the Bureau of Standards dealing with this subject. The Committee has continued this work under Dr. Briggs' direction.

For some time it appeared that the possibility of a successful outcome was very remote. The Committee was faced, on the one hand, with the responsibility of expending public money on what might eventually appear to have been a wild search. On the other hand, it was known that much work on this subject had been done on the continent of Europe, and it was felt to be highly

The list of contracts appended* shows a wide range of effort. Many more programs, while not as extensive as those treated above, might be similarly summarized. The full details are in the hands of the armed services. The Committee will be glad to report to the Commander-in-Chief upon any of these matters, and to the extent that further information is desired.



Vannevar Bush.

* List of contracts, p.56.

FORM OF ORGANIZATION

Committee Members

Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the Committee, President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington.

Richard C. Tolman, Vice Chairman of the Committee and Chairman of Division A (armor and ordnance), Carnegie Institute of Technology

James B. Conant, Chairman of Division B (bombs, fuels and gases), President of Harvard University

Frank B. Jewett, Chairman of Division C (communication and transportation), President of National Academy of Sciences.

Karl T. Compton, Chairman of Division D (detection, controls and instruments), President of Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Conway P. Coe, Chairman of Division E (patents and inventions), Commissioner of Patents

Brigadier General Richard C. Moore, Deputy Chief of Staff

Rear Admiral Harold G. Bowen, Director of the Naval Research Laboratory

Chairman of the Committee on Uranium (Lyman J. Briggs, Director of National Bureau of Standards)

Secretary of the Committee (Irvin Stewart, Director of Committee on Scientific Aids to Learning)

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C. P. Haskins, Asst. Lia. Of.

Committee on Uranium

L. J. Briggs, Chairman

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Gregory Breit
Ross Gunn
G. B. Pegram
M. A. Tuve
H. C. Urey

Consultant:

P. H. Abelson

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C. Norcross, Sr. Administrative Officer
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E. B. Bradford, Tech. Aide
C. C. Lauritsen, Vice Chairman

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E. N. Gelotte
R. J. Hansen
H. P. Robertson
A. C. Ruge
R. J. Slutz
J. B. Wilbur

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Investigations on
Propulsion

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C. H. Greenall
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Consultants:

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L. A. Delsasso
H. P. Robertson

Section T
Investigations at
DTM of C.I.W.

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Consultants:

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J. A. Bearden
R. A. Becker
L. V. Berkner
R. B. Brode
R. H. Crane
J. A. Fleming
W. A. Fowler
G. K. Green
L. R. Hafstad
J. E. Henderson
R. E. Holzer
J. C. Hubbard
S. Karrer
K. H. Kingdon
E. J. Lawton
D. H. Loughridge
L. K. Marshall
R. C. Meyer
R. D. Mindlin
D. P. Mitchell
J. C. Morris
S. H. Neddermeyer
L. A. Obert
H. C. Pollock
H. H. Porter
R. B. Roberts
W. V. B. Roberts
V. L. Ronci
W. J. Rooney
C. H. Shaw
P. L. Spencer
J. F. Streib, Jr.

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Section T
(continued)

Consultants: (cont.)

H. Tanis, Jr.
V. K. Ulrich
K. L. Warthman
P. T. Weeks
Ross Wood
E. J. Workman

Section E
Investigations at
Bureau of Standards

A. Ellett, Chm.
H. L. Dryden, Vice Chm.

Consultants:

H. Diamond
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Wm. Fondiller
W. S. Hinman, Jr.
T. Lauritsen
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H. F. Olson
W. J. Shackelton
G. W. Stewart
L. S. Taylor
R. M. Zabel

Section X
Miscellaneous
Investigations

Consultants:

P. H. Abelson
S. K. Allison
J. W. Beams
R. D. Bennett
P. W. Bridgman
D. S. Clark
A. J. Dempster
R. E. Gibson
R. W. Goranson
W. P. Jesse
F. J. Malina
C. B. Millikan
J. W. Parsons
J. T. Tate
T. vonKarman
E. C. Watson
R. W. Wood

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W. K. Lewis, Vice Chairman

Consultants:
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F. G. Keyes
G. N. Lewis

Synthetic Problems

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W. R. Kirner, Tech. Aide
C. S. Marvel, Tech. Aide

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J. C. Holtz
Fred Olsen
W. H. Rodebush

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J. G. Kirkwood
D. P. MacDougall
J. K. Senior
J. vonNeumann
E. B. Wilson, Jr.

Bureau of Mines Com:

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L. P. Hammett, Vice Chm.

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Roger Adams
R. C. Elderfield
W. H. Rodebush

Section A-2
Synthetic Organics

Roger Adams, Chm.

Member:

P. D. Bartlett

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Section A-3
Detection of
Persistent Agents

W. C. Johnson, Chm.

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Henry Bent
W. G. Brown
W. C. Fernelius
H. S. Gasser
I. M. Kolthoff
H. H. Willard
J. H. Yoe
D. M. Yost

Consultants:

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C. R. Hauser
A. R. Olpin
W. H. Taliaferro

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Vesicant Action

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E. M. K. Geiling
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E. K. Marshall, Jr.
A. R. Moritz
A. N. Richards
W. H. Taliaferro

Physical Chemical
Problems

W. K. Lewis, Div. Vice Chairman
T. K. Sherwood, Cons. on Chem. Engin.

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V. LaMer
I. Langmuir
R. Stevenson

Consultant:

W. G. Brown

Section L-2
Protective Coatings

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V. H. Turkington
A. J. Weith

Section L-3
Special Inorganic
Problems

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A. M. Buswell
F. Daniels
W. F. Clauque
T. R. Hogness
W. M. Latimer
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Nitrocellulose

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Paint Removers

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Member:

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Section L-6
Higher Oxides

W. K. Lewis, Chm.

Section L-7
Oxygen Storage

Consultant:

C. R. Hoover

Section L-8
Gas Drying

O. A. Hougen, Chm.

Section L-9
Metallurgical Problems

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R. F. Mehl
B. Stoughton
R. S. Williams

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DIVISION C
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C. B. Jolliffe, Vice Chm.
Hartley Rowe, Vice Chm.
R. D. Booth, Vice Chm.
J. T. Tate, Vice Chm.

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A. F. Murray, Tech. Aide

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R. K. Potter
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P. J. Den Hartog
H. E. Edgerton

Section C-3
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Members: (cont.)

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Section C-4
Submarine Studies

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Section C-4a
Oceanographic Studies

C. Iselin, Chairman

Section C-4b
Magnetic Studies

Section C-4c
Supersonic Studies

Section C-5
Sound Sources

Section C-5a
Sound Sources

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Hallowell Davis
V. O. Knudsen

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DETECTION, CONTROLS, INSTRUMENTS

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J. G. Trump, Tech. Aide
A. L. Loomis, Vice Chairman

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Detection

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G. Metcalf
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W. P. Allis
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L. W. Alvarez
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L. A. Turner
J. H. Van Vleck
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M. G. White
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C. A. Woodward, Jr.

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E. J. Poitras, Tech. Aide
T. C. Fry, Vice Chm.

Member:

S. H. Caldwell

Consultant:

Arthur Hardy

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J. S. Coleman, Tech. Aide
J. P. Molnar, Tech. Aide
Paul Klopsteg, Vice Chm.

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L. O. Grondahl
T. H. Johnson

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Brian O'Brien

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W. H. Radford

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H. H. Beverage
E. U. Condon
Donald Cooksey
C. S. Draper
E. W. Engstrom
W. C. Evans
W. W. Hansen
Harold Hazen
M. J. Kelly
P. M. Morse
Norbert Wiener

DIVISION E
PATENTS AND INVENTIONS

C. P. Coe, Chairman

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May 19, 1941

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Lt. Col. H. W. Dix

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Capt. W. G. Brown

Project Liaison

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Major W. G. Smith
Major C. M. Cummings
Major H. H. Couch
Major G. W. Goddard
Major P. H. Kemmer
Capt. F. C. Wolfe
Capt. C. K. Moore

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Lt. B. R. Bierer

Project Liaison

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COAST ARTILLERY CORPSNDRC Liaison

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Lt. Col. E. W. Van Deusen

Project Liaison

Capt. Jean Engles
Lt. H. W. Holtzkemper

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SIGNAL CORPSNDRC Liaison

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Lt. Col. T. C. Rives
Major David E. Washburn

Project Liaison

Lt. Col. John H. Gardner
Lt. Col. R. B. Colton

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as of May 1, 1941

NAVY DEPARTMENT LIAISON OFFICERS

Navy Department Liaison Officer

Comm. R. P. Briscoe

<u>Bureau of Ships</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Room</u>	<u>Ext.</u>
Research and Development	Capt. Lybrand Smith	3350	772
Communications and			
Direction Finders-Radio	Lt. Comdr. L.B. Blaylock	4309	520
Microwave	(Lt. Comdr. S.M. Tucker)	4314	2491
	(Lt. H. C. Owens)	4307	244
	(Lt. Comdr. F.D. Kime)	4316	2491
Paints and Plastics	Lt. Comdr. H.A. Ingram	3349	753 or 772
Ship Models-Model Testing	Capt. Lewis B. McBride, Carderock Model Basin		Oliver 8436
Magnetic Detection and			
Mine Sweeping	Lt. Comdr. E.C. Craig	4203	72 or 692
Underwater Sound and			
ASV Devices	Lt. Comdr. M.K. Kirk-Patrick	4303	770

Bureau of Ordnance

Research and development	Capt. G.L. Schuyler	3144	286
(Director)	(Comdr. G.C. Hoover)	3146	735
Rocket applications and	(Comdr. S.R. Shumaker)		
ballistics	Comdr. M.F. Schoeffel	2615	215
Aviation Ordnance	(Lt. (jg) F.R. Drake)	3145	2127
Explosives	(Lt. Comdr. J.A. Snacken- berg (ordered))		
Fire Control	Lt. Comdr. M.E. Murphy	3146	2128
Fire Control, Microwave			
Applications	Lt. Horacio Rivero	3123	13
Guns, Mounts and Turrets	Lt. Comdr. H.B. Brumbaugh	3145	2118
Subsurface warfare	Comdr. J.L. King	Ord. Temp. Bldg. 19	

Bureau of Aeronautics

Research and Development	Comdr. L.C. Stevens	2835-A	533
(General)	Lt. Comdr. G.B.H. Hall	4933	448
Microwave and Communica-	Lt. J.A. Moreno	4933	448
tions	Lt. Comdr. M.P. Hanson	4933	448
Materials	Comdr. D.S. Fahrney	2829	2268
	Lt. Comdr. J.E. Sullivan	2834	2574

- 2 -

Office of Naval Operations

Microwave and Communications	Lt.Comdr.F.R.Furth	2630	838
Codes and Signals	Lt.Comdr.G.B.Myers	2628	117
Special Liaison (Frequency Allocation)	Comdr.J.R.Redman	4813	555

Naval Research Laboratory

Navy Dept.Liaison Officer	Comdr. R.P.Briscoe	Lincoln	8076
Microwave	Lt.Comdr.D.R.Hull	"	"
Communications	Lt.Comdr.W.B.Goulett	"	"
Chemistry, Metallurgy, and Mechanics	Lt.Comdr.R.W.Dole	"	"

a13902

NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH COMMITTEE

1530 P Street NW.

Washington, D. C.

June 14, 1941

TO: All Committee Members, Division Vice Chairmen,
Section Chairmen, and Technical Aides

SUBJECT: Supplemental List of Navy Department Liaison
Officers

This memorandum is supplemental to the list
of Navy Department Liaison Officers (as of May 1, 1941)
sent to you with Office Memorandum No. 34.

Div. of Fleet Training and
the Interior Control Board

	<u>Name</u>	<u>Room</u>	<u>Ext.</u>
Surface Gunnery	Lt. Comdr. C.H. Lyman	2807	328
Antiaircraft Gunnery	Lt. Comdr. P.E. McDowell	2811	457
Fire Control	Lt. Comdr. M.E. Miles	2810	393
	Lt. Comdr. A.B. Leggett	2810	393
	Lt. Comdr. C. H. Lyman	2807	328
Optical Rangefinding	Lt. Comdr. P.E. McDowell	2811	457
Aircraft Ordnance	Lt. Comdr. E.C. Ewen	2811	457
Sound	Lieut. J.R. Waterman	2817	365
Interior Control	Lt. Comdr. M.E. Miles	2810	393
	Lt. Comdr. A.B. Leggett	2810	393
Mines and Minesweeping	Lt. Comdr. R.S. Moore	2805	490

The name of Lt. R.L. Densford will replace
that of Lt. Comdr. G.B. Myers in the Office of Naval
Operations, Codes and Signals.

IRVIN STEWART, Secretary

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PROVISION FOR INTERCHANGE WITH BRITISH SCIENTISTS

The full exchange of scientific information with the British has contributed greatly to the effectiveness of NDRC's work. By this means, American scientists have been enabled to attack defense problems with a background of battle experience and the knowledge of present day tactical requirements. Moreover, they have been handed the accumulated results of the research and development done by the numerous teams of British experts working on battle-tested devices. In return, our scientists have been able to give all possible aid from their present knowledge, and much needed help on urgent problems. Even more important is the opportunity to divide the burden, leaving American research men largely free for the vital task of perfecting those instruments of technological warfare on which next year's battles may depend.

This exchange of scientific information with the British, Canadian, and Australian Governments has been handled by the Liaison Office of NDRC, and by its London Mission. The latter consists of a small permanent staff at the American Embassy in London, which maintains close relations with the British Minist'ries and their research establishments, as well as with the American Military and Naval attaches in London. Relays of experts from various divisions of NDRC have been sent to England for direct consultation with British scientists. There is also continuous interchange by report and cable. In Washington, very close liaison relations exist with the Central Scientific Office of the British Supply Council. Also exchange of information with the Canadian and Australian Governments is handled largely through this same office. There are many exchange visits by

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Page two

Canadian and NDRC scientists. By these several means, research workers in this Country are kept fully informed concerning work in these British Countries and pertinent results obtained here are quickly communicated to the British.

In charge of the Liaison Office in Washington is Mr. Carroll L. Wilson, with Dr. C. P. Haskins and Dr. F. S. Cooper as Assistant Liaison Officers. At the request of the President, Dr. James E. Conant headed the first NDRC Mission to England in February. The most cordial cooperative relationships were established with members of the British Government and with British scientists, and these have been very competently maintained and furthered by Mr. Frederick L. Hovde, who is in charge of the London Mission.

Since February of this year, fifteen experts from NDRC have visited England in small groups for periods of about a month, establishing contacts with British research workers in their specialized fields. These experts have consulted frequently with the Military and Naval attaches, and each group has been able to be helpful to the other. Experts sent thus far have covered such subjects as explosives, war gases, chemical defense, radio detection, fire control, proximity fuses, and anti-submarine developments.

The British Central Scientific Office in Washington, of which Dr. Charles Darwin is Director, succeeds Sir Henry Tizard's British Technical Mission. Both personally, and through his technical staff, Dr. Darwin is in touch with NDRC work and can bring to this work the benefit of the British experience. The Liaison Office also has close relationships with the National Research Council of Canada, and with the Scientific Attache at the Australian Legation.

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Page three

One of the greatest handicaps to effective liaison with the British has been the delay both in transportation of personnel and diplomatic mail. Although few sea-borne pouches have been lost, the time for transit between Washington and London has been from four to eight weeks. The recent establishment of adequate air-ferry service should greatly reduce delay.

There is also a growing realization of the mutual benefits to be derived from British-American interchange on the part of American scientists and of the Service people with whom they are associated. This has resulted in an increasing number of personal contacts and of visits by NDRC personnel to British laboratories. Coupled with eased conditions of transport and communication, this attitude should lead to an even more effective exchange of technical and scientific information in the future.

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June 28, 1941

<u>Contractor</u>	<u>Academic</u>	<u>Number of Contracts</u>
Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute		1
Brown University		1
California Institute of Technology		8
University of California		10
Carnegie Institute of Technology		3
Carnegie Institution of Washington		8
University of Chicago		9
College of the City of New York		1
Columbia University		5
Cornell University		1
Cornell University Medical College		1
University of Delaware		1
Drexel Institute of Technology		1
Franklin Institute of the State of Pennsylvania		2
Harvard University		13
University of Illinois		6
Iowa State College		4
Johns Hopkins University		3
Massachusetts Institute of Technology		20
University of Michigan		4
University of Minnesota		3

<u>Contractors</u>	<u>Number of Contracts</u>
University of Missouri	1
National Academy of Sciences	3
University of Nebraska	1
University of New Mexico	1
Northwestern University	3
Ohio State University Research Foundation	3
Pennsylvania State College	5
University of Pennsylvania	3
Princeton University	10
Purdue Research Foundation	1
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institution	1
University of Rochester	2
Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research	1
University of Southern California	1
Stanford University	3
University of Virginia	2
Wesleyan University	1
University of Wisconsin	5
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution	1
Yale University	2

41 Contractors - 155 Contracts

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<u>Contractor</u>	<u>Number of Contracts</u>
<u>Industrial</u>	
Air Reduction Company, Incorporated	1
American Locomotive Company	1
Bakelite Corporation	1
Carson & Carson	1
Central Scientific Company	1
Ethyl Gasoline Corporation	1
General Electric Company	1
General Radio Company	1
Gulf Research and Development Company	3
Hazeltine Service Corporation	5
Monsanto Chemical Company	1
National Cash Register Company	1
Polaroid Corporation	1
Precision Castings Company	1
Raytheon Production Corporation	2
RCA Manufacturing Company	7
Standard Oil Development Company	1
Edward Stern & Company, Incorporated	1
Union Switch & Signal Company	1
United Shoe Machinery Corporation	1
Western Electric Company	17
Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co.	2

22 Contractors - 52 Contracts

a13+03

Academic	41 Contractors	155 Contracts
Industrial	22 Contractors	52 Contracts
Total	<u>63</u>	<u>207</u>

In addition to the signed contracts listed above, the Committee has authorized contracts covering approximately 100 additional items contracts covering which are now being negotiated.

These contracts cover the development of a variety of new equipment and reports upon a wide range of subjects related to mechanisms and devices of warfare. Among the more important subjects covered by the contracts are the following:

- Microwave equipment
- Anti-submarine devices
- Fire control equipment
- Uranium
- Rockets
- Terminal ballistics
- Fuses
- Explosives
- War gases
- Defense against war gases
- Oxygen storage and measurement
- Fuels
- Communication devices
- Improvements in tanks
- Bridge designs
- High intensity sounds
- Recognition devices
- Infra-red equipment
- Night vision devices

STATUS OF CONTRACT FUNDS

June 30, 1941

Allocated to National Defense Research Committee

\$6,300,000.00

Appropriated through June 12, 1941 meeting:

Chairman's Office

Uranium \$187,000.00

Cryptography 50,950.00

National Academy of Sciences 20,000.00

London Mission 40,000.00

Contract Travel 30,000.00

Division A 880,439.00

Division B 1,104,935.00

Division C 775,582.00

Division D 3,471,910.00

Gross Total Appropriated \$6,570,816.00

Less: Amounts restored through cancellation
of authorizations or through writing
contracts for less than authorized
amounts

273,169.00

Net Total Appropriated

6,290,647.00

BALANCE

\$ 12,353.00

a13u 01

ORDER ESTABLISHING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH COMMITTEE

Pursuant to authority vested in it by section 2 of the Act of August 29, 1916 (39 Stat. 649), the Council of National Defense, with the approval of the President, hereby establishes as a subordinate body of the Council a committee to be known as the National Defense Research Committee. The following persons shall be members of the Committee. Dr. Vannevar Bush, who shall be Chairman, Dr. James B. Conant, Dr. Richard C. Tolman, Dr. Karl T. Compton, Dr. Frank B. Jewett (as President of the National Academy of Sciences), Conway P. Coe (as Commissioner of Patents), one officer of the Army to be designated by the Secretary of War and one officer of the Navy to be designated by the Secretary of the Navy. Vacancies occurring in the membership of the Committee shall be filled by appointment by the Council with the approval of the President. The members of the Committee and of such subcommittees as may be formed by the Committee shall serve as such without compensation but shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation subsistence, and other expenses incidental to the performance of their duties.

The Committee shall correlate and support scientific research on the mechanisms and devices of warfare, except those relating to problems of flight included in the field of activities of National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. It shall aid and supplement the experimental and research activities of the War and Navy Departments; and may conduct research for the creation and improvement of instrumentalities, methods, and materials of warfare. In carrying out its functions, the Committee may (a) utilize, to the extent that such facilities are available for such purpose the laboratories, equipment and services of the National Bureau of Standards and other Government institutions; and (b) within the limits of appropriations allocated to it, transfer funds to such institutions, and enter into contracts and agreements with individuals

- 2 -

educational or scientific institutions (including the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council) and industrial organizations for studies, experimental investigations, and reports.

The Committee shall promulgate rules and regulations for the conduct of its work, which rules and regulations shall be subject to the approval of the Council and the President.

Louis Johnson
Acting Secretary of War

Lewis Compton
Acting Secretary of Navy

Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of Interior

H. A. Wallace
Secretary of Agriculture

Harry L. Hopkins
Secretary of Commerce

Frances V. Perkins
Secretary of Labor

Approved:

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House

June 27, 1940

a13v02

PS F Bush folder
file
Confidential

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. VANNEVAR BUSH:

I am greatly interested in your report of March ninth and I am returning it herewith for your confidential file. I think the whole thing should be pushed not only in regard to development, but also with due regard to time. This is very much of the essence. I have no objection to turning over future progress to the War Department on condition that you yourself are certain that the War Department has made all adequate provision for absolute secrecy.

F.D.R.

SAFE FILE: Canada

PSF 2 Safe: Canada

CK

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Ottawa

Dated June 15, 1940

Rec'd 3:14 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

133, June 15, 7 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

NO DISTRIBUTION.

The Prime Minister has just shown me a "most secret and personal message" from Churchill. Although it was not intended to be more or less verbal and although much of it may already be known to the President, Mr Mackenzie King feels he should pass on its substance.

Yesterday at Tours Reynaud had informed Churchill that the French armies were at the last gasp and even Weygand said he felt it would soon be necessary to plea for an armistice. Reynaud had finally said that he could not carry his Government with him in continuing the struggle unless the President's reply to his appeals contained a firm assurance of immediate aid short of men.

(END OF SECTION ONE)

MOFFATT

EMB

214201

OK

A portion of this telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C & A)

Ottawa

Dated June 14, 1940

Rec'd 3:07 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

RUSH

134, June 14, 7 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The French ministers had instructed Reynaud to inquire whether, if the worst should happen, Britain would admit that France had done all she could and might enter into a separate peace. Churchill replied that Britain could not consent to the French making a separate peace.

Meanwhile the message from the President (which Churchill quoted verbatim to Mackenzie King) reached Reynaud. Churchill read this as an invitation to France to continue and stated that while the President is of course unable to declare war, to remind congress the message went "to the very edge of such a step and seemed to give the assurance which Reynaud required.

Accordingly the British pledge to France was given. Churchill now appealed to Canada to give a similar pledge "(?)" now that Roosevelt has committed himself as we think he has in his reply to Reynaud.

(GRAY) Mackenzie

a14 a02

hsm -2- No. 134, June 14, from Ottawa (Section 2)

(GRAY) Mackenzie King told me that he had just given this pledge to Parliament. He added a sentence which he felt was a paraphrase of the Charlottesville speech and yet which he felt did not speak for the United States. This sentence read: "If I know the heart of the American people as I believe I do, and as I am certain I know the heart of the Canadian people, I believe I can say to President Reynaud, in this hour of agony that the resources of the whole North American continent will be thrown into the struggle for liberty at the side of the European democracies ere this continent will see democracy itself trodden under the iron heel of the Nazis." (END GRAY)

The Prime Minister asked me to inform you that Canada is sparing no effort, that Canadian troops are now fighting in France, and that all available planes, equipment and ammunition have been sent abroad. He viewed the situation as so grave that every hour counted and wanted all information which he might have to be available to you without delay.

MOFFAT

EMB

014a03

PSF 2
Safe

Canada folder
1-44

file
personal

February 28, 1944.

Dear Mackenzie:-

Yours of the twenty-third has been forwarded to me up here at Hyde Park where I am going to be until next Wednesday.

I do hope that Mr. Massey will still be in Washington when I get there, for I should love to see him before he returns to London.

I came up here the day before the teapot boiled over in the Senate and had no intimation that it would explode. However, I am sure that poor old Barkley would not have done it had he not been extraordinarily tired -- and on top of that Mrs. Barkley has been very ill. I do not worry in the least. It is not much more than a "nine days' wonder".

I am having some real sleep up here and practically all my work consists in keeping closely in touch with the news from the fronts.

Take care of yourself and do let me know the next time you come South.

Affectionately,

Honorable William Lyon Mackenzie King,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa,
Canada.

a14 b01

Personal



Ottawa,
February 23, 1944

My dear Franklin:

It has occurred to me that you might like to know that the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, who is High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, will be spending a few days in Washington, arriving, I understand, towards the end of the present week.

Mr. Massey, as you will recall, was Canada's first Minister to the United States. He has been in London as High Commissioner since 1935, and has been at the heart of the official world throughout the period of the war.

Mr. Massey will be returning to London in another week or two. He would, I know, deeply value an opportunity to have just a word with you, if you have a moment to spare. If you have that moment, I am sure you will find a brief talk with Mr. Massey both interesting and helpful.

I see you are having, if anything, a busier time than ever. I shall spare you, therefore, more than this word, except to say that, as always, you are very much in my thoughts and have my best and warmest of wishes.

214 602

I hope you are not getting too tired. Among the foremost of my present aims is to get to bed o'nights as early as I can, as often as I can. It is a little difficult, however, when Parliament does not adjourn its evening sittings until eleven p.m.

*Yours affectionately,
Winston Churchill*

Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

a14 b03

SAFE FILE: Chiang Kai Shek

PSF Safe
Chiang Kai-shek

December 14, 1941

My dear Halifax:

Here is a ~~draft~~ message to General Chiang Kai-Shek and ~~attached~~ a similar message from me to Mr. Stalin. They are self-explanatory.

I hope you will ask London if they will go ahead with the holding of the Singapore conference and also instruct your people in Chungking and Moscow to take part in the proposed meetings as soon as they are held by Chiang Kai-Shek and Stalin. I assume, of course, that Australia and New Zealand will be represented in Singapore.

Always sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Right Honorable the Viscount Halifax, K. G.,
The British Ambassador,
Washington, D. C.

fdr/tmb

Copy sent to Secy. State

a15a01

✓ state Dept. copies

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 751-753

a 15 b 01

Dec. 14, 1941.

DRAFT

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO

In my judgment it is of the highest importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for our common action against our common enemy. To this end I respectfully suggest that you call a joint military conference to take place in Chungking not later than December seventeenth to exchange information and to consider the military and naval action particularly in Eastern Asia which may most effectively be employed to accomplish the defeat of Japan and her allies.

I suggest that the conferees consist of representatives of China, Great Britain, the Dutch, United States and the U.S.S.R., and I am prepared to designate at once Major General George H. Brett as representative of the United States assisted by Brigadier General John Magruder.

It is my thought that this conference arrive at a concrete preliminary plan and that this plan be communicated in the greatest confidence to me by Saturday, December twentieth.

It should also be communicated by the Russian, British and Dutch representatives in the utmost secrecy to their respective Governments.

While your preliminary conference is meeting in Chungking, I am asking the British to hold a military and naval conference in Singapore to include Chinese, American and Dutch officers and report operational plans as they see the situation in the Southern zone.

I am also asking Mr. Stalin to talk with Chinese, American and

a15602

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE GENERALISSIMO (cont)

British representatives in Moscow and let me have his views from the Northern viewpoint.

These estimates and recommendations will give all of us equally a good picture of our joint problem.

I venture to hope that these preliminary conferences especially that in Chungking may lead to the establishment of a permanent organization to plan and direct our joint efforts.

I am working hard on continuing our contribution to your supplies and am trying to increase it.

I send you my very warm personal regards.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

a15 b03

Dec. 14, 1941.

DRAFT

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. STALIN:

In my judgment it is of the utmost importance that immediate steps be taken to prepare the way for common action not merely for the next few weeks but also for the permanent defeat of Hitlerism. I very much wish that you and I could meet to talk this over personally. But because that is impossible at the moment I am seeking to initiate three preliminary moves which I hope will be preparatory to a more permanent joint planning.

First, I am suggesting to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that he call a conference immediately in Chungking consisting of Chinese, Soviet, British, Dutch and American representatives. This group would meet not later than December seventeenth and report to their respective Governments in the greatest confidence by Saturday, December twentieth. This would give us the preliminary picture of the joint problem from the angle of Chungking.

Second, I am asking the British to assemble a military-naval conference in Singapore, reporting by Saturday the twentieth principally from the operational angle in the Southern zone.

Third, I would be very happy if you personally would talk with American, British and Chinese representatives in Moscow and let me have your suggestions as to the whole picture by Saturday the twentieth.

Fourth, I am during this coming week covering the same ground with British Missions here and will send you the general picture from

a15c01

DRAFT

-2-

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MR. STALIN (cont)

this end.

I have had a good talk with Litvinov and I fully appreciate all of your immediate problems.

Again I want to tell you of the real enthusiasm throughout the United States for the progress your armies are making in the defense of your great nation.

I venture to hope that the preliminary conferences I have outlined for this coming week may lead to the establishment of a more permanent organization to plan our efforts.

Hopkins and I send our warm personal regards.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

a15c02

State Dept. copy
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 762.

015d01

BF
Safe: Chungking
40-2-1

TRANSLATION

Telegram to the President
from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
Chungking, December 24, 1941

Mr. President:

The Chinese Government and people wish to express their whole-hearted support of your proposed conference of American, British, Chinese and other representatives. We venture to offer the opinion that a Supreme Allied War Council should be established forthwith in Washington for the speedy formulation of comprehensive war plans. This will constitute a concrete step on the part of the nations of the democratic front to coordinate and concert their efforts against the aggressor nations of the Axis, and will be a most effective factor in bringing about the early destruction of our common enemy.

For this purpose I have designated Mr. T. V. Soong, newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the Chief Delegate of China to such Conference or Supreme War Council as you contemplate to set up in the immediate future, and request you to be good enough to notify him to participate in your deliberations on all questions relevant to the conduct of the war.

a15d02

State Dept. copy
Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 763-764.

a15e01

PSF Safe: Chiang Kai Shek
December 29, 1941.

To:

His Excellency General Chiang Kai Shek,
Chungking,
China.

In order to insure immediate coordination and cooperation in our common effort against the enemy, there is being established a supreme commander for all British, Dutch and American forces in the Southwest Pacific theater.

The advisability of a similar command of activities of the United Powers in the Chinese theater appears evident. This theater we suggest should initially include such portion of Thailand and Indo-China as may become accessible to troops of the United Powers. In agreement with the representatives of the British and Dutch Governments, I desire to suggest that you should undertake to exercise such command over all forces of the United Powers which are now, or may in the future be operating in the Chinese theater.

It is our thought that, in order to make such command effective, a joint planning staff should at once be organized consisting of representatives of the British, ~~Russian~~, American and Chinese governments. If you consider it practicable, and Russia agrees, a Russian representative might be included. This staff should function under your supreme command.

The commander of the Southwest Pacific theater and the commander of the British forces in India would be directed to maintain the closest liaison with your headquarters. A mutual exchange of liaison officers between the three headquarters would be desirable.

Such arrangements would enable your counsel and influence to be given effect in the formulation of the general strategy for the conduct of the war in all theaters. Your views in this matter will be greatly appreciated by me.

ROOSEVELT.

RECEIVED
UNCLASIFIED

a15e02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

a15e03

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1942 China

pages 1-2.

a15f01

Mr. President Bot.

The attached was
returned by the
Prime Minister
G. B. T.

a15f02

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Sale: Chiang Kai-shek

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES 13545KC

MESSAGE
PRECEDENCE

FROM ALUSNA CHUNGKING

OPNAV

PPPPPPPP

RELEASED BY

FOR ACTION

ROUTINE
DEFERRED

DATE 3 JAN 42

TOR CODEROOM 0350/3RD

INFORMATION

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

DECODED BY MCKOWN

PARAPHRASED BY GLTUCKER

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

021830 CR 0820

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

FROM CHIANG KAISHEK

FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

GENERALISSMOS REPLY FOLLOWS:

YOUR SUGGESTION THAT I SHOULD EXERCISE THE SUPREME COMMAND OVER ALL FORCES OF THE UNITED POWERS WHICH ARE NOW OR MAY IN THE FUTURE BE OPERATING IN THE CHINESE THEATER, INCLUDING INITIALLY SUCH PORTIONS OF INDO CHINA AND THAILAND AS MAY BECOME ACCESSIBLE TO TROOPS OF THE

UNITED POWERS, IS ONE WHICH I HAVE CONSIDERED WITH A FULL SENSE OF ALL THE GRAVE RESPONSIBILITIES IT ENTAILS TOWARD THE OTHER COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES CONCERNED AS WELL AS TOWARD CHINA. IF IT WERE SIMPLY A QUESTION OF MY OWN CAPACITIES AND MILITARY QUALIFICATIONS, I COULD

NOT ACCEPT THIS SUPREME COMMAND WITH ITS ATTENDANT DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES. HOWEVER I DO NOT HESITATE TO ACCEPT IT AT YOUR SUGGESTION IN AGREEMENT WITH THE BRITISH AND DUTCH GOVERNMENTS. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPREME COMMAND WILL UNIFY THE STRATEGY AND PROMOTE THE

FULL COOPERATION OF THE UNITED POWERS IN THE CHINESE THEATER. THE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION OF THESE FORCES IN THE COMMON NEED THAT MUST BE PLACED BEFORE EVERY THING ELSE. YOUR OWN INITIATIVE AND EFFORTS HAVE BROUGHT THIS UNITY OF PURPOSE AND MADE THEM WITHIN REACH OF

ACHIEVEMENT AND I SHALL SPARE MYSELF NOTHING TO SECOND YOUR EFFORT AND SERVE THE COMMON GOOD OF ALL THE NATIONS WHICH ARE NOW LINKING

~~SECRET~~

CONTI PAGE 2.

SEE ART 76(4)

NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM _____	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE _____			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

PAGE 2 OF ALUSNA CHUNGKING 021830 CR 0820.

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE	TIME	GCT
------	------	-----

TEXT

TO THEIR RESOURCES AT HOME, THEIR COMMUNICATIONS AND THEIR FIGHTING FORCES ON EVERY FRONT. THIS GROWING UNITY HAS RALLIED THE ENTIRE CHINESE PEOPLE BEHIND IT. IN LINE WITH YOUR SUGGESTIONS I WELCOME THE PROMPT DISPOSITION OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES TO SERVE ON A JOINT

HEADQUARTERS PLANNING STAFF. THE QUESTION OF RUSSIAN REPRESENTATION CAN BE CONSIDERED AS SOON AS THIS STAFF HAS ASSEMBLED AND BEGUN ITS DUTIES. THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF LIAISON WITH THE COMMANDER OF THE BRITISH FORCES IN INDIA AND THE COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC THEATER

CAN BE CARRIED OUT AS SOON AS THE COMMAND AND HEADQUARTERS STAFF OF THE CHINESE THEATER HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. IN EVERY SUCCESSIVE PHASE OF DEVELOPMENT I WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE YOUR VIEWS AND SUGGESTIONS.

RECEIVED
UNCLASSIFIED

PRESIDENT U.S.ACT.
PERSONAL FILE.
DUMBY.

~~SECRET~~

021830

SEE ART 76(4)
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1942 Vol. I General, British Commonwealth,
The Far East

Page 604.

215901

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

February 25, 1942


My dear Mr. President,

General Chiang Kai-shek has sent me a message from Kunming which he asked me to deliver to you in person, and which I am enclosing herewith. As you have been so generous to me in giving me your time in the past, I forbear to impose myself further on you unless you desire to discuss the message with me.

The Canadian Government is making arrangements for me to make a short visit to Canada, leaving tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m. and returning in about three days. If necessary, however, I would of course postpone my departure.

With high regard, I am,

Yours sincerely,



T. V. Soong

The President
The White House

a15902

'I have convey to Wellington Koo the following instructions:

"I presume you have seen my farewell message to India. Please take this opportunity to tell Churchill that I am personally shocked by the Indian military and political situation which are in such a state that I could never conceive of before I arrived in India. I am afraid Churchill himself does not know the real situation. It may be best to talk to Cripps first and for him to inform Churchill.

"I have tried to view the colonial problem most objectively. I could not but speak frankly of what I thought. But I feel strongly that if the Indian political problem is not immediately and urgently solved, the danger will be daily increasing. If the British Government should wait until Japanese planes begin to bomb India and the Indian morale collapses, it would already be too late. If the solution is postponed until after the Japanese armies enter India, then it will be certainly too late. If the Japanese should know of the real situation and attack India, they would be virtually unopposed.

"If the political situation in India were to change for the better, this may prevent the enemy from having any ambitions to enter India.

"Please convey the above to Cripps. Also point out that, in my opinion, if the British Government should voluntarily give the Indians real power and do not allow different parties in India to cause confusion, the Indians would change their attitude toward England, forget their hard feelings and become loyal to the British Empire. Only such a policy could halt the Indian trend to part from the British Empire and make it obvious that it is unpolitic and disadvantageous to secede from the Empire."

Please convey my views to the President. In a word the danger is extreme. If the British Government does not fundamentally change their policy toward India, it would be like presenting India to the enemy and inviting them to quickly occupy India. When I think of it I am both worried and alarmed. Besides deluding themselves and deluding the people with the belief that there is no immediate danger, there is no realization that war is on and there is no determined spirit to fight. The defeat in Malaya was so rapid, probably for similar reasons, and as for military preparations, the present Indian military preparedness is very much behind even of that the British had in Malaya.

915903

China

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF CHINA


February 25, 1942

Dear General Watson,

I enclose a letter for the
President, which you have kindly promised to
deliver to him.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,



T. V. Soong

General Edwin M. Watson
The White House

915904

China

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. T. V. SOONG

Dear T. V.:—

Thank you ever so much for
the message from the Generalissimo.

I hope you have a good
visit in Canada. Let me know when
you get back.

F. D. R.

al5905

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

April 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS, WHITE HOUSE:

Attached hereto is a suggested draft for a
reply by the President to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Admiral King has not seen this draft, but
General Marshall has tentatively approved it.

Will you please revise as you see fit and
return to me as soon as possible in order that reply may
be dispatched ^{to the President} with least practicable delay.

Dwight D. Eisenhower
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Inc.
Draft of reply.



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

a15401

[REDACTED]

April 24, 1942.

Dr. T. V. Soong,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of China.

Dear Dr. Soong:

Will you please dispatch the following message promptly
to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek?

I have just received your special message handed to me by
Dr. Soong and hasten to present to you our position relative to the
matters set forth therein. First, permit me to say that I am more
than grateful to you for sending General Hsuing Shih-Fei, meeting
whom has afforded me personally very special pleasure. His arrival
at this time is not only most opportune, but he brings qualifications
which will insure his being of particular help to our mutual cause.

As you know, I have been, for a long time, resolutely
determined that you and your army are to have every assistance that
we can send and for that reason alone we are straining every resource
to build up with great rapidity an aerial supply line over ten thousand
miles of difficult flying and directly across the British theatres of
operations in the Middle East and Indian Ocean. [There have been
disappointments to you and to me. They have occurred in spite of
anything we could do.]

a15402

[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
MAR 28 1973

~~SECRET~~

The United States Government is exploiting every possibility to expedite the flow of Lend-Lease materials to your armies. In a recent instance, we have taken artillery from the small amounts in the hands of our own troops in order to make available those badly needed weapons to your forces. [We have commenced the building up of a small but strong air force in India for ultimate employment in the China theater. Because of shipping and communication difficulties still existing and the loss of Rangoon, this force has been concentrated initially in India. Moreover, because of India's strategic importance as the gateway to China, an interim mission has been assigned to this force to operate against enemy naval units threatening India.]

In order to tide over until ground routes are complete from India to China, American pilots are now flying a total of thirty-four transport airplanes fourteen thousand miles for use on the air freight route into China. We are extremely short of air transports at this time, but are making them available at the expense of our own forces, and in spite of acute shortages all along the world-wide battle front. We are planning to provide approximately one hundred such planes when facilities are adequately prepared for their operation. We have withdrawn pursuit airplanes from our own defenses for dispatch to China.

~~SECRET~~

Prior to our entry into the War, a number of Missions were established in Washington by democratic governments all over the world which had entered into Lend-Lease agreements with us. To meet the requisitions presented by these missions, the production capacity of the United States then converted to war purposes was taxed to the limit, and we retained for our own use only meager training allotments. On December 7, we were at War. We were immediately obliged to dispatch munitions to our own forces in active theatres and to begin equipping our own forces to ready them for the enormous battles that must come. This created a sudden and new requirement for essential munitions and compelled us in certain instances to secure equipment manufactured in Great Britain for her own use, even while both of us continued to send materials to other Allied Powers. Out of this situation grew the Anglo-American Joint Staff, since the United States insisted that all supplies should be pooled and allocated in accordance with the general situation. We now had as much interest in British supplies as they had in U. S. production.

I fear that there may exist a rather general misunderstanding concerning the functions and authority of this Anglo-American Joint Staff and its various subsidiary bodies including the Munitions

a15h04

DECLASSIFIED
MAR 28 1973

~~SECRET~~

Assignments Board. The United States and the United Kingdom are the only powers who are in a position to dispatch to the other countries opposing the Axis a portion of their own combat strength as represented in airplanes, munitions, ships, naval units, and other resources. The Staff provides the administrative machinery through which this supporting effort is coordinated and properly balanced between the United States and the United Kingdom according to our respective capacities. The existence of these combined bodies does not preclude deliberations with all other United Nations regarding pertinent strategical situations. Quite the contrary. While other countries such as Canada or Russia are not represented on the Anglo-American Joint Material Staff, we have established a definite method here in Washington for handling questions that involve each Allied country. We have established a Pacific-War Council, on which all nations bordering on the Pacific are represented. Its members have the task of studying political-strategic problems and reaching common agreement concerning them. In more technical matters, representatives of the particular power concerned, whether it is China, Australia, the Dutch East Indies, or New Zealand, meet with the Chiefs of Staff and not only present their special points of view,

~~SECRET~~

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MAR 28 1973

also

[REDACTED]

but participate in formulation of decisions. I have been assured by the United States Chief of Staff that no question concerning your great country and its participation in this War will be acted upon, even on the technical level, without according to your distinguished representative full and complete opportunity for collaboration on a completely equal basis.

On the political level I have felt particularly fortunate in having Dr. T. V. Soong as a member of the Pacific War Council. I have been deeply appreciative of the great assistance he has been to us through his constant readiness to supply information and advice.

I tell you without reservation that our sole aim in this war is the defeat of the enemy, which will insure to both our peoples a rightful peace. We will continue to hold among our primary objectives the interests of your magnificent nation.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

a15h08

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MAR 28 1973

~~SECRET~~

PSF

Safe - Chiang Kai-shek

April 25, 1944

Mr. T. V. Soong,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of China.

Dear Mr. Soong:

Will you please dispatch the following message promptly to
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?

I have just received your special message handed to me by
Mr. Soong and hasten to present to you our position relative to the
matters set forth therein. First, permit me to say that I am more
than grateful to you for sending General Hsuing Shih-Yei, meeting
whom has afforded me personally very special pleasure. His arrival
at this time is not only most opportune, but he brings qualifications
which will insure his being of particular help to our national cause.

As you know, I have been, for a long time, resolutely determined
that you and your army are to have every assistance that we can send
and for that reason alone we are straining every resource to build
up with great rapidity an aerial supply line over ten thousand miles
of difficult flying and directly across the British theatres of
operations in the Middle East and Indian Ocean.

The United States Government is exploiting every possibility
to expedite the flow of Lend-Lease materials to your armies. In a
recent instance, we have taken artillery from the small amount:

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 2 1972

~~SECRET~~

a15:01

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

in the hands of our own troops in order to make available these badly needed weapons to your forces.

In order to tide over until ground routes are complete from India to China, American pilots are now flying a total of thirty-four transport airplanes fourteen thousand miles for use on the air freight route into China. We are extremely short of air transports at this time, but are making them available at the expense of our own forces, and in spite of acute shortages all along the world-wide battle front. We are planning to provide approximately one hundred such planes when facilities are adequately prepared for their operation. We have withdrawn pursuit airplanes from our own defenses for dispatch to China.

Prior to our entry into the war, a number of Missions were established in Washington by democratic governments all over the world which had entered into Lend-Lease agreements with us. To meet the requisitions presented by these missions, the production capacity of the United States then converted to war purposes was taxed to the limit, and we retained for our own use only meager training allotments. On December 7, we were at war. We were immediately obliged to dispatch munitions to our own forces in active theatres and to begin equipping our own forces to ready them for the enormous battles that must come. This created a sudden and new requirement for essential munitions and compelled us in certain instances to secure equipment manufactured in Great

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 2 1972

~~SECRET~~

a15:02

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

Britain for her own use, even while both of us continued to send materials to other Allied Powers. Out of this situation grew the Anglo-American Joint Staff, since the United States insisted that all supplies should be pooled and allocated in accordance with the general situation. We now had as much interest in British supplies as they had in U. S. production.

I fear that there may exist a rather general misunderstanding concerning the functions and authority of this Anglo-American Joint Staff and its various subsidiary bodies including the Munitions Assignments Board. The United States and the United Kingdom are the only powers who are in a position to dispatch to the other countries opposing the Axis a portion of their own combat strength as represented in airplanes, munitions, ships, naval units, and other resources. The Staff provides the administrative machinery through which this supporting effort is coordinated and properly balanced between the United States and the United Kingdom according to our respective capacities. The existence of these combined bodies does not preclude deliberations with all other United Nations regarding pertinent strategical situations. Quite the contrary. While other countries such as Canada or Russia are not represented on the Anglo-American Joint Material Staff, we have established a definite method here in Washington for handling questions that involve each Allied country. We have established a Pacific War Council, on which all nations bordering on the Pacific are represented. Its members have the task of studying political-

015:03

~~SECRET~~

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By I. J. Stewart Date FEB 2 1972

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

strategic problems and reaching common agreement concerning them. In more technical matters, representatives of the particular power concerned, whether it is China, Australia, the Dutch East Indies, or New Zealand, meet with the Chiefs of Staff and not only present their special points of view, but participate in formulation of decisions. I have been assured by the United States Chief of Staff that no question concerning your great country and its participation in this war will be acted upon, even on the technical level, without according to your distinguished representative full and complete opportunity for collaboration on a completely equal basis.

On the political level I have felt particularly fortunate in having Dr. T. V. Soong as a member of the Pacific War Council. I have been deeply appreciative of the great assistance he has been to us through his constant readiness to supply information and advice.

I tell you without reservation that our sole aim in this war is the defeat of the enemy, which will insure to both our peoples a rightful peace. We will continue to hold among our primary objectives the interests of your magnificent nation.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By L. J. Stewart Date FEB 2 1972

a15104

Franklin D. Roosevelt

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date 5-7-42

From: Miss Amerson (Secretary to General Malony)

To: Miss Tully

I am enclosing the drafts about which I
talked to you on the telephone this afternoon.

P. A.

Reminder —
To take up with
Harry Sat. night

a15j01

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

*China
Chairing
Kinsick*

May 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

In view of the changed military situation, I do not think the message should go in its present form. The message from the Generalissimo, however, does seem to require an answer. I have taken a shot at a re-draft of the attached message in case you desire to use it. I have talked to General Eisenhower about it.

Harry J. Malony
HARRY J. MALONY

a15j02

[REDACTED]

DRAFT
5-7-42

Dr. T. V. Soong,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of China.

Dear Dr. Soong:

Will you please dispatch the following message promptly to
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek?

// I have received your special message handed to me by Dr. Soong
which I have given my careful consideration.

First permit me to tell you that I am very grateful to you for
having sent General Hsuing Shih-Fei. The exceptional qualifications
which he possesses make him particularly valuable to our mutual
cause.

As you well know, we have attempted to our utmost power to build
an aerial supply line to you directly across British theaters of
operation in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. This we have
done in the face of an extreme shortage of air transports badly needed
by our own troops. We have taken pursuit aircraft and artillery from
our own forces for supply to you.


The recent changes brought about by enemy action have made it
necessary that our plans be revised to meet the rapidly changing
situation as to your supply from us. We are working with the aid of
Dr. Soong to estimate the supply possibilities and to effect necessary
changes.

Prior to our entry into the War, a number of missions were es-
tablished in Washington by the Democratic governments of the world

a15j03

[REDACTED]


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JCS letter, 9-16-70 DEC 4 1973
& OSD letter, 5-8-72


Draft 2-7-42 -- page 2

which had entered into Lend-Lease agreements with us. To meet the requirements of these missions, the production capacity of the United States then converted to War purposes was taxed to the limit, and we retained for our own use only very meager training allotments.

Upon the out-break of War, we were immediately obliged to dispatch munitions to our own forces in active theaters and to equip our troops for the severe fighting that must follow. This brought about a sudden and new requirement for essential munitions and supplies and compelled us in certain instances to secure equipment manufactured in Great Britain for her own use, while both of us continued to send materials to other Allied Powers. Out of this situation grew the Anglo-American Joint Staff, since, upon our insistence, all supplies were to be pooled and allocated in accordance with the general situation.

I fear that there may have grown up some misunderstanding concerning the functions and authority of this Anglo-American Joint Staff and its various subsidiary boards including the Munitions Assignments Board. The United States and the United Kingdom are the only powers now in a position to dispatch to the other countries opposing the Axis a portion of their own combat strength as represented in airplanes, munitions, ships, naval units, and other resources. The Staff provides the administrative machinery through which this supporting effort is coordinated between the United States and the United Kingdom according to their respective capacities for production. The

a 15,04

DECLASSIFIED

JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-8-72

DEC 4 1973

[REDACTED]

Draft 2-7-42 -- page 3

existence of this Staff does not preclude deliberations with all other United Nations regarding pertinent strategical situations. It operates quite contrary to such a conception. While other countries such as Canada or Russia are not represented on the Anglo-American Joint Materiel Staff, we have established a definite method here in Washington for handling questions that involve each Allied country. We have established a Pacific War Council with representation from all nations bordering on the Pacific. Its members have the task of studying political-strategic problems and reaching common agreement concerning them. In more technical matters representatives of the particular powers concerned, whether it be China, Australia, the Dutch East Indies, or New Zealand, meet with the Chiefs of Staff and present their special points of view and participate in the formulation of decisions. I have been assured by the United States Chief of Staff that no question concerning your illustrious country and its participation in this War will be acted upon without according to your distinguished representative full and complete opportunity for collaboration on an equal basis.

I have felt particularly fortunate in having Dr. T. V. Soong as a member of the Pacific War Council. I am deeply appreciative of the great assistance he has given us and his constant readiness with information and advice.

I assure you without reservation that our sole aim in this War is the defeat of the enemy, which will insure to both our peoples a rightful peace. We will continue to hold among our primary objectives the interests of your glorious nation.

[REDACTED] Franklin D. Roosevelt.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS 100-1, 3-18-73
& OSD Letter, 5-3-72
DEC 4 1973

015,05

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Burt

FOR THE PRESIDENT

n,

a15 K01

~~SECRET~~

CABLE FROM MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK

TO LAUCHLIN CURRIE

May 13, 1942.

Thank you for your letter of April 1st, which has just been received. Your ardent interest and always vigorous support of all matters connected with China help us to realize how closely connected Chungking and Washington are.

The AVG yesterday attacked the Gialome airdrome at Hanoi, burning fifteen Japanese planes, damaging many others, and killing many personnel. We lost one pilot.

I appreciate deeply the President's kind offer to facilitate my coming. The date of departure is uncertain, as I must first tie up many loose strings here.

~~SECRET~~

a15k02

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Assistant Sec. of the U.S.
By W. J. Blumenthal Date FEB 2 1972

民國政府軍事委員會用牋

羅斯福總統閣下郝爾萊將軍及納爾遜
先生來華不僅我中國軍事與經濟建
設獲益良多而於我中美兩國今後軍事
經濟與政治上之合作亦將奠立堅實之
基礎余對閣下派遣彼二人來華甚表
感謝余已與彼等作多次之晤談誠懇
交換彼此之意見並命余之同僚與彼
等切實商洽余雖在百忙之中亦必與

國民政府軍事委員會用牋

彼等時時晤見彼等對我中國貢獻之重要使余感覺若彼等能提早一二年以前來華則中國軍事經濟之局勢將遠較今日為進步納爾遜先生所提供對於中國經濟建設之意見余完全贊同今彼回國一行余希望閣下於最短期間最好一個月以內仍令其來華與余共同工作以規劃中國戰時與戰後各

國民政府軍事委員會用牋

種之建設余並擬聘其為中國戰時生產
局之總顧問務請閣下允諾為盼余與郝
爾萊將軍關於軍事合作之會談仍繼續
進行中凡足以增強對日軍事力量之一切
規劃余必不失時間與郝將軍充分商洽並
將迅付實施以副閣下之期望餘托納爾
遜先生面達一切不贅敬問

健康

蔣中正

中華民國三十三年
九月十八日

赫爾利大使面呈

羅斯福總統閣下

國民政府軍事委員會緘

國民政府軍事委員會用牋

羅斯福總統閣下茲乘魏德邁將軍回
美之便託其携致此函以達余問候之忱
魏德邁將軍奉派來華之後我中國軍
事之改進獲得其不少寶貴之協助彼豁
達爽直之熱誠與切實而精詳之工作精
神實為余所罕觀者余得與彼合作殊覺
非常愉快余之同僚與彼感情亦極融洽
故現時中國軍事上之設施已因此而日見

國民政府軍事委員會用牋

加強甚感 閣下之高誼也關於中國軍
事情形及余對此後作戰之意見特託魏
德邁將軍向 閣下詳陳一切深望
閣下對於太平洋及中國戰區作戰方案能
交彼早日携回以達打倒吾人共同敵人之目
的為幸祇頌

健康

蔣中正

中華民國三十四年二月十七日

國民政府軍事委員會用牋

羅斯福總統閣下赫爾利將軍奉派來
華充閣下之私人代表繼復被任為大使
不僅我中美兩國之邦交因之更趨親密而
於遠東整個戰局之改善實有莫大關係
赫爾利將軍自到華以來余個人與彼時
常晤談獲益非淺彼之廣博的政治見解
及正確的判斷與不憚煩勞之精神使彼對
吾人之共同目標有甚大之貢獻
閣下選

國民政府軍事委員會用牋

擇此人實為最適宜之人選殊深感謝今
彼回國述職關於中國政治近況及國民
政府措施之方針以及余個人政治上之意
見均託其向閣下詳陳諒閣下聞之
必感安慰而更有以見教也此次克里米亞
會議之成就皆由閣下偉大明智之精
神所感召殊為欽佩會議中涉及東方
問題之決定甚願獲知其詳余甚望赫

國民政府軍事委員會用牋

爾利將軍能從速返華以期提早達成
其任務謹頌

健康

蔣中正

中華民國三十四年二月十七日

魏德邁將軍面呈

羅斯福總統閣下

國民政府軍事委員會緘

SAFE FILE: China

154
Safe.

DATE 18 OCT 1939

TOR CODE ROOM:

4534/18

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~DISTRIBUTION~~
~~ACTION~~

01... 10... 11... 12... 13... 14... MARCDR... 15... 16... 17... 18... 19... 20... 21... 22... 23... 24... 25... 26... 27... 28... 29... 30... 31... 32... 33... 34... 35... 36... 37... 38... 39... 40... 41... 42... 43... 44... 45... 46... 47... 48... 49... 50... 51... 52... 53... 54... 55... 56... 57... 58... 59... 60... 61... 62... 63... 64... 65... 66... 67... 68... 69... 70... 71... 72... 73... 74... 75... 76... 77... 78... 79... 80... 81... 82... 83... 84... 85... 86... 87... 88... 89... 90... 91... 92... 93... 94... 95... 96... 97... 98... 99... 100... FILE..

Applicant desires that his name be
on record for the purpose of making a
will.

a16a01

Safe: China
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

*File
Confidential*

December 19, 1941

For the President

The Secretary directed that I send
the attached message, from Nishan Chungking,
to the President.

John H. Dillon

John H. Dillon
Confidential Assistant

alb 601

NAVY MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM ALUSNA CHUNGKING CHINA	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY PPP
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE DEC. 19 1941			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY R V ROBINSON			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

190340 CR 0239

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE _____ TIME _____ GCT _____

PART 1 OF 4 PARTS; PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

THE FOLLOWING IS MY ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION AS IT EXISTS AT PRESENT:

MY OWN OBSERVATIONS PLUS 'INSIDE INFORMATION' INDICATE THAT THERE IS NO TIME TO LOSE. WE MUST AT ALL COSTS HOLD SINGAPORE; AND TO GAIN

THIS END WE CANNOT DEPEND UPON THE BRITISH FACILITIES, THEIR ABILITY, OR THEIR INITIATIVE TO ACT PROMPTLY. FOR THE DEFENSE OF BURMA THEY

HAVE BEEN SEEKING AMERICAN VOLUNTEER AIR FORCE AND CHINESE TROOPS. OUR FIGHTER PLANES AND LIGHT BOMBERS WITH ADEQUATE SPARE PARTS AND

GROUND STAFF ACCOMPANYING THEM MUST BE SENT IMMEDIATELY BY CARRIERS, CONVOYED IF NECESSARY BY OUR ENTIRE FLEET.

WITH THEM SHOULD COME AT LEAST FOUR DIVISIONS OF TROOPS INCLUDING ARMoured UNITS. THESE ARE FOR ASSIGNMENT AFTER ARRIVAL TO THE

FAR EAST THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.

(PART 2 FOLLOWS IMMEDIATELY)

ACTION: 00A.....

PERSONAL FILE.....

~~SECRET~~

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

SEE ART 76 (4)
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

MESSAGE
PRECEDENCEFROM **ALUSNA, CHUNGKING**

RELEASED BY

DATE **DEC. 19, 1941.**

TOR CODEROOM

DECODED BY

PARAPHRASED BY **R.V.ROBINSON**

FOR ACTION

OPNAV

INFORMATION

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED **PPP**PRIORITY
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

190450 CR 0241

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE

TIME

GCT

TEXT

PART 2 OF 4 PARTS; PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

FOR THE CHINESE GROUND FORCES LIGHTER ARMAMENT MUST ALSO COME QUICKLY FROM EXISTING SUPPLIES AND THE CHINESE NOTIFIED, FOR THE ONLY POSSIBLE FIELD FOR FINAL DEFEAT OF JAPANESE ARMY IS IN CHINA. THE PRESENT EXPECTATIONS OF USEFUL ACTIVITY BY THE CHINESE ARE ILL-

CONCEIVED DUE TO THEIR SHORTAGE OF EQUIPMENT, POOR CONDITION OF THEIR TROOPS, AND THEIR FEAR OF LOSING WHAT EQUIPMENT REMAINS TO THEM.

GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI CHEK'S ORDERS FOR COUNTER-ATTACKS CAN NOT BE EFFECTIVELY EXECUTED, AND THE OPERATIONS WHICH ARE BEING SO WIDELY

HAILED IN THE PRESS ARE LARGELY ILLUSORY. DUE TO THE EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEK THERE IS A DANGEROUS UNDER-CURRENT IN CERTAIN POWERFUL

OFFICIAL CIRCLES WHICH DEPRECATES AMERICAN AND ENGLISH PRESTIGE AND OUR ABILITY TO WIN THIS WAR. THAT IT IS ALREADY TOO LATE IS

EVEN BEING SAID BY SOME.

(PART 3 WILL FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY)**ACTION: 00.....****PERSONAL FILE.....****~~SECRET~~**SEE ART 70
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

NAVY DEPARTMENT

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER		ADDRESSEES	MESSAGE PRECEDENCE
FROM NAVAL ATTACHE CHUNGKING	FOR ACTION	OPNAV	PRIORITY ppp
RELEASED BY _____			ROUTINE
DATE DEC. 19, 1941.			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY R. V. ROBINSON			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

190615 CR 1240.

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.
ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE _____ TIME _____ GCT _____

TEXT
PART 3 OF FOUR PARTS, PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

THERE IS ALSO OCCURRING A RAPID DETERIORATION OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION WHICH MAY BECOME ACUTE AND BREAK THE GENERALISSIMO'S CONTROL IF SINGAPORE FALLS. THERE ARE OTHER INFLUENTIAL FIGURES IN CHINA WHICH HAVE LONG OPPOSED CHIANG KAI CHEK'S FAITH IN US AND SUCH A SITUATION WOULD PERMIT THESE TO ATTAIN CONTROL AND ABANDON THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT AND UTILIZE THE PRESENT JAP DESIRE TO SETTLE THE CHINA WAR TO OBTAIN A TOLERABLE PEACE, THEREBY GIVING THE JAPS FREE ACCESS TO THE RESOURCES OF CHINA AND THE MANPOWER OF CHINA, THUS FULLY DEVELOPING THE LONG PREDICTED "YELLOW PERIL." INDIA IS AT LEAST AS VULNERABLE TO OUR REVERSES AS IS CHINA. GERMAN AND JAPANESE PROPAGANDA IS VERY STRONG THERE, AND OURS IS CONSPICUOUS BY IT'S ABSENCE. A CRYING NECESSITY IS A STRONG (PREDOMINANTLY SO) BROADCASTING STATION TO THE FAR EAST; PREFERABLY LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.

~~**SECRET**~~

ACTION: Ø Ø.....

PERSONAL FILE.....

PART 4 WILL FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY

SEE ART 76(4)

NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

PHONE EXTENSION NUMBER

ADDRESSEES

MESSAGE
PRECEDENCEFROM NAVAL ATTACHE CHUNGKING

RELEASED BY _____

DATE 19 DECEMBER 1941TOR CODEROOM 0836/19DECODED BY SMITHPARAPHRASED BY V TUCKER

FOR ACTION

SECNAV

INFORMATION

COM 16

PRIORITY
PPPPPPPP
ROUTINE
DEFERREDPPPPPPPPPP
ROUTINE
DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY

190650 CR0242

UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME FOR DEFERRED AND MAIL DELIVERY

DATE

TIME

TEXT

PART 4. LAST SECTION

UNLESS WE BREAK JAPAN QUICKLY WE SHALL LOSE FUTURE CHINESE AND INDIAN COOPERATION AND HAVE NO POINT IN FAR EAST FROM WHICH TO OPERATE. ~~XXXX~~ WE MUST ALSO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PRESENT RUSSIAN ASCENDANCY WHICH MAY NOT LAST LONG. GERMANY UNDOUBTEDLY WILL LAUNCH ANOTHER ATTACK ELSEWHERE SOON TO PREVENT BRITISH HELP TO FAR EAST THEN STRIKE AGAIN AT RUSSIA IN SPRING WITH JAPAN ALSO INVADING SIBERIA. WE MUST EMPLOY ALL POSSIBLE FORCE WITH SAME DARING THAT ENEMY HAS STRUCK AND WITHOUT THOUGHT OF LOSSES TO MEET THIS CRISIS. OTHERWISE WE SHALL FIND OURSELVES FACING A CONTROLLED AND HOSTILE FAR EAST AS WELL AS EUROPE WITH NO POSSIBLE FOOTHOLD FOR COMEBACK.

DISTRIBUTION:

00A....ACTION

PERSONAL FILE..

~~SECRET~~SEE ART 76(4)
NAV REGS

MAKE ORIGINAL ONLY, DELIVER TO COMMUNICATION WATCH OFFICER IN PERSON

PSF - Safe: China

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 27, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: ABC conference in Chungking.

A very puzzling and unsatisfactory cable has just come in from Macruder, which will doubtless be sent to you.

On the joint defense of Burma there are three important issues:

1. The use of lend lease material. There is no mention of any final decision on this in Macruder's cable.
2. The use of the American Volunteer Air Force in Burma. Macruder said there was no decision by the Generalissimo but an apparent disinclination to give any further assistance here.
3. Chinese defense of Burma. Macruder said that the Chinese offered two army corps, but this was declined by Wavell. On the other hand, our consul at Kunning reports the passage through there of 100,000 crack Chinese troops moving southward.

Probably Brett's and Wavell's reports will shed a clearer light on the outcome of the conference. You may wish, however, to avail yourself of the present opportunity to suggest to the Prime Minister the desirability of the British in Burma availing themselves to the full of Chinese offers of cooperation. I have an idea that Chiang Kai-shek would have no objection to the use of lend-lease material and the volunteer air group in Burma if they were used in conjunction with Chinese ground operations.


Lauchlin Currie

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I N D E X

BOOK I

I. OVERALL STRATEGY

- | | | |
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| (2) | JCS 290/1 - Conduct of the War in 1943-44 | TAB (B) |
| (3) | JCS 283/1 - Current British Policy and Strategy in Relationship to that of the United States | TAB (C) |
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BOOK II

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| (7) | CIC 16/1 - German Strategy in 1943
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| (3) | JCS 297 - Operations in Burma 1943-44 | TAB (M-1) |
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BOOKS III and IV

IV. OUTLINE PLANS FOR SPECIFIC OPERATIONS

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\ JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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OVERALL STRATEGY

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(J.C.S. 286/1)

May 8, 1943

Pages 6-10, incl.

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

RECOMMENDED LINE OF ACTION AT COMING CONFERENCE

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is a memorandum which was sent to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff this date.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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By Authority of JCS 927/495-1

By APJ Date APR 13 1973

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ENCLOSURE

May 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Recommended line of action at coming conferences.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following line of action be adopted by the United States at the coming conferences and submit it herewith for your approval. Their recommendations are followed by a brief supporting discussion.

RECOMMENDATIONS

General

I. The agenda must not be limited to 1943, nor to BOLERO as distinguished from ROUNDUP.

II. The close interrelation between strategy against Germany and strategy against Japan must be clearly stated and emphasized early in the conference. It should be intimated that a British course of action in Europe which the United States consider unsound may force the United States to increased attention to the Pacific.

Axis in Europe

III. The United States consider that SICKLE from now on, and ROUNDUP in 1944 constitute the basic strategy against Germany, and must not be delayed or otherwise prejudiced by other undertakings in Europe.

IV. However, they recognize certain advantages in prompt post-HUSKY operations in the Western Mediterranean, and as an alternative or compromise will discuss them with a view to determining the best course of action in that area - provided such

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action involves a timely reduction rather than an increase in allied resources committed to that area, tends to support SICKLE, and does not interfere with ROUNDUP.

V. Subject to discussion and future developments, the occupation of SARDINIA is considered less open to objection than other Mediterranean operations.

VI. The United States will not become involved in operations east of Sicily except possibly for special air operations.

VII. If the British insist on doing so, they do it alone.

VIII. Should the British insist on undertaking commitments in the Mediterranean, which the United States considers prejudicial to the over-all concept of the earliest possible defeat of Germany and the ultimate defeat of Japan, the British will be informed that the United States may be forced to revise their strategy and extend their operations and commitments in the Pacific.

Japan

IX. ANAKIM should be undertaken and pressed to successful conclusion.

X. If ANAKIM proves impossible, due to lack of British support or other reasons, and no adequate alternative can be agreed upon, the United States will expand and intensify its operations in the Pacific, in order to counteract the advantage which Japan gains by Allied failure adequately to support China.

DISCUSSION

2. The main subjects of the agenda proposed by the British are:

a. "Post-HUSKY strategy in 1943 against Axis in Europe under following heads:

Further action in Mediterranean
SICKLE and BOLERO"

b. "Action against Japan in Pacific and Indian Ocean theaters."

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While these subjects are in general satisfactory, the limiting phrase "in 1943," in item (a) is typical of the British tendency to the immediate and short view, in contrast to our belief that agreed undertakings must be based on the over-all or long view. We should see that the words "in 1943" are omitted from the approved agenda, and that it is changed to read "SICKLE, BOLERO and ROUND-UP."

3. The close interrelation between the two principal subjects - the war in Europe and the war against Japan, should be emphasized in discussing the agenda. Our position should be that, while at the present time we accept a strategy which contemplates the defeat of Germany first, we maintain that any proposed course of action against Germany has a direct relation to our proposed course of action against Japan.

4. After these two points concerning the agenda have been decided, the subject of "Further action in Mediterranean" will come up. It appears that the crux of this question will be whether or not the Allied Nations shall be committed to major operations in the Eastern Mediterranean. We should state that such a commitment is contrary to sound strategy and should firmly maintain that the United States will not become so committed.

a. Such action does not offer adequate contribution to the basic concept of the earliest possible defeat of the Axis in Europe.

b. It will absorb means that are needed for SICKLE, ROUNDUP, and the war against Japan.

c. It will involve longer and more hazardous lines of communication and the application of our effort in an area remote from and having substantially no communications leading to the decisive theater of the war.

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d. While purporting to support Russia it can hardly fail to arouse Russian suspicions as to the future of the Dardanelles. It should be noted that because of the advent of air power, supplemented by the submarine, British possession of the Dodecanese with the continuance of the control they have consistently exercised over Greece, would serve to bar the transit of the Straits by Russia substantially as effectively as if the British held the shores of the Straits themselves.

e. It will be increasingly difficult to maintain popular acceptance of such action in the United States -- particularly in view of the continuing threat in the Pacific.

f. It assumes an early and complete accomplishment of HUSKY. This assumption seems less likely of realization than the contrary one that this operation will be long drawn-out and costly.

Should the British insist on operations to the east of Sicily, the United States should inform them (1) that they will have to rely entirely on British resources, and (2) that to the extent such employment of resources detracts from the effectiveness of operations directly against Germany, the United States may be forced to increase its commitments in the Pacific.

5. We are firmly of the opinion that sound basic strategy for conducting the war in Europe requires that the major effort against Germany be made from the United Kingdom by SICKLE now and by ROUNDUP in 1944. We realize however that there is some force in the arguments that post-HUSKY operations in the western Mediterranean will --

a. maintain the momentum of HUSKY.

b. employ resources available there, which cannot be transferred to the United Kingdom this year.

c. furnish support to Russia.

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d. tend to knock Italy out of the war.

e. threaten southern France and Italy.

For these reasons the Joint Chiefs of Staff should, as an alternative or compromise, consider further operations in the Western Mediterranean. They should strongly maintain, however, that such operations are of an emergency nature, primarily in support of Russia and that the major effort against Germany must remain SICKLE from now on and ROUNDUP in 1944. As between SARDINIA and ITALY as objectives, SARDINIA would detract less from the essential concentration of our resources in the United Kingdom.

6. The British will continue to depreciate the importance of the effort against Japan and the necessity for support of China. They will argue that ANAKIM is impracticable in 1943 and will probably present unsatisfactory alternatives. The United States cannot do ANAKIM alone. A strong position should be taken as regards the Pacific and ANAKIM - namely, that if ANAKIM should be abandoned the United States must expand and intensify its operations in the Pacific, in order to counteract the advantage which Japan would gain by Allied failure adequately to support China.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

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(J.C.S. 290/1)

May 8, 1943

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(1) JCS 290

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943 - 1944

References: (a) J.C.S. 272
(b) J.C.S. 76th Mtg. Min., Item 1

Note by the Secretaries

The attached study was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff this date.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat

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By 10/15 Date APR 13 1973

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By ABJ Date APR 18 1973

CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN 1943-44.

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

1. UNITED NATIONS OVERALL OBJECTIVE

The overall objective of the UNITED NATIONS, in conjunction with RUSSIA and other Allies, is to bring the war against GERMANY, JAPAN, and ITALY to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible date.

2. OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

a. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies to force an unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE.

b. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate unconditional surrender can be forced.

c. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers and, if possible with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN. If however, conditions develop which indicate that the war as a whole can be brought more quickly to a successful conclusion by the earlier mounting of a major offensive against JAPAN, the strategical concept set forth herein may be reversed.

3. OPERATIONS IN THE ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN AFRICAN AREAS

a. Secure the lines of communications in the ATLANTIC by defeating the U-Boat and removing other threats to these sea communications.

b. European area

(1) Conduct a full scale assault from the UNITED KINGDOM against the Continent in the spring of 1944.

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(2) Conduct a vigorous air offensive with a view to reducing GERMANY'S war potential and to making feasible a cross-channel operation and exploitation from lodgments on the Continent in the spring of 1944.

(3) Build up appropriate forces in the UNITED KINGDOM for tasks (1) and (2).

(4) Prepare for and return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

c. African area

(1) Accomplish HUSKY.

(2) After the completion of HUSKY, or in the event that HUSKY is cancelled, conduct limited offensive operations in the MEDITERRANEAN area. These operations will be designed:

(a) To destroy Italian war potential by continuing air attacks from MEDITERRANEAN bases;

(b) To continue support to RUSSIA by the diversion of AXIS forces and materials;

(c) To force dispersion of AXIS forces in order to facilitate a cross-channel operation; and

(d) To maintain the security of our positions and communications in the MEDITERRANEAN area.

The strength of the forces to be employed in the MEDITERRANEAN will be so limited as not to prejudice the success of a cross-channel operation in 1944. U. S. ground and naval forces will not be employed in the MEDITERRANEAN east of SICILY.

4. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

a. Conduct operations to maintain lines of communication in the PACIFIC, particularly to AUSTRALIA; to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the initiative, force attrition, contain the Japanese Fleet in the PACIFIC, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full scale offensive against JAPAN; and to keep CHINA in the war.

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b. For these purposes, U. S. naval forces will be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the ATLANTIC. ^{With} Due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the EUROPEAN AXIS, air and ground forces will be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of U. S. naval forces.

c. Offensive operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943 - 1944 will have the following objectives:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
- (2) Seizure of BURMA.
- (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
- (4) Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.
- (5) Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.

5. ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE COMBATANT FRENCH

a. Sustain the Soviet forces by the greatest volume of munitions that can be supplied and transported to RUSSIA without militating against the attainment of the over-all objectives.

b. Sustain CHINA by continuing to furnish munitions to the greatest extent practicable.

c. Continue to furnish munitions to the combatant French in Northwest Africa on the scale previously agreed upon.

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May 8, 1943

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CURRENT BRITISH POLICY AND STRATEGY IN RELATIONSHIP
TO THAT OF THE UNITED STATES

References: a. J.C.S. Supplementary Minutes,
76th Mtg., Item 1 (a)
b. J.C.S. 272

Approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - May 8, 1943

1. In accordance with the above references, as elaborated in discussion with the Joint Staff Planners, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee submit, as enclosures, their estimate of the current British military policy and strategy, with particular relation to the most probable British proposals, at the next "Casablanca" meeting.

2. In making this estimate, the Committee has examined the record of British action, proposals and announcements, insofar as available to them, and have discussed the subject with appropriate officials of the State Department. The most pertinent sources of available information are the record of General Marshall's visit to London in April, 1942, of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff visit to London in July, 1942, the Casablanca papers, including the recent C.C.S. 199/1, certain dispatches between the Prime Minister and the President, and Mr. Churchill's speech of March 21, 1943.

3. The paper is prepared in two parts -- Enclosures "A" and "B" -- the former a general discussion, the latter a paragraph by paragraph comparison between J.C.S. 243/3 and what is believed to be the British ideas.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

The war aims of the United States and British coincide in respect to the basic objectives of: (a) the imposition upon the Axis nations of a defeat that will render them militarily impotent; and (b) in principle, the defeat of Germany as of first priority.

It is the general nature of the latter objective, which is not susceptible of precise definition, that has given rise to some divergence of views. It is a divergence easily understood. It springs from such fundamental causes as the differences in the geographical situation of the two nations vis-a-vis the several enemies, and in the marked contrast between the two nations in respect of their territorial structures and the bases of their power.

The threat in the Pacific, the importance of the Mediterranean, do not appeal to them with the same force. To the U. S. the former appears of such a nature and imminence that they view with greater concern than the British an indefinite delay in meeting its challenge. Operations in the Mediterranean, on the other hand, are viewed by the U. S. solely from the military viewpoint of wherein they contribute to winning the war. By the British, restored control of the Mediterranean is regarded as an objective of national policy essential to the maintenance of their present Imperial power, whereas they are confident that the defeat of Japan, no matter how long delayed, nor how completely accomplished by the United States, will restore the British position in the Far East.

In consequence, United States policy indicates adoption of those direct measures that promise the earliest possible defeat of Germany. The British have hitherto regarded successful accomplishment of such measures as being militarily impracticable at present. Furthermore, the decline in their Imperial strength that would result from a heavy loss of British manpower renders them reluctant to undertake major costly operations of

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doubtful success. Having a definitely secondary interest in the Pacific but feeling the political necessity of conducting immediate offensive operations, the British advocate measures that, from the strictly military point of view of the U.S., seem indirect and lacking decisive effect in terminating the war.

It is difficult to assess the relative weight given by the British to the factor of military practicability of direct decisive operations and to their political desire to improve their post-war position. Both factors have undoubtedly played a part. However, unless the British are actually convinced that Mediterranean operations are the best military strategy they must see definite advantages therein, to their post-war position as regards Europe. It would seem that the defeat of the Axis in Europe, however accomplished would restore the pre-war British position in the Mediterranean. Her insistence that war be fought in that area would suggest that the British desire to substantially improve their pre-war position in the Mediterranean and consider that actual occupation of certain areas, will greatly tend to strengthen their case at the peace table.

It is believed that the proposals that will be advanced by the British will include operations involving the occupation of one or more of the following objectives, viz:

a. In the eastern Mediterranean - Crete, Dodecanese, Greece, Turkey.

b. In the western Mediterranean - Sardinia, Corsica, Italy.

Each of such proposals should be examined from, inter alia, the point of view not only of the extent to which it will further the prosecution of the war, but of the extent to which it will absorb available means to the detriment of: an intensification of the air effort from the U.K.; the prosecution of the war effort in the Pacific on the scale approved by ANFA; and the build-up of BOLERO.

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To extend operations into the eastern Mediterranean is to project our effort away from the decisive theater of war to a region remote therefrom and having substantially no land communications leading thereto. Such operations would involve longer and more hazardous sea communications, and would impose a strain on available Allied means for objectives that will have little, if any, influence on the outcome of the war.

Such operations, except possibly in the case of Crete, are likely to arouse the suspicions of and be resented by Russia as being a continuation of the historic British policy of their domination of the Straits vis-a-vis Russia.

An Allied occupation of Italy would appear likely to prove more of a liability than an asset. Aside from the maintenance of forces of occupation we would be faced with inescapable demands for supplies, including coal, for the civil population.

Of the various objectives mentioned, the occupation of Sardinia and Corsica would appear to be the least objectionable. The communications thereto will be shorter and less exposed, and the occupation of those islands would facilitate a subsequent operation into Southern France.

In lieu of a further extension of operations in the Mediterranean we should propose to the British at the forthcoming conference the implementation of the plan for the combined air offensive against German war industry. An estimate should be made by the planners of the effect upon German war making capacity of successful accomplishment of the four phases of that plan. Based upon this estimate the earliest practicable target date for ROUNDUP should be established. We should press the British for the acceptance of this target date and the utilization of our means to accomplish the maximum practicable buildup in the United Kingdom prior to that date.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

Subject: Apparent British Policy and Strategy with relation to that of the United States.

1. For brevity and clarity in discussing the British strategic concept, the present C.C.S. concept, as interpreted in J.C.S. 243/3 (Clarification of Casablanca Decisions) is taken as a basis, and each paragraph thereof (typed in capitals) is discussed from what is believed to be the British point of view.

I. OVER-ALL STRATEGY OF THE WAR

(a) IN COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AND THE LESSER ALLIES, TO FORCE AN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE.

The British have accepted this over-all concept in public announcements at Casablanca, and it is probable that in making such announcements they were sincere at the moment. However, we cannot overlook the possibility that the British may have some mental reservations as to interpretation of "unconditional surrender." This is indicated by Mr. Churchill's speech of March 21, 1943, in which he says: "Nevertheless, in my opinion, the moment when Hitler is beaten and Germany and Italy are prostrate will mark the climax of the war and that will be the time to make a new declaration upon the task before us." Such reservations would have their basis in the traditional British objection to the development of a dominant military power on the mainland of Europe. It is a possibility that they cannot entirely overlook that as the war in Europe develops, Russia and Germany may exhaust each other. The British will be concerned with the post-war position of France. The British will probably desire a considerably weakened Italy in order to enhance the British control of the Mediterranean.

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(b) SIMULTANEOUSLY, IN COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER PACIFIC POWERS, TO MAINTAIN AND EXTEND UNREMITTING PRESSURE AGAINST JAPAN.

The British probably would be glad to accept this statement with the words "and extend" omitted. However, were they to write it themselves, it would probably read: "Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Powers to prevent further advance by the Japanese." This desire of the British to minimize the war against Japan is a fundamental difference between the British and American concepts.

(c) THEREAFTER, IN COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER PACIFIC POWERS AND IF POSSIBLE WITH RUSSIA, TO COMBINE THE FULL RESOURCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN TO FORCE THE UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN.

This statement has the definite approval of the Prime Minister. However, while at Casablanca, he offered a formal treaty in support of this commitment, in his speech of March 21st he suggests "a new declaration," when "Hitler is beaten." The British are probably sincere in this commitment at the moment. Much can happen, however, between now and the defeat of Germany to blunt the British willingness to undertake an "all-out" war against Japan. The British have consistently indicated a surprising lack of concern about the Far East. They may be counted upon to perform the letter of their commitments in this connection, but they are traditionally expert at meeting the letter while avoiding the spirit of commitments, and such action in regard to British support of the war against Japan should always be kept in mind as a possibility.

II. BASIC STRATEGY FOR 1943

TO CONDUCT A STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE AXIS IN EUROPEAN - MEDITERRANEAN THEATER, EMPLOYING THE MAXIMUM FORCES CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING AND EXTENDING UNREMITTING PRESSURE AGAINST JAPAN, AND WITH MEETING CURRENT ACCEPTED STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS.

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The British would like to have this read as follows:

"To conduct the major strategic offensive against the Axis in the European - Mediterranean Theater with maximum possible forces, while maintaining the strategic defensive in other areas."

The British have consistently indicated that their main interest is the War in Europe, and that all other undertakings should be kept at the minimum with a view to pressing that offensive. They have believed and strongly advocated that the major effort against the Axis in Europe in 1943 should be made in the Mediterranean.

III. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

RESOURCES WILL BE ALLOCATED TO MEET APPROVED STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS ON A SCALE SUBJECT TO REVIEW FROM TIME TO TIME. RESOURCES AVAILABLE AFTER MEETING CURRENT STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS WILL BE ALLOCATED TO APPROVED STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS, SUBJECT TO ALTERATION IN KEEPING WITH THE CHANGING SITUATION.

This statement would probably be satisfactory to the British, provided that the words "by the Combined Chiefs of Staff" be added after "review" in the first sentence and after "allocated" in the second sentence. This would represent no change in the intent of this paragraph but would relieve the British concern lest such "review" and "alteration" be undertaken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff alone.

IV. EXISTING STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS

PRIORITY GROUP 1.

(a) MAINTAIN THE SECURITY, AND WAR-MAKING CAPACITY OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE AND BRITISH ISLES.

(b) SUPPORT AND MAINTAIN OUR FORCES IN ALL AREAS TO WHICH COMMITTED.

(c) KEEP ENEMY SUBMARINE EFFORT UNDER INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE CONTROL.

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PRIORITY GROUP 2.

(d) MEET REQUIREMENTS OF RUSSIAN PROTOCOL TO GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE WITHOUT PROHIBITIVE COST IN SHIPPING.

(e) SUSTAIN CHINA BY THE GREATEST VOLUME OF SUPPLIES THAT CAN BE GOT INTO CHINA, WITHOUT PROHIBITIVE COST IN TRANSPORT.

(f) OTHER FIRM COMMITMENTS, APPROVED FROM TIME TO TIME, FOR POLITICAL OR MILITARY REASONS AS ESSENTIAL TO THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

While the British have not definitely accepted the idea of establishing priority on the basis of strategic commitments and strategic undertakings, it is believed they would consider Items (a), (b), (c) and (d) to be satisfactory. Item (e) they would probably accept as a safe statement, while making mutual reservations as to how they would interpret it. There are numerous indications that the British conception of the importance of China in the war is different from ours. They have consistently depreciated such importance and opposed our conception that China is of vital importance in ultimately defeating Japan. The British would probably approve of Item (f) provided it stated affirmatively that such commitments must be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This, of course, is the intention.

V. PROJECTED STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS

Priority as between the Axis in Europe and Japan

(a) RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS WILL BE ALLOCATED ON THE BASIS OF THE APPROVED OVER-ALL STRATEGY OF CONDUCTING A STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE AXIS IN EUROPE, WHILE MAINTAINING AND EXTENDING UNREMITTING PRESSURE AGAINST JAPAN.

The British would change this to read "* * * * overall strategy of conducting the major offensive against the Axis in the European - Mediterranean Theater with maximum forces, while maintaining the strategic defensive in other areas."

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(b) AS BETWEEN THESE TWO BASIC UNDERTAKINGS, AVAILABLE RESOURCES WILL BE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

(1) FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE AXIS IN EUROPE - ALL RESOURCES OVER AND ABOVE THOSE ALLOCATED FOR USE AGAINST JAPAN.

(2) FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN - RESOURCES ADEQUATE TO INSURE THAT OPERATIONS IN EUROPE ARE NOT PREJUDICED BY THE NECESSITY TO DIVERT FORCES THEREFROM, IN ORDER TO RELIEVE AN ADVERSE SITUATION ARISING FROM OPERATIONS AGAINST JAPAN; THE EXTENT OF SUCH OPERATIONS, HOWEVER, TO BE KEPT WITHIN LIMITS WHICH WILL NOT, IN THE OPINION OF THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, JEOPARDIZE THE ABILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF A FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEAT GERMANY DECISIVELY IN 1943.

The British would like to have this stated:

"All available resources will be allocated to the offensive in European - Mediterranean Theater, except the minimum necessary to safely maintain the strategic defense against Japan in the Pacific and Burma."

PRIORITY AS AMONG SPECIFIC OPERATIONS.

(a) WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE RESOURCES ALLOCATED FOR USE AGAINST JAPAN, THE OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE PACIFIC AND THEIR RELATIVE PRIORITY WILL BE DECIDED BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

The British would like to have added: "subject to the limitation that in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, such operations will be in accord with the general concept of maintaining the strategic defense in that area."

(b) WITHIN THE RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO THE EUROPEAN THEATER AND TO THE FAR EAST, THE PRIORITY OF MAJOR OPERATIONS IS ESTABLISHED IN THE ORDER: TORCH, HUSKY, SICKLE, ANAKIM, BOLERO.

This item the British would like to revise to read: - TORCH, HUSKY, SICKLE and further operations in the Mediterranean at least on an equal basis with SICKLE, BOLERO, ANAKIM.

2. At this point our concern with probable British strategy reduces itself to the consideration of "Post-HUSKY" operations. They will undoubtedly propose and press for further operations in the Mediterranean, while maintaining that such operations will

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recognize the equal priority of SICKLE. They will probably advocate extending operations in the Eastern Mediterranean as soon as practicable, and support their proposals on the ground that such operations -

- (a) will maintain momentum of HUSKY
- (b) give timely support to Russia
- (c) tend to knock out Italy
- (d) bring in Turkey
- (e) use resources available in Mediterranean, which otherwise would not be put to immediate use.

They will maintain as before, that the build-up for BOLERO cannot be done in time to support Russia this year, but can continue as rapidly as possible. They will argue that the proposed Mediterranean operations will not seriously interfere with SICKLE. The probable reasons behind the British proposals are:

(a) They do not want to face what they honestly believe to be the great hazards and the heavy losses of cross-Channel operations.

(b) They want to end the war with a position in the Mediterranean stronger than their pre-war position.

(c) They think the outcome of Mediterranean operations is sufficiently promising from a Military point of view, to ultimately lead to the defeat of the Axis.

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May 5, 1943

JOINT WAR PLANS COMMITTEE

GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, 1943 - 44

Note by the Secretaries

1. The attached report is the Global Estimate of the Situation, 1943 - 1944, as revised by the Joint Staff Planners.

2. This paper supersedes J.W.P.C. 10.

C. E. MILLER,

C. F. BARBER,

Joint Secretaries.

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GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, 1943 - 44

Reference: J.C.S. 272

REPORT BY THE JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

1. A Global Estimate of the Situation, 1943 - 44, is contained in Enclosure "A."

2. The most probable courses of action of the AXIS powers are as follows:

1943.

a. EUROPEAN AXIS

Intensify the war of attrition against UNITED NATIONS shipping and resume the offensive in RUSSIA at the earliest practicable moment, while assuming the defensive on all fronts and retaining as long as possible the Tunisian bridgehead.

b. JAPAN

(1) Defeat of RUSSIA clearly imminent:

JAPAN will attack SIBERIA.

(2) Defeat of RUSSIA not clearly imminent:

JAPAN will remain on the strategic defensive, exploit and consolidate her gains, intensify the war of attrition against shipping, and undertake limited offensive operations in the AUSTRALIA-NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS area, CHINA, and BURMA, and vigorously counter UNITED STATES offensive action in the WESTERN ALEUTIANS.

1944.

a. EUROPEAN AXIS

(1) If RUSSIA is defeated in EUROPE.

Conduct offensive action toward gaining control of the MEDITERRANEAN and the PERSIAN GULF, while conducting and air and submarine campaign against the UNITED NATIONS, particularly the UNITED KINGDOM.

(2) If RUSSIA is not defeated in EUROPE.

Exploit the areas it controls, consolidate the fortress of EUROPE, and continue the U-boat campaign.

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b. JAPAN

(1) Defeat of RUSSIA is clearly imminent, and CHINA continues in the war.

If the defeat of RUSSIA in EUROPE becomes apparent in 1943, JAPAN will attack SIBERIA and the major part of her offensive effort will be directed toward RUSSIA in 1944.

(2) Defeat of RUSSIA not clearly imminent.

JAPAN will not attack SIBERIA. JAPAN will direct her major efforts toward securing and exploiting the territory she controls, and eliminating CHINA from the war.

3. Recommended UNITED NATIONS courses of action, 1943 - 44,
are as follows:

a. That the UNITED NATIONS main effort continue against the EUROPEAN AXIS, with emphasis on the following in 1943:

(1) Defeating the U-boat menace.

(2) Accomplishing HUSKY.

(3) Conducting a bomber offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM with a view to reducing GERMANY'S war potential, and concentrating appropriate forces so that a cross-channel operation and exploitation from lodgements on the Continent will be feasible in 1944.

(4) Conducting limited operations in the MEDITERRANEAN area within the capabilities of the forces finally allocated after providing for the concentration of forces in the UNITED KINGDOM for cross-channel operations and the exploitation of lodgements on the Continent.

(5) Continuing air attacks against ITALY, without detracting from the air offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM, with the object of eliminating ITALY from the war.

(6) Furnishing supplies and equipment to RUSSIA.

b. That forces be built up in the UNITED KINGDOM during 1943 and 1944 for:

(1) Conducting a vigorous bomber offensive integrated with current and prospective operations, including an invasion of the Continent.

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(2) A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

(3) A full-scale assault against the Continent as early as possible in 1944.

c. That in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST:

(1) The UNITED NATIONS conduct limited offensive operations in order to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the initiative, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against JAPAN, and in order to keep CHINA in the war.

(2) For these purposes, naval forces be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the ATLANTIC and MEDITERRANEAN and that, with due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the EUROPEAN AXIS, air and ground forces be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of U. S. Naval Forces.

d. That if RUSSIA is defeated in the EUROPEAN-AFRICAN area, the basic strategic concept should be reviewed and modified to conform to our then existing capabilities. Based on these capabilities, the UNITED NATIONS should then either:

(1) Reverse their strategic concept and launch all-out operations without delay against JAPAN, while making UNITED NATIONS positions in the EUROPEAN-AFRICAN area secure, or

(2) If GERMANY has been sufficiently weakened, continue operations with a view to her ultimate defeat on the Continent of EUROPE.

In either case the UNITED NATIONS air offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM should be continued.

e. That participation of CHINA in the war be assured by continuing to furnish her supplies and air support to the greatest extent practicable.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, 1943-1944

EUROPEAN AXIS SITUATION

4. The AXIS campaign against RUSSIA in 1942 failed to attain the territorial objectives set, and resulted in serious losses. AXIS forces are being driven out of AFRICA. There is every indication that future AXIS operations will be directed towards Military (the defeat of Russian armed forces in 1943) rather than territorial objectives. The AXIS submarine campaign against UNITED NATIONS shipping will be intensified.

a. Military. GERMANY is increasing the total number of her divisions to about 330. ITALY may provide 70 divisions and the satellite countries approximately 55 more, making a grand total of 455.

At the end of 1942 the AXIS had a total of some 470 submarines. By the end of 1943, the total may increase to about 600. The strategic position of the Italian Navy has been weakened by increased threat of air attack; it has shown great unwillingness to risk its major units in action, is short of cruisers, and has no aircraft carriers. It is able, however, to contain a substantial UNITED NATIONS naval force in the MEDITERRANEAN in an area in which this force may be subjected to air attack.

The German Navy, though its surface forces are of limited size, contains a large British naval force in the NORTH ATLANTIC.

The German Air Force has an estimated strength of 9200 combat airplanes of which 6000 are assigned to operating squadrons in the combat zones. The rate of production is estimated at 1300 per month. However, by shifting from bombers to fighters, the number of airplanes produced may ultimately be increased. There are some indications that the German Air Force is increasing its fighter strength at the

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expense of bombers in order to meet increased requirements for defense against the UNITED NATIONS bomber offensive.

The EUROPEAN AXIS is faced with an air war on three fronts. The combined UNITED NATIONS bomber offensive may reasonably be expected to create favorable conditions for cross-channel operations by midsummer 1944.

It is significant that AXIS air power has not increased in proportion to her ground and sea forces. This may be attributed to:

(1) Production limitations.

(2) Increasing the number of ground force units. This is being done because:

(a) The AXIS cannot expect to move ground forces freely to and from the Eastern Front because of the strategical situation.

(b) Preparations are being made to bolster Italian and satellite resistance.

b. Economic. GERMANY'S military effort was somewhat impaired by air attack in 1942. In 1943 the increasing bombing offensive expected and the greater precision of air attack will bring about further substantial decline in AXIS armament production. For aircraft, destruction of output will be felt almost immediately in first line operations. For other munitions, destruction of facilities will produce a more gradual effect on Military operations. However, except for aircraft, it is probable that the AXIS can increase somewhat in 1943 the scale of Military effort, but only at the expense of an accelerated decline in economic potential.

ITALY and her satellites are dependent on GERMANY for munitions and raw materials. GERMANY depends on the satellites for some strategic raw materials of a high priority.

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c. Manpower. If casualties are as high in 1943 as in 1942, GERMANY faces a reduction in the size or an impairment in the quality of her armed forces in 1944.

d. Armaments. The estimated low production of combat planes will probably restrict the German air effort in 1943 to essentially strategic defensive operations. This will not preclude an offensive concentrated against RUSSIA within a limited area, which might give a local air superiority for a limited time. The number of operating submarines will increase. German Military operations are not likely to be restricted by shortages of any other form of armaments. Destruction achieved by the proposed bomber offensive may seriously reduce GERMANY'S production of armaments.

e. Morale. Italian resistance will probably decline at least until the homeland is invaded, when a stronger fighting spirit may be aroused temporarily. The resistance of satellite nations is on the decline. ITALY or one of the satellites may make peace overtures in 1943. German morale probably will not crack in 1943 but will decline considerably as the result of the failure to defeat RUSSIA by the end of 1943, and because of the chaos and destruction inflicted by the UNITED NATIONS air offensive.

EUROPEAN AXIS CAPABILITIES FOR 1943

5. Major courses of action open to the EUROPEAN AXIS in 1943.

- a. Intensify the war of attrition against shipping.
- b. Resume the offensive in RUSSIA.
- c. Withdraw to and defend the MEDITERRANEAN island line.
- d. Occupy the IBERIAN PENINSULA with a view to closing the STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR and possibly attacking NORTH AFRICA.
- e. Assume an active defense on all fronts.
- f. Attack the MIDDLE EAST through ANATOLIA.

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6. Most likely course of action. Intensify the war of attrition against UNITED NATIONS shipping and resume the offensive in RUSSIA at the earliest practicable moment, while assuming the defensive on all other fronts and retaining as long as possible the Tunisian bridgehead.

JAPANESE SITUATION

7. JAPAN has established control of the WESTERN PACIFIC, the east coast of the Asiatic continent, and SOUTHEASTERN ASIA. She is exploiting the resources and providing for the security of these areas by establishing defensive positions and opposing UNITED NATIONS efforts to penetrate her defensive barrier. She is protecting her northern flank by maintaining neutral relations with RUSSIA.

JAPAN has suffered substantial air and naval losses. The losses to her ground forces have been insignificant.

a. Military. The strength of her army is currently estimated at 72 Japanese divisions, plus about 600,000 Chinese and Manchurian troops. She is making use of such puppet troops to an increasing extent.

Her operational air strength is estimated at 3700 combat aircraft with a production of about 600 combat planes per month, which is presumed to be increasing. The limited size of this force precludes adequate air support for simultaneous extensive operations on two fronts.

The Japanese Navy remains powerful. JAPAN'S limited capacity for naval construction places her at a disadvantage in a war of attrition.

b. Economic. Japanese exploitation of captured resources is limited by shortages in shipping, skilled manpower, and fabricating equipment. It is estimated that her industrial expansion under favorable conditions will be at the rate of 10% to 15% per year. Those essential industrial facilities located in JAPAN proper are concentrated in a few relatively small areas.

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c. Shipping. Losses of Japanese shipping during 1942 and 1943 have exceeded construction. Losses in dry cargo vessels are being partially compensated for by improving railroad transportation in SOUTHEASTERN ASIA, and by a program of wooden shipbuilding. Tanker losses, despite more effective operation made possible by the rehabilitation of oil fields and refineries near the combat zones, if continued at the present rate will seriously interfere with Military operations in the future. Movement of Japanese troops will not be curtailed until the shipping situation becomes more critical.

d. Morale. Japanese morale is of a very high order.

JAPAN'S CAPABILITIES FOR 1943

8. Major courses of action open to JAPAN in 1943.

a. Remain on the strategic defensive and consolidate her gains, undertaking limited offensive operations in the AUSTRALIA - NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS area, CHINA, BURMA, the ALEUTIANS, and along the lines of communication between the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS and AUSTRALIA.

b. Renew the general attack on CHINA.

c. Attack INDIA.

d. Attack SIBERIA.

e. Renew an offensive in the AUSTRALIA - NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS area.

f. Intensify the war of attrition against shipping.

9. Most likely course of action. JAPAN's most likely course of action will be influenced by the outcome on the Russian Front.

a. Russian defeat clearly imminent.

In all likelihood JAPAN will attack SIBERIA.

b. Russian defeat not imminent.

JAPAN will probably remain on the strategic defensive, exploit and consolidate her gains, intensify the war of attrition against shipping, and undertake limited offensive operations in the AUSTRALIA - NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS area, CHINA, and BURMA, and vigorously counter UNITED STATES offensive action in the WESTERN ALEUTIANS.

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JOINT ACTION BY GERMANY AND JAPAN

10 GERMANY and JAPAN are partners in the war only because of self-interest. Joint action by them is founded primarily on coincidence of policy. Each is undoubtedly anxious to see that the UNITED NATIONS power will be deployed increasingly against the other partner. The major opportunity for coordinated German-Japanese action lies in the Japanese capability to attack SIBERIA. The Germans are keenly in favor of such an attack. Joint German-Japanese action with a view to effecting a junction through the MIDDLE EAST is not considered an AXIS capability.

FORECAST FOR 1944, EUROPEAN - AFRICAN AREA

11. General. The determining factor in estimating the Military situation which may exist in 1944 is the status of RUSSIA, i.e., whether or not she is defeated in 1943. AXIS forces will, in either case, be expelled from AFRICA, and UNITED NATIONS lines of communication through the MEDITERRANEAN will be greatly improved by the latter part of 1943.

12. If RUSSIA is defeated in EUROPE.

a. German ground and service forces will probably be reduced in order to release men for industry and agriculture, and thus relieve the strain on German economy. The extent of the German Military effort, however, may be seriously decreased as a result of the UNITED NATIONS air offensive and of losses sustained in the operations involving the defeat of RUSSIA.

b. SPAIN will remain at least a passive partner of the AXIS. TURKEY will remain neutral, but UNITED NATIONS prestige and influence in TURKEY will be materially decreased.

c. A successful invasion of the UNITED KINGDOM in 1944 is not considered an AXIS capability.

d. The UNITED NATIONS air offensive will become the only effective means for conducting operations against the AXIS in EUROPE.

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e. The UNITED NATIONS will continue to blockade the EUROPEAN AXIS.

f. The most probable AXIS course of action after the defeat of RUSSIA will be to conduct offensive action toward gaining control of the MEDITERRANEAN and the PERSIAN GULF, while conducting an air and submarine campaign against the UNITED NATIONS, particularly the UNITED KINGDOM.

13. If RUSSIA is not defeated in EUROPE.

a. The scale of German Military effort in 1944 will be below that of 1943.

b. The major part of the AXIS Military forces will be absorbed on the Russian Front.

c. Italian resistance will deteriorate still further.

d. UNITED NATIONS success in the MEDITERRANEAN will force the Germans either to reinforce ITALY, or to withdraw from ITALY and take over Italian commitments in FRANCE and the BALKANS when Italian troops are recalled from those areas to defend the homeland.

e. Turkish resistance to German influence will be strengthened and Spanish neutrality will continue.

f. Defection will increase in the satellite and occupied countries.

g. GERMANY'S goal will probably be to achieve a Military stalemate.

h. A serious, though perhaps not immediately critical, decline in German morale will follow.

i. The UNITED NATIONS air offensive will become an increasingly important factor.

j. Under this assumption (RUSSIA not defeated), GERMANY'S most likely course of action in 1944 will be to exploit the areas she controls, to consolidate the fortress of Europe and to continue the U-boat campaign.

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FORECAST FOR 1944 - PACIFIC AND FAR EAST

14. General.

Since the United Nations main effort in 1943 will be made in the EUROPEAN - AFRICAN Area, operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST will continue with the object of maintaining pressure on JAPAN, accomplishing the attrition of enemy forces, retaining the initiative, and attaining a position of readiness for a full scale offensive against JAPAN as soon as GERMANY is defeated.

Though the UNITED NATIONS should have a potential air advantage, the dispositions of air forces will not be such as to permit their decisive application.

The UNITED NATIONS naval forces will be superior to those of JAPAN.

The situation with regard to JAPAN will be strongly influenced by the status of RUSSIA in EUROPE, and of CHINA.

15. If the defeat of RUSSIA is clearly imminent, and CHINA continues in the war.

If the defeat of RUSSIA in EUROPE becomes apparent in 1943 the Japanese will most likely attack SIBERIA.

In such a case:

- a. The major part of the Japanese offensive effort will be directed toward RUSSIA in 1944.
- b. Limited offensives by the UNITED NATIONS against JAPAN in the PACIFIC areas and SOUTHEASTERN ASIA will be facilitated.
- c. Lend-Lease deliveries to RUSSIA will be reduced.
- d. There will be no substantial change in the situation in CHINA.

16. If the defeat of RUSSIA is not clearly imminent.

If the imminence of defeat of RUSSIA is not clear to JAPAN in 1943, an attack against SIBERIA is unlikely. In this case

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Full-scale Lend-Lease aid to RUSSIA will continue and JAPAN'S major efforts will be directed toward securing and exploiting the territory she controls, and eliminating CHINA from the war.

17. If CHINA is eliminated from the war.

JAPAN may succeed in eliminating CHINA as an active UNITED NATIONS ally, either through Military action or political intrigue. If accomplished, JAPAN will be relieved of many of her Military commitments in CHINA, will be free to employ the forces thus relieved in other areas, and the prospect of bombing attack from CHINA on her homeland will be eliminated.

UNITED NATIONS SITUATION

18. In the EUROPEAN - AFRICAN area, the bulk of the ground forces are engaged on the RUSSIAN Front. The UNITED NATIONS occupy advantageous positions for an air offensive against the EUROPEAN AXIS and for invasion of the continent from their bases in the UNITED KINGDOM and to a lesser degree in AFRICA. At present the principal American and British ground forces in the EUROPEAN - AFRICAN theater are concentrated in NORTH AFRICA. An air offensive is proceeding and will continue at a gradually increasing rate. The initiation of an invasion awaits the build up of essential forces and the logistic requirements for their support. The time that it may be undertaken, the location of the staging area, and the scale of effort required is dependent upon the reduction of GERMANY'S war potential and morale through the UNITED NATIONS air offensive and other means.

19. In the PACIFIC and FAR EAST, the UNITED NATIONS are in contact with the enemy in the ALEUTIANS, the SOLOMONS - NEW GUINEA area, BURMA, and CHINA. Limited offensives in these areas are designed to apply pressure on the enemy, to accomplish attrition of enemy forces including shipping, to retain the initiative, to gain positions for a full-scale offensive, and to sustain CHINA as an active ally.

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20. Air Power.

The outstanding feature of the UNITED NATIONS war effort has been the rapidity with which air power has been developed and applied. Air advantage has been gained in practically all areas, and the advantage will increase rapidly in the immediate future. The proposed UNITED NATIONS bomber offensive should gravely affect the AXIS war effort.

21. UNITED STATES.

a. Manpower. Mobilized and trained manpower will reach its optimum in 1944.

b. Military. Current estimates indicate that by the end of 1943 the Army Air Force will have 114 bomber groups (6200 airplanes) and 59 fighter groups (5900 airplanes). Of these, 26 bomber groups and 12 fighter groups will not be deployable outside of the UNITED STATES due either to the status of equipment or training.

The ground forces should consist of 100 combat divisions. Sixty-nine divisions will be in the UNITED STATES, but only 32 of these will have completed training.

Disregarding prospective losses, naval forces available for deployment to the PACIFIC by the end of 1943, will be superior to the Japanese Fleet. Extended naval action against Japanese lines of communication and positions will be possible.

c. Production. Most major items should be in full-scale production by early 1944.

d. Shipping. Considering the scheduled production of shipping and the measures being instituted to combat the submarine, it is expected that adequate shipping will be available to meet transportation requirements.

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22. GREAT BRITAIN.

a. Manpower. Mobilized to capacity; the bulk of the forces in the UNITED KINGDOM should soon be fully trained and equipped for offensive action.

b. Military. It is estimated that by the end of 1943, the Royal Air Force will have 225 bomber squadrons (3825 airplanes) and 342 fighter squadrons (4100 airplanes).

The British Imperial Army will consist of 84 combat divisions, including 65 divisions of British and Dominion troops, 15 divisions of African and Indian troops, and 4 divisions made up of Allied personnel.

British naval strength at the end of 1943 will be adequate for neutralizing enemy surface naval forces in the ATLANTIC and MEDITERRANEAN. British naval forces in the INDIAN OCEAN are adequate only if major Japanese naval forces are contained in the PACIFIC.

c. Economic. The productive capacity of GREAT BRITAIN may be expected to increase only slightly.

23. CHINA.

a. As long as Chiang Kai Shek remains in power, Chinese collapse is unlikely. A change in the political regime would reduce the effectiveness of and might eliminate CHINA as an ally. Enemy operations resulting in the isolation of CHINA would curtail and eventually prevent the Military cooperation of CHINA regardless of her political leadership.

b. Manpower. Manpower is not a limitation upon the size of the Chinese Army. The Chinese forces are best adapted to holding operations and guerilla activities.

c. Military. The army now contains fewer Japanese forces than it did in December, 1941. Important battles with Japanese ground forces may be fought on Chinese soil and will require the participation of large Chinese forces.

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d. Economic. Practically all munitions for the Chinese must be supplied by the UNITED NATIONS.

e. Morale. Chinese morale is now depressed but steady. An improvement in Chinese morale reflected in combat power, may be expected in 1943 or 1944 when the Chinese Government is convinced that the United Nations are undertaking decisive operations in the FAR EAST.

24. French Forces in AFRICA.

a. Manpower. It appears that a maximum of 3 armored and 8 infantry divisions with the supporting forces and an air force of some 450 airplanes can eventually be armed by the UNITED NATIONS. Additional manpower is available but could probably not produce combat units suitable for service in EUROPE.

b. Economic. The UNITED NATIONS have agreed to equip and maintain such forces.

25. RUSSIA.

a. RUSSIA is containing the bulk of the German forces. The ability of the UNITED NATIONS to obtain the unconditional surrender of the EUROPEAN AXIS will be influenced to a high degree by the length of time RUSSIA remains effectively in the war and the attrition she will have inflicted on GERMANY'S Military resources.

b. Manpower. The Russian forces can probably be sustained at the current levels if UNITED NATIONS assistance is continued at the current rate.

c. Economic. The Russian economy has probably passed its peak effort and may suffer critical decline during 1944.

26. AXIS occupied countries.

a. Military. The Military benefits which may be expected from the subjugated populations are sabotage, intelligence, and subversive activities, all of which force the AXIS to divert ground forces for police purposes.

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The latter course of action is the less acceptable because of the unfavorable terrain, logistical difficulties, limitations to furnishing adequate air support, and diversion of air forces from the bomber offensive from the UNITED KINGDOM.

29. In the PACIFIC and FAR EAST, the UNITED NATIONS can in 1943 - 1944:

a. Maintain pressure against JAPAN, retaining the initiative, attaining positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against JAPAN, and keeping CHINA in the war, with such forces as are allocated for the purpose.

b. Furnish supplies and limited air support to CHINA.

c. Increase attrition of Japanese shipping, air, and naval resources.

d. Undertake naval operations in the PACIFIC against Japanese shipping and positions at an increasing rate and intensity.

e. Maintain Allied lines of communication.

30. If CHINA is eliminated from the war.

If CHINA is eliminated as an active ally, the UNITED NATIONS will be deprived of the most promising sites from which to conduct an air offensive against JAPAN, the obligation to free CHINA from Japanese control will become an added burden, and the defeat of JAPAN may be delayed for years.

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April 13, 1943

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SURVEY OF PRESENT STRATEGIC SITUATION
(Clarification of Casablanca Decisions)

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

The enclosure is a study prepared by the United States Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and represents clarification of the Casablanca decisions. It is submitted to the Combined Chiefs for their information.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

CLARIFICATION OF CASABLANCA DECISIONS

I. OVER-ALL STRATEGY OF THE WAR.

(a) In cooperation with Russia and the lesser allies, to force an unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

(b) Simultaneously, in cooperation with the other Pacific Powers, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan.

(c) Thereafter, in cooperation with the other Pacific Powers and if possible with Russia, to combine the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to force the unconditional surrender of Japan.

II. BASIC STRATEGY FOR 1943.

To conduct a strategic offensive against the Axis in the European - Mediterranean theater, employing the maximum forces consistent with maintaining and extending unremitting pressure against Japan, and with meeting current accepted strategic commitments.

III. ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES.

Resources will be allocated to meet approved strategic commitments on a scale subject to review from time to time. Resources available after meeting current strategic commitments will be allocated to approved strategic undertakings, subject to alteration in keeping with the changing situation.

IV. STRATEGIC COMMITMENTS.

Priority Group 1

(a) Maintain the security, and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and British Isles.

(b) Support and maintain our forces in all areas to which committed.

(c) Keep enemy submarine effort under increasingly effective control.

Priority Group 2

(d) Meet requirements of Russian protocol to greatest extent possible without prohibitive cost in shipping.

(e) Sustain China by the greatest volume of supplies that can be got into China, without prohibitive cost in transport.

(f) Other firm commitments, approved from time to time, for political or military reasons as essential to the conduct of the war.

V. STRATEGIC UNDERTAKINGS.

Priority as between the Axis in Europe and Japan.

(a) Resources available for strategic undertakings will be allocated on the basis of the approved over-all strategy of conducting a strategic offensive against the Axis in Europe, while maintaining and extending unremitting pressure against Japan.

(b) As between these two basic undertakings, available resources will be allocated as follows:

(1) For operations against the Axis in Europe - all resources over and above those allocated for use against Japan.

(2) For operations against Japan - resources adequate to ensure that operations in Europe are not prejudiced by the necessity to divert forces therefrom, in order to relieve an adverse situation arising from operations against Japan; the extent of such operations, however, to be kept within limits which will not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, jeopardize the ability of the United Nations to take advantage of a favorable opportunity to defeat Germany decisively in 1943.

Priority as among specific operations.

(a) Within the scope of the resources allocated for use against Japan, the operations to be undertaken in the Pacific and their relative priority will be decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(b) Within the resources allocated to the European theater and to the Far East, the priority of major operations is established in the order: TORCH, HUSKY, SICKLE, ANAKIM, BOLERO.

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April 23, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

SURVEY OF PRESENT STRATEGIC SITUATION
(Clarification of Casablanca Decisions)

Memorandum by the Representatives of the
British Chiefs of Staff

Enclosed are some comments in detail on Enclosure "A" to C.C.S. 199, the paper prepared by the United States Joint Strategic Survey Committee and representing clarification of the Casablanca decisions.

These comments are submitted for the consideration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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E N C L O S U R E

CLARIFICATION OF CASABLANCA DECISIONS

We have considered in detail Enclosure "A" to C.C.S. 199, in close consultation with the British Chiefs of Staff.

1. In general, we do not understand why a clarification of the Casablanca decisions is required. In our view, C.C.S. 155/1 is a clear, carefully worded document, unanimously approved at Casablanca by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and thereafter also approved by the President and the Prime Minister. We feel that if the U. S. Chiefs of Staff wish to amend C.C.S. 155/1 the proposed amendments should have strict relation to the existing text. Alternatively, if merely interpretation or clarification is required, we feel that it would be better to agree upon such interpretation or clarification again in direct relation, paragraph by paragraph, to the existing text than to try to reach agreement about a fresh paper which cannot but introduce new shades of meaning.

2. Clauses 5 and 6 of C.C.S. 155/1, read in conjunction with the words "with the maximum forces that can be brought to bear upon her by the United Nations" which appear at the end of clause 3, make it abundantly clear that the agreed intention at Casablanca was to limit the forces allocated for use against Japan to those necessary for preventing Japan from creating a situation so adverse to the United Nations that it would have to be retrieved at the expense of operations against Germany. From the information available to us it does not appear that such a situation is imminent nor that the United Nations are in danger of losing the initiative; and we therefore feel that no "extension" of the pressure now being applied to Japan and visualised in

Enclosure "A" to C.C.S. 199

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paragraph 6(c)(ii) of C.C.S. 155/1 is necessary or justifiable at the expense of operations against Germany. Indeed, it is clear from paragraph 6(c) that any "extension" of pressure against Japan was to be of a lower order of priority than ANAKIM.

3. With regard to the allocation of resources referred to in paragraph III of C.C.S. 199, we are not clear as to exactly what this paragraph is intended to convey. We feel that it might be interpreted as establishing the right to unilateral modification of agreed programmes and would like to know who will review the scale and who will judge how the changing situation will affect allocations.

4. We feel that clauses 3 and 5 of C.C.S. 155/1 give a clearer and simpler statement of the agreed strategy than that given in paragraph V(b) of C.C.S. 199 and that they should be adhered to.

5. Paragraph VI(b) of C.C.S. 199 sets out a priority as among specific operations. We are not quite happy about this paragraph because we feel that whereas perhaps as regards the Pacific it is not binding enough, as regards the other theatres it is perhaps rather too binding. For instance, it is too early yet to say that after SICKLE should come ANAKIM. Then again, its wording rather rigidly excludes any reference to the possibility, after HUSKY, of such action as that referred to in paragraphs 4(a) and (b) of C.C.S. 155/1. The position of BOLERO also needs further examination in relation to commitments in the Pacific. If our policy is to be a strategic offensive against the Axis in Europe, clearly BOLERO must not be starved as otherwise Cross-Channel Operations in 1944 will again be impossible.

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6. A general comment, which we think to be fair, is that C.C.S. 199 by implication would seem to give pride of place to war in the Far East, whereas the clear decision at Casablanca was that the decisive defeat of Germany must come first.

7. We feel, therefore, that there are many important points of difference between C.C.S. 199 and C.C.S. 155/1. If it is felt that a new version of C.C.S. 155/1 is required as distinct from possible amendments to or amplification of C.C.S. 155/1, we consider that it would be a hopeless task to try to arrive at this new version by the interchange of telegrams. C.C.S. 155/1 was the fruit of many days of careful and earnest discussion in an atmosphere in which the various points of view were disclosed with perfect frankness and where the elucidation of any point of view could be obtained immediately. We recommend therefore:

a. That C.C.S. 155/1 should continue to be the accepted paper that it has been ever since Casablanca.

b. That if the U. S. Chiefs of Staff should wish to amend that document, the proposed amendments should have strict relation to the existing text and ample time should be given for their consideration.

8. It is clear that any amendments which may be agreed between the Combined Chiefs of Staff would have to be referred to the President and the Prime Minister for their approval.

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C.C.S. 199/2

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SURVEY OF PRESENT STRATEGIC SITUATION
(Clarification of Casablanca Decisions)

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have noted the comments submitted by the representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff concerning the clarification of the Casablanca decisions set forth in C.C.S. 199. This clarification was not intended as an attempt to reopen the Casablanca Conference or to rewrite its decisions.

2. Clarification of the Casablanca Decisions was perhaps not the best title. The paper is actually an attempt to bring up to date in one short paper for the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and U. S. Services the current accepted strategic concept, with particular reference to furnishing an adequate basis for allocation of resources. Such a paper must of necessity include: (a) a consideration of all the pertinent Casablanca papers; (b) matters assumed as generally accepted, and hence omitted at Casablanca (support of British economy for example); (c) information as to available resources in modification of the Casablanca data; (d) action of C.C.S. subsequent to Casablanca; (e) new events and conditions as they have arisen.

3. It should be emphasized that this paper is not considered a "revision" of C.C.S. 155/1, any more than was C.C.S. 170/2 or Part II of the appendix of C.C.S. 183/1. On the other hand, it is our opinion that when another Casablanca document is eventually produced, it might well be prepared in the same general form as C.C.S. 199.

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(J.C.S. 302)

May 11, 1943

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

COLLAPSE OR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF ITALY

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

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COLLAPSE OR UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF ITALY

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An examination of the courses of action of the UNITED NATIONS in the event of the collapse or unconditional surrender of ITALY is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The courses of action selected are as follows:

a. In the event of civil war in ITALY:

(1) Establish ground and air forces in ITALY for the purpose of supporting the revolutionists only.

(2) Demand as concessions from the revolutionists, upon the successful conclusion of the civil war, bases in Italian possessions, and the immobilization of the Italian fleet.

(3) Assist in the economic support of ITALY.

b. In the event of the collapse of ITALY:

(1) Occupy a defensive line in northern ITALY.

(2) Establish air bases and continue the air offensive against GERMANY.

(3) Assist in the economic support of ITALY.

(4) Establish garrisons for the maintenance of order.

c. In the event of the unconditional surrender of ITALY:

(1) Terms of surrender should meet Military requirements, but should be sufficiently liberal to insure a stable government.

(2) Other courses of action should be as in b above.

ENCLOSURE "A"

COLLAPSE OR UNCONDITIONAL
SURRENDER OF ITALY

3. Problem.

To determine the courses of action the UNITED NATIONS should adopt in the event of the collapse or unconditional surrender of ITALY.

4. There are three general conditions which may develop within continental ITALY which may require the establishment of UNITED NATIONS forces on Italian soil. These are:

a. Civil war, resulting from an Anti-Fascist and Anti-German revolution.

b. The "collapse" of ITALY, meaning the disintegration of organized government followed by political chaos.

c. "Unconditional surrender" of ITALY, meaning the orderly compliance with terms of surrender through the control of an organized government.

5. A civil war in ITALY may develop through the rise of an Anti-Fascist and Anti-German revolution. This contingency is most unlikely because, at present, contrary to some opinion, large elements of the populace approve the German alliance, and no individual or group is considered to be strong enough, or to have sufficient prestige, to initiate or lead such a revolution. However, should these unlikely conditions of a civil war develop, it might become necessary, on an appeal for aid by the revolutionists, for the UNITED NATIONS to furnish them Military support.

6. The collapse of ITALY may be brought about by one factor or varying combinations of the following factors: Military reverses, refusal by GERMANY of further Military assistance, destruction caused by the UNITED NATIONS air offensive, subversive

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activities, and loss of faith in and repudiation of their present leadership by the Italian people. The disintegration leading to chaos may be a gradual process and there should be sufficient and timely intelligence as to the stages of its development.

7. GERMANY will take steps to prevent the collapse of ITALY, even to the extent of sending some forces there, only as long as GERMANY considers the retention of all or part of ITALY of strategic value. Economically and politically, ITALY is a liability rather than an asset. When TUNISIA is cleared of AXIS forces, SICILY would continue to be of strategic value to GERMANY, and all evidence points to GERMAN assistance in the defense of SICILY. The collapse of ITALY prior to successful completion of HUSKY is therefore unlikely.

8. A successful HUSKY, following the LIBYAN-TUNISIAN debacle, is likely to have serious effects on Italian will to continue to fight. Primarily GERMANY would wish to retain that part of ITALY from which GERMANY could control the ADRIATIC coast (against an invasion of the BALKANS) and SARDINIA and CORSICA (against an invasion of Southern FRANCE), and at the same time deny air bases to the UNITED NATIONS. GERMANY would weigh these objectives against requirements elsewhere, such as on the Russian Front and those resulting from the UNITED NATIONS air offensive. Thus, the German reaction after HUSKY is difficult to predict. For the purpose of the rest of this study, therefore, it is assumed that when ITALY collapses, the German forces will have withdrawn from the greater part of ITALY to a defensive line of their own choosing.

9. The unconditional surrender of ITALY will be brought about primarily by Military action aided by varying combinations of the factors listed in paragraphs 6 and 7 as contributing to her collapse. She will not surrender unconditionally as long as GERMANY dominates the Italian government and maintains forces in ITALY.

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10. GERMANY'S decision to abandon ITALY will be a calculated measure designed to injure the UNITED NATIONS as well as to benefit herself. ITALY will be compelled to pay a high price to GERMANY for the privilege of seeking peace with the UNITED NATIONS. GERMANY will be unconcerned with the resulting conditions in ITALY or the terms of peace ITALY is able to reach.

11. To insure that GERMANY may gain the economic advantages she desires and may provide for her own security, GERMANY will denude ITALY of such economic assets as can be moved or destroyed in the short time available. These measures will impose upon the UNITED NATIONS the burden of furnishing economic support to ITALY, and thus impose a further drain on UNITED NATIONS resources. Italian units returned from occupied countries would be of value to the UNITED NATIONS in stabilizing the situation in ITALY. However, in order to deny the use of Italian forces and equipment to the UNITED NATIONS, GERMANY will not assist in the return of Italian troops and materiel to the Homeland, and will insist at least upon the scuttling of the Italian surface fleet.

12. The severe measures which GERMANY may impose as the price for permitting ITALY to withdraw from the war might bring about the conditions of collapse rather than conditions leading to unconditional surrender.

13. It appears unlikely that ITALY will submit to terms of surrender which fail to provide for the stability of her government. If terms of surrender are imposed that fail to provide this stability, collapse is likely to follow. It is most desirable, therefore, that the terms be sufficiently liberal to permit a stable Italian government to survive. The alternative would be the obligations resulting from a collapse.

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14. The courses of action which should be undertaken by the UNITED NATIONS are:

a. In the event of civil war in ITALY:

(1) Establish ground and air forces in ITALY for the purpose of supporting the revolutionists only. The establishment of forces in continental ITALY for other purposes would alienate sentiment favorable to the revolution.

(2) Demand as concessions from the revolutionists, upon the successful conclusion of the civil war, bases in SICILY, SARDINIA, and the DODECANESE; the immobilization of the Italian Fleet; and, if deemed expedient at the time, the withdrawal of Italian forces from non-Italian territory.

(3) Assist in the economic support of ITALY.

b. In the event of the collapse of ITALY:

(1) Occupy and defend with minimum forces a readily defensible line in northern ITALY, and only such coastal positions within the occupied area as are of strategic importance.

(2) Establish air bases in the occupied area and continue the air offensive against GERMANY.

(3) Undertake economic assistance to the Italian people.

(4) Garrison centers of population with minimum forces for the maintenance of order. Establish a Military government making maximum use of any existing civil agencies, and gradually restore Italian control of the civil administration.

c. In the event of unconditional surrender of ITALY:

(1) Surrender terms should meet Military requirements, but be sufficiently liberal to insure the continued existence of a stable government.

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(2) Other courses of action should be as in b, except that forces required to insure the stability of the government would be considerably smaller.

15. The strength of UNITED NATIONS forces to be established in ITALY will depend upon whether the occupation will be the result of civil war, a collapse, or an unconditional surrender, and upon the nature of defense required. It is impossible to predict the circumstances which will control the strength of these forces. It appears likely that fifteen divisions would be the minimum required. A force of this size might be made available from the garrisons in the MEDITERRANEAN area, otherwise they would have to be built up gradually from other areas.

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By RHP, NLR, Date

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(J.C.S. 304)

May 12, 1943

Pages 1-32 incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

Note by the Secretaries

The attached report, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An analysis has been made of possible UNITED NATIONS courses of action in the PACIFIC-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944 to conform to the objectives set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in J.C.S. 290/1. The analysis is contained in Enclosure "A."

2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are as follows:

a. Far Eastern theater

(1) ANAKIM and Revised ANAKIM

Retained as suitable. Vital to implementing the strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN and to keeping CHINA in the war.

(2) Air operations in and from CHINA

Retained. Close coordination with other elements of plan are essential.

(3) Operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA

Retained for implementation subsequent to the recapture of BURMA as a vital part of the strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN.

b. PACIFIC theater

(1) Operations in the SOLOMONS and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

Retained. Provides for retaining the initiative, maintaining pressure on JAPAN, and the defense of AUSTRALIA.

(2) Operations in NEW GUINEA

Retained. The capture of NEW GUINEA will facilitate the opening of a line of communications to the CELEBES SEA and contribute to the defense of AUSTRALIA.

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(3) Operations in eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

Retained. Due to limitation of forces, operations other than air warfare should be restricted to the seizure of those islands necessary to the capture of NEW GUINEA.

(4) Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS

Retained. Shortens line of communications to SOUTHWEST PACIFIC and CELEBES SEA.

(5) Operations in the CAROLINE ISLANDS

Retained. Necessary to gain control of central PACIFIC, thereby facilitating establishment of line of communications to CELEBES SEA. Will enable UNITED NATIONS forces to directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

(6) Operations in the northern PACIFIC, after the ejection of Japanese from the ALEUTIANS

Rejected. Not in accordance with strategic concept.

3. Conclusions:

a. Offensive operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943-1944 should have the following objectives:

- (1) Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
- (2) Seizure of BURMA.
- (3) Ejection of the Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
- (4) Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.
- (5) Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.

b. Operations to gain these objectives will be restricted by the availability of trained amphibious divisions and amphibious craft.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST IN 1943-44

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

4. To prepare an analysis of possible UNITED NATIONS courses of action in the PACIFIC-Asiatic area in 1943 and 1944, in conformity with UNITED NATIONS strategy.

ASSUMPTIONS

5. It is assumed that:

a. CHINA will continue in the war against JAPAN.

b. It is the intention of JAPAN to invade SIBERIA at a time advantageous to her and disadvantageous to RUSSIA, and before GERMANY is defeated.

6. After a thorough estimate of the situation for 1943-44 was made, it was concluded that in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST:

a. The UNITED NATIONS should conduct limited offensive operations in order to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the initiative, and attain or retain positions of readiness for a full-scale offensive against JAPAN, and in order to keep CHINA in the war.

b. For these purposes, UNITED STATES naval forces should be increased to a maximum consistent with the minimum requirements in the ATLANTIC, and with due regard to the requirements of the main effort against the European AXIS, air and ground forces should be provided so as to facilitate joint action and make optimum use of the increasing strength of UNITED STATES naval forces.

7. J.C.S. 287/1 sets forth a strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN. Based on this strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN, the following courses of action are open to the UNITED NATIONS:

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a. In the Asiatic theater:

- (1) Operations ANAKIM and Revised ANAKIM.
- (2) Air operations in and from CHINA.
- (3) Initiation of operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA.

b. In the PACIFIC theater:

- (1) Operations in the SOLOMONS and in the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.
- (2) Operations in NEW GUINEA.
- (3) Operations in the eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.
- (4) Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS.
- (5) Operations in the CAROLINE ISLANDS.
- (6) Operations in the northern PACIFIC.

PART I

OPERATIONS IN ASIA

8. The operation ANAKIM and Revised ANAKIM

This operation is discussed in J.C.S. 303.

9. Air operations in and from CHINA

a. General examination of this course of action.

- (1) This course of action is suitable.
- (2) The feasibility of the current plan for air operations in CHINA is limited by the problem of supply. Air transport is the only route of supply leading into CHINA and air operations in CHINA during 1943 and 1944 will expand in size and scope of operations, in direct proportion to the increase in the amount of supplies made available to the air force in CHINA.

b. In the event that the operation ANAKIM or a Revised ANAKIM is successful, it is estimated that supplies to CHINA will begin to move by land routes in approximately six months. A rapid expansion of the capacity of the air route will be

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immediately practicable, due to the added facilities available at the western terminus, and the existence of more favorable operating conditions.

c. Current plans for the air transport route to CHINA contemplate that its present capacity of approximately 3,000 tons per month may be expanded to approximately 10,000 tons per month by the end of 1943. Due to physical limitations imposed by the area in which this line operates, it is doubtful whether this latter figure can be exceeded until ANAKIM or a Revised ANAKIM has been accomplished.

d. The Commanding General, 14th Air Force, estimates that the forces required to conduct planned combat operations in CHINA are as follows:

4 Fighter Groups	300	airplanes
2 Medium Bomber Groups	114	"
1 Heavy Bomber Group	35	"
1 Recon. Squadron	24	"
TOTAL	473	airplanes

e. The Commanding General, 14th Air Force, estimates that this force can be operated on a monthly supply of 7,128 tons. This is only possible by cutting the ground echelon T/O approximately in half and utilizing local sources of supply to the utmost.

f. It is believed that the operation of this force will accomplish the following objectives:

(1) Subject the Japanese Air Force to a very costly attrition.

(2) Permit sustained and damaging attacks against Japanese shipping on the YANGTSE RIVER, along the CHINA coast, and out to sea to include all of the islands of FORMOSA and HAINAN and the sea lane between JAPAN and SHANGHAI.

(3) Permit damaging air attack on Japanese industrial targets as far north as SHAN-HAI-KWAN and east to include NANKING, SHANGHAI, and the island of FORMOSA.

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(4) Permit limited bombardment attacks on the mainland of JAPAN.

(5) Make extensive preparations for the eventual operation of large air forces to be used in the air offensive against JAPAN proper.

(6) Give support to Chinese ground forces.

g. Air operations in and from CHINA are considered a vital and necessary step in the "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN," J.C.S. 287/1. The scale and tempo of the air operations must be carefully gauged as they progress, in the light of probable Japanese reaction. If advanced too rapidly they might precipitate a large scale land offensive by the Japanese in CHINA, at an earlier date than we consider desirable.

h. Following these limited operations, the large scale, sustained air offensive against JAPAN proper becomes feasible when supply routes to CHINA are developed to the point where the forces involved can be logistically maintained. This latter phase will undoubtedly require logistic support through a CHINA port in order that it may be conducted on the scale we contemplate.

10. Operations to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA.

a. After the recapture of BURMA, operations should be initiated to open the STRAIT OF MALACCA. Such operations will compel JAPAN to disperse her forces and will provide an additional front in which Japanese forces may be engaged. These operations probably will extend from the RANGOON area down the KRA PENINSULA towards SINGAPORE and to SUMATRA.

b. The operations should be undertaken by British Commonwealth Forces because the area is one of British strategic

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responsibility. These operations should be undertaken after the recapture of BURMA and should commence in 1944.

PART II

OPERATIONS IN PACIFIC

11. Operations in the SOLOMONS and in the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

a. Operations now directed.

(1) Operations for the seizure of the SOLOMONS-BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO have been under way since July, 1942 (about nine months). The tasks prescribed by the latest directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (March 28, 1943) are quoted below:

"TASKS

4. (a) Establish airfields on KIRIWINA and WOODLARK ISLANDS.

(b) Seize LAE - SALAMAU - FINSCHAFEN - MADANG area and occupy western NEW BRITAIN.

(c) Seize and occupy SOLOMON ISLANDS to include the southern portion of BOUGAINVILLE.

5. Purposes. To inflict losses on Japanese forces, to deny these areas to JAPAN, to contain Japanese forces in the PACIFIC Theater by maintaining the initiative, and to prepare for the ultimate seizure of BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO."

b. Present status of operations.

(1) General.

The Supreme Commander, SWPA, gives June 15, 1943, as the target date for the occupation of KIRIWINA and WOODLARK ISLANDS. No date is indicated for subsequent phases of the entire operation.

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(2) Forces required.

It is estimated that on July 1, 1943, UNITED NATIONS forces in the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC areas will total 14 offensive divisions and 2,106 combat aircraft. These forces, together with naval forces in the area, are considered adequate for the operations directed.

(3) Time of completion.

The exact timing of the successive operations is impracticable at this time to predict, since the enemy reaction to the plans is indeterminate, and limited topographical intelligence may result in unexpected hindrances. The operations may run well into 1944.

c. Subsequent operations.

(1) Capture BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

(a) General.

UNITED NATIONS strategic plans envisage the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO (including ADMIRALTY ISLANDS) following the completion of tasks indicated in paragraph a above.

The existing concept of operations provides initially for the capture of KAVIENG, in order to isolate sea communications to RABOUL. After the establishment of airdromes in NEW BRITAIN and NEW IRELAND, the defenses of RABOUL will be heavily attacked by land-based aviation. When the enemy defenses are softened up, capture of the area will be made by two amphibious forces. One force will be mounted from the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC and one from the SOUTH PACIFIC.

After the seizure of the NEW BRITAIN-NEW IRELAND area, the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS can be neutralized by land-based aviation operating from NEW GUINEA and NEW BRITAIN. Seizure will be made by amphibious forces.

(b) Forces required.

The Supreme Commander, SWPA, estimates that 7 infantry divisions, 5 of which are amphibious, will be required to seize KAVIENG and capture RABAU. It is believed, however, that with effective air neutralization of the RABAU area, the foregoing estimate may be reduced to 5 divisions, 3 of which would be amphibious.

The timing of the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO will determine to a great extent the availability of ground forces. Provided there is sufficient time for reorganization and recuperation of units, it appears the 5 divisions can be provided from the 18 offensive divisions allocated to the area as of January 1, 1944. This figure will be subject to revision after the operations now projected for the area get under way. The ground forces required for the successive operations in the BISMARCK-NEW GUINEA area must take into account the losses from malaria and battle casualties which necessitate withdrawal of troops to rear areas for rehabilitation after four to six months.

It appears that 2,579 combat aircraft allocated to the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC as of January 1, 1944, will be sufficient to complete the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

(c) Time required for operation.

Assuming the UNITED NATIONS establish positions in western NEW BRITAIN and southern BOUGAINVILLE by December 1, 1943, it is estimated that, exclusive of medical rehabilitation of personnel, at least two months will be required to reorganize amphibious units, develop the advance air bases, and make the complete preparations

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for the amphibious attack on the RABAU area. It is estimated that a minimum of two months will be required to complete the operations subsequent to the landing attack on RABAU. From the foregoing, it appears that the most optimistic estimates indicate that the BISMARCK operations cannot be completed before April 1, 1944.

12. Operations in NEW GUINEA.

a. Capture NEW GUINEA.

After the seizure of the HUON PENINSULA and the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, our strategic plans contemplate operations to extend our line of communications through the PACIFIC to the HALMAHERA-northwest CELEBES area. The control of NEW GUINEA to include the VOGELKOP area is obviously essential to accomplishing this objective.

The concept of operations for the seizure of NEW GUINEA envisages the projection of our line of communications to the VOGELKOP region by the successive seizure of air bases along the north and southwest coasts.

The initial phases of operations along the north coast consist primarily of air-ground action, covered by air and fleet operations to prevent interference by enemy counter-attacks. Ground forces will be employed in the seizure of air bases by shore-to-shore amphibious operations.

In order to gain control of the ARAFURA-BANDA seas and of the south coast of NEW GUINEA, it will be necessary to seize AROE, KEI, and possibly TANIMBAR Island.

b. The operations to capture NEW GUINEA will consist of two phases as follows:

PHASE I

(1) Seizure of north coast of NEW GUINEA to include CAPE D'URVILLE.

(2) Establishment of an air base on southwest coast of NEW GUINEA as a preliminary to seizure of the AROE Islands. Possible occupation of TANIMBAR Island.

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PHASE II

(1) Capture of the VOGELKOP area to include the Island of WAIGEO.

This phase will be accomplished by the seizure of SCHOUTEN and JAPEN Islands on the north coast. The southern and western portion of the VOGELKOP will be seized after we have established positions in McCLUER GULF and AMBONIA.

c. The capture of NEW GUINEA envisages a movement along the coast line 1,200 miles in length. The forces required for this operation, so distant in the future, cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy. After the loss of the HUON PENINSULA and the RABAU area, the enemy may decide to withdraw to a more advantageous defensive position in the CELEBES SEA area. On the other hand, he may be able to build up his defenses in depth along the entire north coast.

The extent of our control of the sea to the north of NEW GUINEA will in a great measure determine the ease with which we eject him from the area.

d. Estimate of enemy forces.

(1) Ground forces

It is estimated that the Japanese now have approximately 5 divisions deployed in the area. It is assumed that this force could be augmented to a total of 8 divisions. Port facilities and enemy shipping will be limiting factors.

(2) Air forces

It is estimated that the Japanese now have approximately 807 operative aircraft deployed in this area (SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC). It is assumed that the Japanese could reinforce to a total of 1,000 to 1,200 aircraft, depending on the state of their activity and requirements on other fronts.

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e. Estimate of UNITED NATIONS forces required.

(1) Ground forces (assault units)

2 air-borne divisions

16 infantry divisions (including 5 amphibious)

2 parachute regiments

(2) Air forces

(a) Assault

Type	Groups	Aircraft		
BH	7	245		
BM	6	321		
L/DB	6	321		
Fighters	9	720		
Photo Recon.	1	52		
Obsn.	5	260		
Troop Carrier	10	390	Groups	Aircraft
Total	44	2309	44	2309

(b) Area defense

BH	3	105		
BM	3	171		
L/DB	3	171		
Fighters	3	240		
Photo Recon.	1	52		
Obsn.	-	--		
Troop Carrier	-	--		
Total	13	739	13	739
TOTAL			57	3048

(3) Naval forces

Sufficient forces to

(a) Cover advances along the north and south coasts
of NEW GUINEA.

(b) Protect line of communications.

(c) Provide naval defense in ARAFURA-BANDA Seas.

13. Further operations to eastern NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

a. Paragraph 12 discussed the implications of a campaign through the ARAFURA-BANDA sea area for the purpose of seizing the VOGELKOP region. If those operations are not conducted, other offensive-defensive operations should be undertaken in the TIMOR-CELEBES-CERAM area in order to maintain the security of AUSTRALIA and subject enemy forces to attrition.

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b. These operations will consist of air and amphibious action. In view of other operations more pressing in attaining our strategic objectives, it is considered that the availability of forces will limit our activity primarily to air action.

14. Operations in the MARSHALL ISLANDS

a. The capture and occupation of the MARSHALL ISLANDS is a preliminary objective in establishing a line of communications to the CELEBES SEA. It also secures and shortens the line of communications to the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. The occupation of these islands extends our control of the sea two thousand miles into the central PACIFIC. Land-based aircraft from bases in the MARSHALLS will facilitate the operation of naval surface craft against enemy lines of communication. Operations in this area will force attritional losses on enemy aircraft and shipping. It may also compel the Japanese Fleet to accept battle. It is in conformity with the strategic plan for the defeat of JAPAN.

b. Operations against enemy positions in the MARSHALLS consist of amphibious operations initially supported by carrier aircraft. The success of the operation will be greatly enhanced by the use of amphibious tractors which are capable of crossing coral reefs.

c. To control the MARSHALLS it will be necessary to occupy or neutralize all of the major atolls in the group and WAKE ISLAND. The amphibious troops will have to be relieved by garrison troops, and then reorganized and trained for the CAROLINE operations. A minimum estimate of the periods required are as follows:

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Control of the MARSHALLS	3.0 months
Relief by garrison force	1.5 "
Rehabilitation in HAWAII	.75 "
Training new replacements and rehearsals for CAROLINES	1.0 "
Movement, HAWAII to MARSHALLS and preparation for assault on PONAPE	.5 "
TOTAL	6.75 months

d. It is estimated that forces required for capture of the MARSHALLS are as follows:

- (1) Ground
 - 2 Infantry Amphibious Divisions, reinforced
- (2) Air
 - 2 Groups, Bombardment (H)
 - 2 Groups, Fighter
 - Carrier-based aircraft in 4 CVs and 4 ACVs
(72 VT, 192 VSB, 156 VF)
- (3) Naval
 - 4 BB, 4 CV, 7 ACV, 8 CA, 8 CL, 63 DD,
24 APA, 44 LST, plus landing craft.

e. The following forces will be required to garrison the islands:

- (1) Ground
 - 1 Infantry Division, reinforced
 - 10 Defense Battalions
- (2) Air

	B (H)	B(M)	VF	VSB	VT	Total
Land-based	72	72	221	108	72	545
Seaplanes	72 VP 24 VSO					
- (3) Naval
 - 18 PT, miscellaneous craft.

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15. Operations in the CAROLINES

a. Purpose

Operations in the CAROLINES will be for the purpose of wresting control of the central PACIFIC from the Japanese. The establishment of a mainfleet base at TRUK, adequately protected by outlying air bases, is required in order to maintain control, and thus be in a position to continue westward across the PACIFIC or directly threaten the Japanese Archipelago.

b. Operations required

The following operations are required in a campaign to capture the CAROLINES:

TASK ONE. To capture PONAPE and TRUK, and to establish air and garrison forces thereon.

(1) Operations

(a) Capture PONAPE.

(b) Destroy or neutralize enemy air on atolls within radius of 250 miles and as far west as WOLEAI.

(c) Prevent interference with landing operations by major naval forces.

(d) Prevent strong reinforcement of TRUK garrison after landing operations have been initiated.

(e) Capture TRUK, by attack launched from the MARSHALLS and PONAPE, in three phases with several days elapsing between initial landing and final assault and capture, during which time considerable naval support must remain in the vicinity. The capture should not be envisaged as placing a landing force ashore and then a departure of naval forces.

(f) Movement of garrison forces to TRUK.

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TASK TWO. To secure control of the western CAROLINES.

(1) Operations

(a) Neutralization of enemy air establishments in the western CAROLINES in which there are five probable seaplane bases.

(b) Aerial raids against GUAM and SAIPAN.

(c) Aerial raids against KAPINGAMARINGI, if enemy occupies RABAU.

(d) Establishment of air and garrison forces on NOMOI, WOLEAI, and GAFERUT.

TASK THREE. To establish a main fleet operating base on TRUK.

(1) Availability of mobile operating and repair facilities such as LIONS, CUBS, and ACORNS must be assured prior to execution of TASK TWO.

(2) Operations

(a) Assembly of this material at PEARL HARBOR and western coast of the UNITED STATES.

(b) Movement of this material to TRUK and assembly thereof.

c. Factors influencing the campaign

(1) The campaign should be launched from the MARSHALLS even though we hold RABAU. It should follow the capture of the MARSHALLS as quickly as possible. It appears that the controlling factors in this respect will be:

(a) Length of time the two amphibious divisions which captured the MARSHALLS are held thereon before being relieved by the garrison division.

(b) The availability of a third amphibious division and its transports.

(2) A study of the time required to complete the operations enumerated in Tasks One, Two, and Three, above, clearly indicates that the capture of the CAROLINES will require a campaign of several months duration.

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d. Estimate of forces required

(1) In determining forces required, estimates are based on tasks to be performed and a considerable increase of the Japanese garrisons. At TRUK, the garrison is estimated to be one reinforced division.

(2) For the capture of the CAROLINES

(a) Ground

3 Inf. Amph. Divs., reinf.

(b) Air

Land-based

2 Groups, Bombardment (H)

Carrier-based (10 CV's ENTERPRISE-ESSEX Class and 7 ACV's)

VF Sq.	VSB Sq.	VT Sq.	VSTB Sq.
23-1/2	23	7	4-1/2

(c) Naval

4 BB, 9 OBB, 10 CV, 7 ACV, 3 CA, 10 CA or CL,
18 CL, 108 DD, 20 SS, 45 APA, 15 AKA, 6 LSD,
3 Hq. Ships, Misc. aux.

(3) For garrisoning the CAROLINES

(a) Ground

2 Infantry Divisions, reinforced
3 Defense Battalions

(b) Air

Land-based

1 VP Wing
3 VSO (Naval) Squadrons
1 Group, Bombardment (H)
1 Group, Bombardment (M)
1 Group, Bombardment (L and D)
2 Groups, Pursuit

(c) Naval

Misc. Harbor and Local Defense Craft

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16. Operations in the north PACIFIC

a. General

Operations are now in progress for the capture of ATTU and the occupation of SHEMYA. These operations envisage cutting the enemy line of communications from JAPAN to KISKA. The seizure of this area will provide additional bases for the air offensive against KISKA and will enable us to base our submarine operations further to the westward.

Until the Japanese are driven out of KISKA, the UNITED STATES must keep large air and ground forces in the ALEUTIANS and is forced to disperse naval forces to that area. The Japanese must be expelled from KISKA. It may be that the air offensive and blockade will force them to evacuate or surrender. Based on the results of the aerial offensive which has been in progress for several months past, it is probable that landing operations will be required.

The Japanese reaction to our seizure of ATTU will determine the strength of forces and length of time required for operations in the north PACIFIC.

b. U. S. forces now engaged

(1) Ground

3 Infantry Regiments, reinforced
1 Engineer Regiment

(2) Air

2 Sq. Heavy Bombardment
2 Sq. Medium Bombardment
6 Sq. Pursuit
54 Patrol planes

(3) Naval

3 OBB, 3 CA, 4 CL, 19 DD, 3 DM, 11 OSS, 1 ACV,
4 APA, 1 APD, 4 AP, 1 AT, 1 XAP, 3 XAK, 3 XAPc,
6 AO, 2 AD, 11 MTB, 1 AVP, 2 DE, 1 PG, 3 AM,
4 LST.

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c. Our present strategic concept does not contemplate further amphibious operations west of the ALEUTIANS. Our forces there will assume a defensive role until conditions are favorable to operations in support of RUSSIA in the KAMCHATKA PENINSULA-Siberian area.

17. Naval operations in the PACIFIC

Both ANAKIM (discussed in J.C.S. 297) and the Revised ANAKIM Plan (J.C.S. 303) provide for naval operations in the PACIFIC to hold Japanese naval forces in those waters. A positive naval operation in the fall of 1943 will have to be undertaken for this purpose. It is unlikely that operations in the SOLOMONS-NEW GUINEA area will have the desired effect. Probably a carrier-based air attack on JAPAN will be required.

Availability as to Means

18. General

One of the controlling factors for the operations discussed above is the availability of amphibious divisions and amphibious equipment.

a. Amphibious divisions

The only amphibious divisions available in May 1943 are two Marine Corps divisions in the SOUTH PACIFIC and one in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. Readiness for action dates are:

1st Marine Division, (Southwest Pac)	June 1
2d Marine Division, (SoPac)	June 1
3d Marine Division, (less 1 Regt.) (SoPac)	June 1
1 Regt., 3d Marine Division	July 15

Commander SOUTHWEST PACIFIC has set June 15 as target date for commencing operations designed to continue as far as MADANG (NEW GUINEA) - western NEW BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE, and has stated that sequence and timing is subject to fluctuation of tactical circumstances. Three amphibious divisions are required in these operations.

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A most optimistic view, excluding the capture of RABAU, can not envisage relief of amphibious divisions from the SOLOMON - BISMARCK - NEW GUINEA area before February, 1944. Any division relieved will require four to six months for rehabilitation.

The 4th Marine Division is scheduled to depart UNITED STATES in December, 1943. It could be earmarked as one of the two amphibious divisions required for the capture of the MARSHALLS, provided excessive losses are not encountered in SOUTHWEST PACIFIC operations prior to the completion of the MADANG (NEW GUINEA) - western NEW BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE campaign.

Therefore, for the capture of the MARSHALLS there is available one Marine Corps amphibious division from the UNITED STATES in December, 1943, while the other must be provided from the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC or by training an Army division in the UNITED STATES.

(1) Summary of availability of amphibious divisions

<u>Campaign number</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Divisions required</u>	<u>Possible sources of divisions required</u>
1	MADANG-western NEW BRITAIN - BOUGAINVILLE (See par 11 a)	3	3 Marine Corps Divisions in SOUTH PACIFIC and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
2	BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO (See par. 11 c)	5 (possibly reduced to three)	3 Marine Corps Divisions used in Campaign No. 1, after 4 - 6 months rehabilitation. 1 Marine Corps Division from U. S. in Dec., 1943. 1 Army Division must be trained.
3	NEW GUINEA (See par. 12)	5	<u>CASE I</u> Army and Marine Corps Divisions used in Campaign No. 2, after 4 - 6 months rehabilitation

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or

CASE II
Train 5 Army Divisions during Campaign No. 2.

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Campaign number	Area	Divisions required	Possible sources of divisions required
4	Further operations in eastern NEI (see par 13)	5	Same as for Campaign No. 3
5	MARSHALL ISLANDS (see par 14)	2	<p><u>CASE I</u> 1 Marine Corps Division in U. S. in 1943 in which case 2 Army Divisions must be trained for Campaign No. 2. 1 Marine Corps Division from SOUTH PACIFIC upon completion Campaign No. 1 in which case other provisions must be made for 1 Division if Campaign No. 2 is to follow No. 1 without delay.</p>

or

CASE II
 1 Marine Corps Division in U. S. in December, 1943 with same implications as noted in Case I.
 1 Army Division or a new Marine Corps Division must be trained in U. S.

6 CAROLINES (See par. 15)

3

CASE I
 2 Divs. used in Campaign No. 5.
 1 Army or a second new Marine Corps Division must be trained in U. S.

or

CASE II
 2 Divisions used in Campaign No. 5.
 1 Division from SOUTH PACIFIC about after Campaign No. 2, and possibly after 4 - 6 months rehabilitation; in which circumstances Campaign No. 3 (Case I) will be short 1 Division and arrangements must be made to provide it.

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NOTE: It should be emphasized that in transferring divisions from SOUTH or SOUTHWEST PACIFIC to central PACIFIC an additional load will be placed on shipping.

(2) Conclusions based on above summary

A minimum of four additional amphibious divisions must be organized. Consideration should be given to organizing:

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2 Marine Corps divisions - making a total of 6
Marine Corps divisions.

2 Army divisions.

b. Amphibious craft (See Appendices "A" and "B")

(1) It is estimated that 26 APAs and 7 AKAs will be in service in the PACIFIC on January 1, 1944. This will be sufficient to lift two amphibious divisions. Assuming that all APAs and AKAs becoming available for assignment in 1944 are assigned to the PACIFIC, and allowing no attrition after January 1, 1944, the following table indicates the number available to meet all of the requirements in the PACIFIC theater:

	April 1, 1944	July 1, 1944	October 1, 1944	January 1, 1945
APAs	31	43	55	63
AKAs	8	20	32	40

The CAROLINE operations alone will require 45 APAs.

(2) It is estimated that under proposed allocations (Appendix "A"), sufficient LSTs, LCI (L)s, and LCT (5)s will be available for one division to operate in shore to shore movement. A general discussion of losses from attrition is contained in Appendix "B".

NOTE: Amphibious craft figures are subject to adjustment if incompatible with operations determined upon in BURMA and EUROPE.

c. Ground (less amphibious), air, and naval forces

The UNITED NATIONS have 14 offensive divisions in the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC Theaters. The deployment of these divisions cannot be determined far in advance of an actual operation. The requirements for the defense of important bases in the line of communications, and the necessity for rehabilitation of units greatly reduces the number of units actually available at any one time for offensive action.

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Experiences to date in NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMON ISLANDS indicate that combat units can carry on offensive operations for approximately 3 months, after which they must be withdrawn to ^{rear}/~~near~~ positions for recuperation. For each division (or similar combat unit) actually engaged with the enemy, it is essential that an additional division be located in the combat zone in order to insure the availability of combat units to meet counter-attacks or recoup an unfavorable situation. Due to the distances involved, the recuperative period will be about 6 months. It follows that one-third the combat units will at all times be in, or enroute to, recuperative bases too far from the combat zone to be available for an emergency. For planning purposes, it can therefore be assumed that not over one-third of the offensive divisions actually in the area will be available for operations at any given date. The foregoing estimate is substantiated by experiences thus far in the PACIFIC Theater.

Estimates of requirements for subsequent operations are therefore based on the foregoing analysis.

19. Operations in CHINA

a. Air

The estimated aircraft requirements for CHINA as listed in paragraph 9 d above, totals 473 airplanes.

Present deployments indicate the following total aircraft available, and shortages, not classified by types:

	<u>Aircraft available</u>	<u>Shortage</u>
Present	209	264
July 1, 1943	209	264
Jan 1, 1944	209	264
July 1, 1944	279	194
Jan 1, 1945	279	194

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20. Operations in BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO

a. Ground

It was noted in paragraph 11 c (1) (b) that a minimum of 5 divisions will be required for the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. Assuming the occupation of the MADANG-western NEW BRITAIN-BOUGAINVILLE area is accomplished with the forces now planned, it is estimated there will be sufficient infantry divisions available in the area to complete the BISMARCK operation. The availability of amphibious forces has been discussed in paragraph 18 a, above.

b. Air

2579 combat airplanes are estimated to be required in the area. This number will be available as of January 1, 1944. This includes Army, Navy, R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F. Some adjustment as to types may be necessary.

c. Naval

Sufficient naval forces will be made available for this operation.

21. Operations in NEW GUINEA

a. Ground

It is estimated that 18 offensive divisions will be required to capture NEW GUINEA. In addition a minimum of 5 divisions will be required to secure vital bases on the line of communications, making a total of 23 divisions. Tentative deployments as of January 1, 1944 indicate that the UNITED NATIONS will have 18 divisions in the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. This number is exclusive of Australian and NEW ZEALAND defense divisions.

It would appear, therefore, that a minimum of 5 additional offensive divisions will be required to provide the necessary divisions to capture NEW GUINEA.

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It should be pointed out that the 18 divisions include 3 U. S. Marine Divisions. The withdrawal of these units to the central PACIFIC would require their replacement with 3 Army Divisions.

The status of the availability of the amphibious equipment for this operation cannot be determined until after the RABAUl campaign.

b. Air

A total of 3048 combat aircraft are estimated to be required for this operation. As of January 1, 1944, 2579 will be available. This includes Army, Navy, R.A.A.F., and R.N.Z.A.F. This indicates a shortage of 469 aircraft. In addition some adjustment as to types may be necessary.

c. Naval

In view of the other operations which may be conducted in the PACIFIC, such as the BISMARCK, CAROLINE, or MARSHALLS operations, the requirements and availability of naval forces for the capture of NEW GUINEA cannot be determined.

22. Operations in the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS

a. Ground

The defense of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS will require 3 Army Divisions. One division may be obtained from HAWAII by reducing the strength of the garrison to 2 divisions. The remaining 2 divisions must come from the UNITED STATES.

b. Air (MARSHALLS)

(less carrier-based)

	<u>Assault</u>	<u>Garrison</u>
B (H)	96	72
B (M)	0	72
B (L/D)	0	180
Ftr	<u>200</u>	<u>221</u>
	296	545

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As of January 1, 1944 the U. S. Navy will have 714 combat aircraft of all types (exclusive of carrier-based), deployed for special assignment by CINCPAC. Required aircraft should be available for this operation.

c. Naval (MARSHALLS)

The situation in cruisers to mount the MARSHALL ISLANDS operation (¹²~~8~~ CL plus ¹⁶~~8~~ CA) will be tight until early in 1944. As of January 1, 1944, there will be 9 CA, 12 CL, and 4 OCL in the PACIFIC. If all cruisers which become available for assignment in the first quarter of 1944 (1 CA and 4 CL) are assigned to the PACIFIC and, assuming no attrition after January 1, 1944, there would be available on April 1, 1944, 10 CA 12 CL, and 4 OCL. After meeting the requirements for this operation 2 CA, 4 CL, and 4 OCL would be available to meet all other requirements in the PACIFIC. One CL and one CA become available for assignment during the second quarter of 1944.

d. Air (CAROLINES)

(exclusive of carrier-based)

	<u>Assault</u>	<u>Garrison</u>
VSO	0	36
B (H)	96	48
B (M)	0	64
B (L/D)	0	96
Ftr	<u>0</u>	<u>200</u>
	96	444

As of January 1, 1944, the U. S. Navy will have 714 combat aircraft of all types (exclusive of carrier-based) deployed for special assignment by CINCPAC. No deployments have been made for later dates, but it is assumed that this figure of 714 will be increased after January 1, 1944, and that the CAROLINE operation is not likely to occur until

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after this date. It therefore appears that sufficient aircraft will be available for this operation.

e. Naval (CAROLINES)

The CAROLINES operation requires 4 BB and 9 OBB, total 13. Assigned to the PACIFIC as of January 1, 1944, are 6 BB and 8 OBB, total 14. One additional BB becomes available for assignment in the 3rd quarter of 1944.

Thirty-one cruisers are required for this operation. Assigned to the PACIFIC as of January 1, 1944, are 9 CA, 12 CL, 4 OCL, a total of 25. Assuming the 2 CA and 5 CL which become available in the first half of 1944 are all assigned to the PACIFIC, and no attrition after January 1, 1944, there will be 32 cruisers in the PACIFIC on July 1, 1944, available to meet all the requirements of that area.

Ten CV are required for the CAROLINES. Nine will be available for the PACIFIC on January 1, 1944. Assuming the 5 which become available in the first half of 1944 are all assigned to the PACIFIC, and no attrition after January 1, 1944, on July 1, 1944 there will be 14 CV available to meet all the requirements of that area. Seven ACV will be required and will be available.

It is estimated that destroyers and other types can be made available.

25. Summary as to availability of means

a. Ground

From the above, it is estimated that the capture of NEW GUINEA, and the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS will require the shipment of 7 additional Army divisions to the PACIFIC.

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b. Air

Air operations in CHINA will require additional aircraft as shown in paragraph 19 a above.

Air deployments to SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (2579 aircraft), January 1, 1944, have been made in accordance with requests for forces by the Commander, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, to perform tasks assigned, exclusive of capture of RABAU. •

It is entirely possible that attrition of Japanese aircraft during the preliminary phases of operations under way will permit the taking of RABAU and completion of subsequent operations in NEW GUINEA, with the forces allocated.

However, for planning purposes, and assuming JAPAN has not been evicted from the CAROLINES, it is estimated that for operations to complete the capture of NEW GUINEA, including defense forces, 3048 aircraft will be required. This indicates a shortage of 469 aircraft as of January 1, 1944.

There will be sufficient land-based aircraft available to CINCPAC for the operations in the MARSHALLS and CAROLINES during 1944.

c. Naval

It is concluded that there are not sufficient naval forces to carry on a major operation in the central PACIFIC and a major operation in the SOUTH PACIFIC simultaneously during 1943-44. Preceding discussions of the naval requirements for individual operations make it apparent that consideration must be given to the sequence of assigned tasks.

d. Logistics

The logistical implications for supporting major operations such as those in NEW GUINEA or the CAROLINES have not been assessed in this paper. Among these implications would be the shipping required to support the additional ground, air, and naval forces moved to the theater. Furthermore, as the forces advance there will be increasing demands for cargo shipping due to the extension of the line of communications, such as from HAWAII to the MARSHALLS, the MARSHALLS to the CAROLINES, or from RABAU to NEW GUINEA.

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26. Sequence of operations in the PACIFIC

Operations in the northern PACIFIC are in progress.

The MADANG-western NEW BRITAIN-BOUGAINVILLE campaign will commence about June 15, and will probably take the remainder of 1943 to complete.

Prior to the completion of the above campaign, a decision must be made whether to launch the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO or MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign. The MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign cannot be launched before early 1944.

The relative value, as well as the magnitude, of further operations in NEW GUINEA with respect to operations in the CAROLINE ISLANDS must be assessed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the progress of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO or MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign, depending on which had been previously selected.

When the direction of the main effort has been determined, a firm decision on the sequence of operations can be made.

COORDINATION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
IN THE PACIFIC WITH OPERATIONS IN ASIA

27. Coordination and timing of all Military operations in the PACIFIC-Asiatic Theater must be directed and controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in some instances by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in order that each operation will not be considered as an independent operation, but as a part of a larger picture. This is particularly important in our war against JAPAN where the enemy is operating on interior lines.

28. Specifically, coordination should be prescribed for operations in the PACIFIC with those projected for the INDIA - CHINA Theater. In addition, all raids by naval task forces should be coordinated, insofar as practicable, with other current operations in order that maximum benefit may be achieved. Such coordination can be accomplished without infringing on the prerogative of

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theater commanders to plan, organize, and execute such operations. The necessity for such coordination will become increasingly apparent as the war progresses.

29. A definite policy as to the timing of any bombing offensive or bombing raid against JAPAN proper from bases in CHINA should be announced at once, because of the probability of a premature raid jeopardizing the success of the desired diversionary effect in connection with some other operation at a later date, such as the MARSHALL ISLANDS operations. Again the initiation of bomber raids against JAPAN proper from bases in CHINA before sufficient means to make a sustained bomber offensive are available may result in JAPAN making intensified efforts to end Chinese resistance, such as an attack on KUNMING from HANOI.

CONCLUSIONS

30. From the above discussion, it is concluded that the objectives in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST in 1943-44 should be:

- a. Conduct of air operations in and from CHINA.
- b. Seizure of BURMA.
- c. Ejection of Japanese from the ALEUTIANS.
- d. Seizure of the MARSHALL and CAROLINE ISLANDS.
- e. Seizure of the SOLOMONS, the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO, and Japanese held NEW GUINEA.

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APPENDIX "A"

AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT

	IN SERVICE 1 January 1944		Additional becoming available for assignment by quarters in 1944.			
	ATLANTIC	PACIFIC	1st Qtr. 1944	2nd Qtr. 1944	3rd Qtr. 1944	4th Qtr. 1944
A G C	2	2	0	0	0	0
A P A	17	26	5	12	12	8
A K A	7	7	1	12	12	8
A P D	6	13	0	0	0	0
L S D	1	6	1	0	0	0
L S T	89	123	10	10	6	0
L C I (L)	80	102	36	36	0	0
L C T (5&6)	120	183	30	30	10	0

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APPENDIX "E"

ATTRITION LOSSES OF AMPHIBIOUS LANDING CRAFT

Plans which involve using landing craft for successive operations must take account of losses. In planning for HUSKY, the British are assuming 20% of those initially assigned will be unavailable for the assault due to operational and training attrition; the UNITED STATES is assuming 10% operational and training loss prior to assault. Both the British and UNITED STATES are assuming 30% loss in the attack. On basis of UNITED STATES assumed loss figures, out of 100 landing craft assigned to an operation, 90 will be available for the initial assault and 63 will be available for assignment to a second operation. Of these 63, fifty-seven will be available for the second assault and 40 will remain after the second assault. After a third operation, 25 out of the original 100 will remain.

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15 May 1943

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MOBILITY AND UTILIZATION OF AMPHIBIOUS
ASSAULT CRAFT

Note by the Secretaries

(The attached report, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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By RHP, MLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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MOBILITY AND UTILIZATION OF AMPHIBIOUS
ASSAULT CRAFT

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An analysis has been made to determine a scheme of optimum use of amphibious assault craft for operations in 1943-44. This analysis is contained in Enclosure "A".
2. The conclusions derived from the Enclosure are as follows:
 - a. U. S. landing craft remaining after HUSKY can be shifted to:
 - (1) ROUNDUP to meet target date.
 - (2) ANAKIM to meet target date.
 - b. U. S. landing craft remaining after any other limited operation in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY can be shifted to:
 - (1) ROUNDUP to meet target date provided they are released:
 - (a) From eastern MEDITERRANEAN - early December 1943
 - (b) From western MEDITERRANEAN - mid-December 1943
 - c. Losses incurred in operations in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY can only be made good by diversions from the PACIFIC (See J.C.S. 291/1).
 - d. Amphibious assault craft from the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC can be ready at PEARL HARBOR for the MARSHALLS campaign:
 - (1) By 1 April 1944, if the NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS campaign is completed about 1 January 1944.
 - (2) By 1 July 1944, if the BISMARCK campaign is completed about 1 April 1944.
 - e. Diversion from the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC to ANAKIM must be effected by mid-August; however, this will jeopardize the operations in the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.
 - f. The most logical source of craft for ANAKIM is from U. S. production.

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g. Only LCT(5)'s and smaller types can at this time be sent to the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC to replace similar types moved from that area to ANAKIM.

h. Based on landing craft availability, extended amphibious operations in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY would have the following implications:

(1) EITHER:

- (a) Continue ROUNDUP build-up, and
- (b) Defer ANAKIM and all PACIFIC amphibious operations.

(2) OR:

- (a) Defer ROUNDUP, and
- (b) Mount ANAKIM and amphibious operations presently directed in the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

(3) OR:

- (a) Limited build-up for ROUNDUP, and
- (b) Limited amphibious operations in the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, and
- (c) Defer ANAKIM.

(4) OR:

- (a) Limited build-up for ROUNDUP, and
- (b) Mount ANAKIM, and
- (c) Defer all PACIFIC amphibious operations.

i. In the event that the main effort is directed against JAPAN after HUSKY, landing craft in the ATLANTIC-European Theater can be made available for PACIFIC operations by mid-January, 1944.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

MOBILITY AND UTILIZATION OF AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT CRAFT

ASSUMPTIONS

1. It is assumed that:

a. HUSKY will be successfully completed by mid-August 1943.

b. HUSKY will be followed by (a) further operations in the MEDITERRANEAN (b) no further operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

c. Landing craft will be assembled in the UNITED KINGDOM for an assault on the Continent with target date 1 April 1944.

d. Objectives in the PACIFIC will be:

(1) Ejection of Japanese from ALEUTIANS.

(2) Seizure of MARSHALL ISLANDS.

(3) Seizure of SOLOMONS and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

e. ANAKIM will be executed beginning 1 November 1943.

2. For basic data see Appendix "D".

DISCUSSION

3. The necessity for a detailed tactical plan of the operation and its planned logistical support is a basic factor of primary importance in any study concerned with a determination of numbers and types of landing craft required for a given operation. One of the principal reasons that there are various types in existence is the fact that certain types are more efficient under a given set of circumstances than others. It does not follow, however, that one type can be substituted for another simply because there are a variety of types available. While it is true that a given operation may call for certain types and, lacking those types, others can be substituted, this substitution should never be made unless two factors are known, namely (1) hydrographic conditions, and (2) the use intended. It should always

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be borne in mind that, although there are many combinations that can be used to lift a combat team and its supporting elements, there is always one best method, and possibly a few other acceptable methods. The decision must be based on the tactical scheme of maneuver and detailed information on hydrographical conditions.

4. Some of the factors that determine the number of landing craft remaining after an operation and available for use elsewhere are:

a. The loss rate. Little data exists upon which to base an estimate of any value. Operations against several types of defense such as strong or weak enemy air opposition (even types of enemy aircraft have an influence), coast defenses, beach defenses, mines, underwater obstacles, and anti-boat guns must be conducted before estimates can be based upon valuable data. In this connection there is not even agreement on the loss rate for operational training as evidenced by planning for HUSKY wherein the planners estimated 20%, the Navy Department recommended about 5%, and the U. S. Army used 10% as a compromise.

Reports received 12 May 1943 indicate following training loss rates:

	LST	LCI(L)	LCT	LCM(3)	LCVP
Camp Edwards, Mass. (U. S. Army Base)	Nil	Nil	16%	20%	33% (1)
Amphibforlant (Norfolk)	For all types - 30% (2)				

(1) Reduced to 20% with experienced personnel.

(2) Norfolk has less experienced personnel than Camp Edwards.

b. Use for logistic support. Immediately after an amphibious attack, landing craft are required to land supplies across the beach. The length of time landing craft of

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practically every type except LCI(L)'s are retained for purely logistical support depends upon:

- (1) Availability of a port and port facilities.
- (2) The possibility from an equipment and hydrographical viewpoint of constructing a pier.
- (3) The feasibility and desirability of using seagoing types of landing craft to transport supplies from the base to the operating area.

(c. Availability of salvage and repair facilities. A good percentage of the landing craft will probably require salvage and a large percentage overhaul after an operation. The availability of spare parts and assistance by shore establishments or tenders in providing mechanics and machinery will determine the time interval for overhaul. It takes more time to repair many landing craft than it does to repair a few. This is because of docking facilities, repair crews, time for shifting berth under own power or by towing, etc. All of these factors must be considered in determining time required for salvage and repairs.

(5. Examination of capabilities of moving landing craft from one theater to another.

Bearing in mind the varying types required and the governing factors discussed in the preceding paragraph, an examination will be made of the possibility of moving landing craft from one theater to another (or from one campaign to another) for the purpose of determining availability at a certain time and place.

(6. There are three main sources from which landing craft may be obtained, namely the ATLANTIC, the PACIFIC, and new production in the UNITED STATES. For convenience, these have been designated "Atlantic Pool", "Pacific Pool", and "Production Pool", and are discussed in Appendices "A", "B", and "C". Pertinent factors from these studies are set forth below.

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ATLANTIC POOL
(See Appendix "A")

7. Upon completion of HUSKY, the great majority of the landing craft in the ATLANTIC POOL will be in the vicinity of TUNISIA.

8. Problem: To determine the implications of moving landing craft subsequent to HUSKY.

a. To ROUNDUP.

b. To ANAKIM.

c. To PACIFIC.

9. To ROUNDUP.

a. If no further operations are conducted in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY, and the landing craft are released by mid-August, seagoing types can arrive in U. K. about mid-November, and shipborne types can arrive with the last echelon of the troops about 1 January 1944.

b. If further operations are conducted in the MEDITERRANEAN, it is probable that shipping other than that used for the transfer of combat troop divisions to U. K. must be made available to transport the shipborne types of landing craft. If the shipping is made available, landing craft can be used without prejudice to the 1 April 1944 target date provided they are released for ROUNDUP as follows:

(1) Eastern MEDITERRANEAN - early December 1943

(2) Western MEDITERRANEAN - mid-December 1943

c. Losses incurred in operations in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY can only be made good by diversions from the PACIFIC or ROUNDUP (See J.C.S. 291/1).

10. To ANAKIM.

a. If no further operations are conducted subsequent to HUSKY, and the landing craft are released by mid-August, following are estimated dates of availability for ANAKIM at CALCUTTA.

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- (1) Seagoing types - late October 1943
(2) LCT(5) - end of October 1943
(3) Other shipborne types - mid-October to early November 1943.

b. If the mounting of ANAKIM is predicated on using landing craft from HUSKY, a target date of early November can be met.

c. It is obvious that landing craft committed to ANAKIM can not be used in a ROUNDUP launched 1 April 1944. At the earliest, these craft can arrive in U. K. early in August, 1944.

11. To PACIFIC.

a. On the assumption that the main effort will be directed against JAPAN after HUSKY, landing craft from the MEDITERRANEAN can arrive at BRISBANE as follows:

- (1) Seagoing types - early January, 1944
(2) Shipborne types - mid-January, 1944.

PACIFIC POOL (See Appendix "B")

12. The greatest concentration of landing craft in the PACIFIC is now in the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC area.

13. Problem:

To determine the implications of moving amphibious assault craft from the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC area.

a. To PEARL HARBOR for the MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign prior to the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

b. To PEARL HARBOR for the MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign subsequent to the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

c. To ANAKIM.

14. TO PEARL for MARSHALLS prior to the BISMARCK CAMPAIGN.

a. On the assumptions that the NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS operations are completed about 1 January 1944, amphibious assault

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shipping sufficient for 2 divisions can be moved from the SOUTH PACIFIC and be ready in PEARL HARBOR about 1 April 1944.

b. If this diversion is made, no ship-to-shore operations can be conducted in the SOUTH or SOUTHWEST PACIFIC until completion of the MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign, but operations with a portion of one shore-to-shore division can probably be conducted.

15. TO PEARL for MARSHALLS subsequent to the BISMARCK CAMPAIGN.

a. On the assumption that operations for the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO are projected immediately subsequent to the NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS operations, and that their capture will be completed about 1 April 1944, amphibious assault shipping sufficient for 2 divisions can be moved from the SOUTH PACIFIC and be ready in PEARL HARBOR about 1 July 1944.

16. To ANAKIM.

a. In order to arrive in CALCUTTA and be available at the target date of ANAKIM, assault shipping must be released from operations in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC by mid-August. The diversion of the above craft will occur at the peak of operations directed by J.C.S. 238/5/D, and will place operations in that area in jeopardy.

PRODUCTION POOL
(See Appendix "C")

17. The sailing port for LST's is NEW ORLEANS. The sailing port for LCI(L)'s is HAMPTON ROADS. LCT(5)'s and smaller types are assembled at various East and West Coast ports. The flow of shipborne types from the United States depends entirely on shipping available.

18. Problem:

To determine the implications of moving landing craft from the production pool:

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- a. To ROUNDUP.
b. To NORTH PACIFIC.
c. To CENTRAL PACIFIC.
d. To SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.
e. To ANAKIM.

19. To ROUNDUP.

a. The latest dates allocations from the production pool can be made in order to meet ROUNDUP target date are:

- | | |
|--|----------------------|
| (1) LST | - late December 1943 |
| (2) LCI(L) | - mid-January 1944 |
| (3) LCT(5) and other
shipborne craft* | - mid-February 1944 |

*NOTE: Assumes shipping is immediately available.

20. To NORTH PACIFIC.

a. On the assumption that an operation to capture KISKA will be undertaken, allocations from the production pool must be made as follows:

- (1) LST - 16-1/2 weeks prior to mounting.
- (2) LCI(L) - 13 weeks prior to mounting.
- (3) LCT(5) and smaller - 5-1/2 weeks prior to mounting.

NOTE: Decision has not been made as to types required.

21. To CENTRAL PACIFIC.

If the target date for landing craft to be available and ready to move from PEARL against the MARSHALLS is 1 April 1944, the latest date allocations of LST's can be made from the production pool is mid-December, 1943.

22. To SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

a. If replacement landing craft must be in the area by the time those diverted to ANAKIM depart, allocations from the production pool must be made as follows:

- (1) LST's should have been made in mid-April, 1943.
- (2) LCI(L)'s should have been made in early May, 1943.
- (3) LCT's and smaller types - must be made by late

June, 1943.

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23. To ANAKIM

a. In order to meet the ANAKIM target date, allocations from the production pool must be made as follows:

- (1) LST's - late June, 1943.
- (2) LCI(L)'s - late July, 1943.
- (3) LCT's and smaller types - late August, 1943.

24. See Appendix "E" for graphic presentation of transit time for amphibious assault craft.

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APPENDIX "A"

ATLANTIC POOL

1. Problem.

To determine the implications of moving landing craft subsequent to HUSKY.

- a. To ROUNDUP.
- b. To ANAKIM.
- c. To PACIFIC.

2. Upon the completion of HUSKY, the great majority of landing craft in the ATLANTIC Pool will be in the vicinity of TUNISIA.

3. To ROUNDUP.

a. The following table is a time study based on weeks required after the release of landing craft from operations in the MEDITERRANEAN until they become available in the UNITED KINGDOM.

TYPE	Time Required in Weeks						Total
	Salvage(1)	Repair(2)	Knockdown(3)	Trans(4)	Assem.(5)	Train(6)	
LST	2	6	-	1	-	3	12
LCI(L)	2	5	-	1	-	3	11
LCT(5)	1	4	2	1	3	3	14

NOTES: (1) Average time required for salvage and reassembling at a North African repair base.

(2) Repair of battle damage and overhaul, considering facilities available.

(3) Disassembly and stowage on board ship.

(4) Transit time from NORTH AFRICA to U. K.

(5) Assembly, repair of shipping damage, and tuning up.

(6) Three weeks are required for training and rehearsal, after arrival in theater.

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b. In addition to LCT's, there will be a large number of shipborne types which must be moved from the MEDITERRANEAN to the U.K. If it is decided that about 6 divisions of troops will be moved from AFRICA to U.K. and their heavy equipment left for French troops or other forces in NORTH AFRICA, it will be possible to move these shipborne types on the vessels used for the movement.

c. Conclusions.

(1) If no further operations are conducted in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY, and the landing craft are released by mid-August, seagoing types can arrive in U.K. about mid-November, and shipborne types can arrive with the last echelon of the troops, about 1 January 1944.

(2) If further operations are conducted in the MEDITERRANEAN, it is probable that shipping, other than that used for the transfer of combat troop divisions to U.K., must be made available to transport the shipborne types of landing craft. If the shipping is made available, landing craft can be used without prejudice to the 1 April 1944 target date provided they are released for ROUNDUP as follows:

Eastern MEDITERRANEAN - early December 1943

Western MEDITERRANEAN - mid-December 1943

(3) Losses incurred in operations in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY can only be made good by diversions from the PACIFIC or ROUNDUP (See J.C.S. 291/1).

4. To ANAKIM.

a. The following table is a time study based on weeks required after the release of landing craft from operations in the MEDITERRANEAN until they become available at CALCUTTA.

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TYPE		(7)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
	Salvage:	Repair:	Knockdown:	Trans.:	Assem.:	Train:	Total
LST	0 (1)	2	-	4	-	3	9
LCI(L)	0 (1)	2	-	3	-	3	8
LCT(5)	0 (1)	2	1/2	4 (5)	1/2	3	10
Shipborne	1	2-4	-	4 (6)	-	3	10-12

NOTES: (1) No salvage and a minimum repair period has been allowed in view of the relatively small number required in relation to the number used in HUSKY. It is estimated that a sufficient number of these types to meet ANAKIM requirements will be on hand in good running order.

(2) Disassembly, and stowage aboard ship.

(3) Transit time from BIZERTE to CALCUTTA.

(4) Assembly, repair of shipping damage, and tuning up.

(5) Three weeks required for training and rehearsal, after arrival in the theater.

(6) Convoy speed of advance - 9 knots.

(7) Considering number involved and facilities available.

b. Shipping must be provided for LCT(5) and other shipborne types.

c. Conclusions.

(1) If no further operations are conducted subsequent to HUSKY, and the landing craft are released by mid-August, the following are estimated dates of availability for ANAKIM at CALCUTTA.

(a) Seagoing types - late October 1943

(b) LCT(5) - end of October 1943

(c) Other shipborne types - mid-October to early November, 1943

(2) If the mounting of ANAKIM is predicated on using landing craft from HUSKY, a target date of early November can be met.

(3) It is obvious that landing craft committed to ANAKIM can not be used in a ROUNDUP launched on 1 April 1944. At the earliest, these craft can arrive in U.K. early in August, 1944.

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5. To PACIFIC.

a. Assumption.

After HUSKY, the main effort will be directed against JAPAN.

b. Conclusion.

Using data shown in the table under ANAKIM, but increasing transit time, landing craft can arrive at BRISBANE as follows:

- (1) Seagoing types - early January 1944
- (2) Shipborne types - mid-January 1944.

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APPENDIX "B"

PACIFIC POOL

1. Problem.

To determine the implications of moving amphibious assault craft from the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC area:

a. To PEARL HARBOR for the MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign, prior to capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

b. To PEARL HARBOR for the MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign, subsequent to capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO.

c. To ANAKIM.

2. To PEARL for MARSHALLS, prior to BISMARCK campaign.

a. Basic data.

(1) Three amphibious divisions involved in the initial SOUTHWEST PACIFIC operations.

2 equipped for ship-to-shore landing.

1 equipped for shore-to-shore landing.

(2) Two amphibious divisions required for MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign.

APA's, AKA's, steaming time @ 14 knots NOUMEA-PEARL 10 days.

LST's steaming time @ 9 knots NOUMEA-PEARL 16 days

b. Assumptions.

(1) The operations directed by J.C.S. 238/5/D (NEW GUINEA - SOLOMONS) will be completed about 1 January 1944.

(2) Three tenders or equivalent can be made available in the SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC for overhaul of LST's.

(3) No major losses in APA's and AKA's assigned to the PACIFIC.

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c. The following table is a time study based on weeks required after the release of craft from operations in the SOUTH PACIFIC until they become available at PEARL HARBOR.

TYPE	Salvage	⁽⁴⁾ Repair	Transit(1)	Training	Total
APA (2)		3	1.5	3	7.5
AKA (2)		3	1.5	3	7.5
LST	2	4 (3)	2.5	3	11.5

NOTES: (1) NOUMEA to PEARL HARBOR.

(2) Assumed to have full allowance of LCVF's and LCM(3)'s in good repair.

(3) Assumed that spare parts are available in SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

(4) Considering number involved and facilities available.

d. Conclusions.

(1) Based on assumption (1), amphibious assault shipping sufficient for 2 divisions can be moved from the SOUTH PACIFIC and be ready in PEARL HARBOR about 1 April 1944.

(2) If this diversion is made, no ship-to-shore operations can be conducted in the SOUTH or SOUTHWEST PACIFIC until completion of MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign, but operations with a portion of one shore-to-shore division can probably be conducted.

3. To PEARL for MARSHALLS, subsequent to BISMARCK campaign.

a. Basic data.

5 amphibious divisions, involved in BISMARCK campaign.

For steaming time, see paragraph 2 a. (2).

b. Assumptions.

(1) Operations for the capture of the BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO will be projected immediately subsequent to those directed by J.C.S. 238/5/D and said capture will be completed about 1 April 1944.

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(2) Three tenders or the equivalent can be made available in SOUTH and SOUTHWEST PACIFIC for overhaul of LST's.

(3) No major losses in APA's and AKA's assigned to the PACIFIC.

c. Conclusion.

Based on assumption (1), amphibious assault shipping sufficient for 2 divisions can be moved from the SOUTH PACIFIC and be ready in PEARL HARBOR about 1 July 1944.

4. To ANAKIM.

a. The following table is a time study based on weeks required after the release of craft from operations in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC until they become available at CALCUTTA.

Type	Assembly and Repair	Transit (3)	Training	Total
APA (1)	3	3	3	9
AKA (1)	3	3	3	9
LST	3 (2)	5	3	11
LCI (L)	3 (2)	4.5	3	10.5

NOTES: (1) Assumed to have full allowance LCVP, LCM(3).

(2) Assumed spare parts available in SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, and considering number involved and facilities available.

(3) NOUMEA-CALCUTTA.

b. Conclusion.

In order to arrive in CALCUTTA and be available for target date of ANAKIM the above craft must be released from operations in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC by mid-August. The diversion of the above craft will occur at the peak of operations directed by J.C.S. 238/5/D and will place operations in that area in jeopardy.

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APPENDIX "C"

PRODUCTION POOL

1. Problem.

To determine the implications of moving landing craft from the Production Pool:

- a. To ROUNDUP.
- b. To NORTH PACIFIC.
- c. To CENTRAL PACIFIC.
- d. To SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.
- e. To ANAKIM.

2. Basic data.

a. LST's require 50 days fitting out and shakedown; sailing port - NEW ORLEANS.

b. LCI(L)'s require 35 days fitting out and shakedown; sailing port - HAMPTON ROADS.

c. LCT(5)'s and smaller types are assembled at various East and West Coast ports. Their flow from U. S. depends entirely on shipping available.

3. To ROUNDUP.

a. Time required in weeks.

Type	F/O & Shakedown	Transit	Assembly	Train(1)	Total
LST	7	4 (2)	-	3	14
LCI(L)	5	2	-	3	10
LCT(5)	-	2	1	3	6
Shipborne	-	2	1	3	6

NOTES: (1) Training time allowed after arrival destination.
(2) One 3-day stop enroute for fuel and provision.

b. Conclusion.

Latest dates of allocation which will meet ROUNDUP target date are:

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- LST - late December 1943
- LCI(L) - mid-January 1944
- LCT(5) and other shipborne craft* - mid-February 1944

* Assuming shipping is immediately available.

4. To NORTH PACIFIC.

a. Assumption.

An operation to capture KISKA will be undertaken.

b. Time required in weeks.

Type	F/O & Shakedown	Transit(2)	Assembly	Train (1)	Total
LST	7	6.5	-	3	16.5
LCI(L)	5	5	-	3	13
LCT(5)	-	1.5 (3)	1	3	5.5
Shipborne	-	1.5 (3)	1	3	5.5

- NOTES: (1) Training to be conducted on West Coast, U. S.
- (2) NEW ORLEANS-SAN FRANCISCO-DUTCH HARBOR, includes 1 week for assembly of convoy on West Coast.
- (3) Assuming departure SAN FRANCISCO and shipping immediately available.

c. Conclusion.

To meet any target date selected, allocations of types of craft shown above must be made as indicated in the table. Decision has not been made as to types required.

5. To CENTRAL PACIFIC.

a. Assumption.

(1) LST's for MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign must be provided from Production Pool.

(2) Target date for departure from PEARL HARBOR to execute MARSHALL ISLANDS campaign is 1 April 1944.

b. Time required in weeks.

Type	F/O	Shakedown	Transit (1)	Train	Total
LST		7	5	3	15

- NOTE: (1) NEW ORLEANS-SAN DIEGO-PEARL HARBOR, includes one 3-day period for fuel and provisions.

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c. Conclusion.

If LST's are to be used from Production Pool, they must be allocated in mid-December 1943.

6. To SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

a. Assumption.

Replacement landing craft must be in the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC by the time landing craft diverted to ANAKIM departs.

b. Time required in weeks.

Type	F/O & Shakedown	Transit (1)	Assembly	Train	Total
LST	7	7 (1)	-	3	17
LCI(L)	5	6 (2)	-	3	14
LCT(5)	-	3.5 (3)	1	3	7.5
Shipborne	-	3.5 (3)	1	3	7.5

NOTES: (1) NEW ORLEANS-PANAMA-BORA BORA-NOUMEA, includes two 3-day periods for fuel and provision.

(2) HAMPTON ROADS-PANAMA-BORA BORA-NOUMEA, includes two 3-day periods for fuel and provision.

(3) SAN FRANCISCO-NOUMEA and shipping is immediately available.

c. Conclusion.

Landing craft from the Production Pool to replace any diverted from the SOUTH-SOUTHWEST PACIFIC to ANAKIM must be allocated as follows:

LST - should have been made in mid-April, 1943

LCI(L) - should have been made in early May, 1943

LCT(5) and
Shipborne - must be made in late June, 1943

7. To ANAKIM.

a. Time required in weeks.

Type	F/O & Shakedown	Transit	Assembly	Train	Total
LST	7	8 (1)		3	18
LCI(L)	5	6 (2)		3	14
LCT(5)	-	6 (2,3)		3	9
Shipborne	-	6 (2,3)		3	9

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NOTES: (1) NEW ORLEANS-BIZERTE-CALCUTTA.
(2) HAMPTON ROADS-BIZERTE-CALCUTTA.
(3) Assuming shipping is immediately available.

b. Conclusions.

Landing craft from the Production Pool for use in ANAKIM must be allocated as follows:

LST	- late June, 1943
LCI(L)	- late July, 1943
LCT(5) and shipborne	- late August, 1943

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APPENDIX "D"

BASIC DATA

1. Transit times calculated by assuming a speed of advance of 9 knots for LST's, and 11 knots for LCI(L)'s.

2. Each landing craft will require one week overhaul, with base or tender assistance, after an ocean voyage; it is estimated that 6 LST's and 12 LCI(L)'s can be overhauled by an AD, AS, AR, or ARL in one week provided spare parts are available.

3. LST's and LCI(L)'s should not be assigned to the same convoy as this would require the LCI(L)'s running at critical engine speed.

4. LCT(5) crew can knock down one LCT(5) in:

8 hours after practice

24 hours without practice

Crew can assemble one LCT(5) in:

48 hours without practice

5. LCT(5)'s heaviest weight when knocked down is 50 tons, which usually requires a dock crane for unloading.

6. Data on transportation of shipborne types of landing craft in cargo vessels and LST cargo vessels.

<u>Carrier</u>	<u>Capacity of landing craft</u>
U. S. Cargo Vessel (EC-2, C-1, C-2, C-3)	12 - 36' Personnel landing boats (LCVP, LCP(R), LCP) <u>or</u> * 3 - LCM(3)
U. S. Cargo Vessels (EC-2, C-1, C-2, C-3)	12 - 36' Personnel landing boats <u>or</u> ** 6 - LCM(3)

* Can be handled by booms normally installed in the cargo vessel.

** The additional 3 LCM(3) can be loaded if movement is made from base-to-base with dock cranes to lift the 22 L. Ton LCM(3).

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LST

The following combinations can be lifted:

a. 1 - LCT(5), 1 - LCM(3), 3 - LCVP

b. 1 - LCT(5), 7 - LCVP

c. 15 LCVP


d. 4 LCM(3), 3 LCVP

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Original Map retired

I N D E X

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| (2) | JCS 290/1 - Conduct of the War in 1943-44 | TAB (B) |
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ation, 1943-44 | TAB (D) |
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| (7) | JCS 304 - Operations in the Pacific
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BOOK II

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BOOKS III and IV

IV. OUTLINE PLANS FOR SPECIFIC OPERATIONS

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EUROPEAN - AFRICAN AREA

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(J.I.C. 83/1 - 2d Draft)

May 7, 1943

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(1) J.I.C. 83/M
(2) J.I.C. 83/1

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

FORECAST OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE RUSSO-GERMAN FRONT

Note by the Secretary

The attachment, which was prepared in response to a request from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, is in the form adopted by the J.I.C. at its 61st Meeting.

A. SIDNEY BUFORD III,
Secretary.

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FORECAST OF DEVELOPMENTS ON RUSSO-GERMAN FRONT

Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To determine Russian strength as of May 1, 1943, and to forecast developments on the Russian front after that date.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

2. Weather. The past winter has been much milder than is the average Russian winter. The thaw was early this year, and the fronts should be dry enough for large scale military operations as follows:

- a. Taman Peninsula - May 1
- b. From Kharkov to the South - May 10 - 15
- c. From Moscow to Kharkov - May 20 - 25
- d. From Leningrad to Moscow - June 1 - 10
- e. From Leningrad to the North - June 10 - 15.

3. Strengths. Although the Russians probably enjoy a numerical superiority, there appears to be an approximate equality in effectiveness of ground forces on both sides. The Germans have the advantage as regards adequacy of communications and choice of battle area (by this is meant the present established front). The Germans are superior in air strength, but requirements in Western Europe and the Mediterranean will leave them inferior on the Russian front. The Germans have been making superhuman efforts to reinforce their armies, but we believe that these reinforcements will not be organized and adequately trained prior to July 15, 1943.

4. Available Reinforcements.

a. German. We believe that Germany has taken a calculated risk and is now drastically changing her system of occupational deferment, at heavy expense to her war production.

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Assuming this risk to be acceptable, we estimate that Germany will be able to replace her past casualties and provide sufficient men and equipment to form 26 additional divisions by October 1, 1943. After that time we believe that she will be able to replace only a portion of her casualties. The German Army should reach its peak, in numbers, by that date and will probably decline thereafter.

b. The Russian pool of military manpower of effective fighting age is several times the size of the German. Limitations to the effectiveness of Russian armed forces lie in organization and transport rather than in an insufficient supply of manpower.

5. Dispositions. The evacuation of the Taman Peninsula has provided a pool of 12 to 13 divisions of German troops whose further disposition along the front has not been determined. They appear to be still on the Crimean Peninsula. A movement to the south of the boundary between the Army Group, Center, and the Army Group, South, has raised the total divisions under von Kluge's command to 87, only 5 of which are defensive. The concentration of the 2nd Panzer Army north and west of Orel and the 2nd Army north of Kursk (a total of 32 divisions) suggests that it is here that action is to be expected. The Russian failures to break the northern anchors at Volkhov and Staraya Russa suggest that those points will continue to anchor the northern end of the line. The swamp land and forests in the north sector do not make for successful offensive battle terrain. But a thrust from Staraya Russa toward Yaroslav and possibly on toward Gorki would be over less difficult terrain. In the southern sector the presence of the 4th Panzer Army (8 Panzer and 9 Infantry Divs.) south of Kursk further focuses attention in the Kursk area.

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6. The Russians hold a bridgehead on the west bank of the Donets near Izyum and a salient containing Kursk. There is no good information available concerning Russian dispositions.

7. Probable Actions.

a. Germany will, in 1943, make its main effort against the Russian Armed Forces. Such intention does not necessarily imply that the initial offensive will be German. Much depends upon the strategy employed by the Russian High Command. If Russia opens an offensive, the Germans will probably await a favorable opportunity to counter-attack and exploit any success to the fullest. In this event we believe that Germany would have an excellent chance of destroying the greater part of the Russian Armed Forces. If, however, the Russians do not mass troops for offensive action and can conduct rear guard actions and retirements to draw out the German lines of communications, the Russians may again find themselves, late in the year, in a position to strike offensively and turn the tables. The Russians, in all probability, however, will not be able to knock out the German Army this year.

b. We are of the opinion that the German massed offensive, when it comes, will move from the Orel - Kursk area to seize Voronezh; then, using the Orel - Voronezh line as an anchor, turn either northeast toward Gorki or southeast toward Stalingrad. If northeast, and successful, a secondary offensive south of Lake Ilmen toward Yaroslav may develop; if southeast, it will probably be accompanied by a southern pincer thrust originating on the Taman Peninsula and designed to trap Russian Forces in the Caucasus - Donbas areas, as well as cutting the Volga - the route of oil to Russia. The latter, if it develops, may be followed by a resumption of the northern action with the objective of annihilating the bulk of the Russian forces farther to the north.

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8. Negotiated Peace. Other controlling factors remaining as they are, a negotiated settlement between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia would become a practical possibility only if the war on the Eastern front were considered by both sides to have reached a complete stalemate which could not be broken by continued fighting. In this situation the purpose of such a settlement would be strictly military -- to provide a breathing spell in which both sides could prepare for a resumption of hostilities. There seems to be small prospect that such a stalemate will develop in 1943. Reported Japanese efforts to bring about such an understanding have made no apparent progress, and Soviet successes of last winter are believed to have strengthened Russia's determination.

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(J.C.S. 291/1)

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(1) JCS 291
(2) JCS 291
(revised)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM
THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943-1944

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff this date.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM
THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943 -1944

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. A detailed examination of the merits and possibilities of the defeat of the EUROPEAN AXIS by a bomber offensive and air-ground invasion of the Continent from the UNITED KINGDOM is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. It is estimated that GERMANY has 7 offensive divisions available on short notice to oppose an invasion effort. These forces could be increased in time to a grand total of 60 divisions. She also has about 1254 planes in the area (747 fighters) which could be increased to 1766 (1158 fighters) by stripping all areas except the MEDITERRANEAN and Eastern Front. In addition to a coastal defense zone varying from 5 to 15 miles in depth, she has four additional defensive belts which must be reduced or neutralized before the "West Wall" is reached.

3. The projected bomber offensive against GERMANY may be expected to so reduce her ability to wage modern war as to create favorable conditions for a reentry to the Continent unless GERMANY is able to build up timely and effective counter-measures.

4. By maximum utilization of shipping and UNITED KINGDOM port facilities for the movement of UNITED STATES Forces, and by placing increased emphasis on the conversion of British defensive divisions into offensive units, it is estimated that 36 divisions can be made available for cross-channel operations by April 1, 1944.

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5. If 6 divisions with supporting troops are moved from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM in the last quarter of 1943, there will be no increase in divisions available but the addition of battle tested troops will be an added insurance for the success of the initial assault.

6. Landing craft required for a cross-channel movement on April 1, 1944, can be provided if production is increased within limits which will not jeopardize Destroyer Escort (DE) and combatant class programs and if certain delays are accepted in the build up of UNITED STATES landing craft now allocated to the PACIFIC.

7. The two most promising areas for assault operations, the CAEN and COTENTIN PENINSULA sectors, will afford port facilities for a build up in 12 months of 912,000 men. By extending this bridgehead to include the SEINE RIVER and the ports of LE HAVRE and ROUEN, the build up in 12 months would be 4,012,000 men, or about 100 divisions. This force would be capable of major operations.

8. It should be noted that consideration of cross-channel operations in this study has been confined to the first movement and the availability of landing craft for this purpose as compared with the requirements of C.C.S. 105/2. The build up immediately thereafter and the requirements in APA's, AKA's, AP's, AK's, etc. have not been examined.

9. It is recommended that:

a. The bomber offensive be given first priority in build up and its execution be facilitated.

b. As the bomber offensive progresses, its effects should be continuously examined and integrated with other factors; the results of these examinations to be used in determining the date for cross-channel operations.

c. A balanced invasion force be built up in the UNITED KINGDOM as rapidly as possible for the purpose of an early invasion in the event of a collapse of GERMANY.

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d. Production in landing craft be increased by:

(1) Increasing the tailing on program of LST's to 12 per month for a total of 108 additional LST's.

(2) Increasing the present rate of LCI(L)'s from 16 per month to 20 per month and present program from 192 to 300.

e. Planned allocations of UNITED STATES landing craft to the PACIFIC be changed as follows (figures in parentheses represent allocations as presently planned):

<u>1943</u>			<u>1944</u>		
<u>3rd Quarter</u>	<u>4th Quarter</u>	:	<u>1st Quarter</u>	<u>2nd Quarter</u>	<u>3rd Qtr.</u>
LST 25 (38)	0 (22)	:	0 (0)	35 (0)	0 (0)
LCI (L) 0(34)	0 (36)	:	30 (36)	60 (24)	40 (0)

NOTE: This recommendation is subject to adjustment if incompatible with proposed operations in the Pacific and Far East.

f. With the exception of the above allocations, all UNITED STATES production (less assignments to UNITED KINGDOM) be sent to the ATLANTIC area during this period.

g. The target date of April 1, 1944 be accepted for operations from the UNITED KINGDOM. These operations to be conducted with the forces available in the UNITED KINGDOM on 1 January 1944. The target date coincides with the completion of the fourth phase of the bomber offensive and is subject to revision in the light of the results obtained.

h. The area selected for the assault contain sufficient port capacities to build up the 100 division force required for major operations on the Continent.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM THE
UNITED KINGDOM IN 1943-1944

PROBLEM

To present a study on operations from the UNITED KINGDOM including a bomber offensive, a build-up of forces in the UNITED KINGDOM for an air-ground invasion of the Continent at the earliest possible date, and a full scale offensive.

ASSUMPTIONS

10. a. The primary objective of the UNITED NATIONS is the final defeat of the WESTERN AXIS by invasion of the Continent from the UNITED KINGDOM.

b. GERMANY'S offensive against the Russian Army in 1943 will be unsuccessful, which will necessitate holding the bulk of her ground forces on the Russian front during 1944.

c. The AXIS will not invade the BRITISH ISLES, TURKEY, or the IBERIAN PENINSULA. SPAIN and PORTUGAL will remain neutral.

d. The Battle of the ATLANTIC remains serious in its shipping implications.

e. UNITED NATIONS commitments to other theaters will remain substantially as presently planned.

f. RUSSIA and JAPAN will remain at peace.

WESTERN AXIS COURSE OF ACTION

11. The probable course of action of the WESTERN AXIS in 1943 will be:

a. To intensify the U-boat campaign.

b. To resume the offensive in RUSSIA at the earliest practicable moment, while assuming the defensive on all other fronts and retaining as long as possible the Tunisian bridgehead.

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AXIS CAPABILITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

12. The Germans now have 32 divisions in FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES, 7 of which are identified as offensive. There are a total of 1254 planes in the area, 747 of these are fighters. About 40 destroyers and 60 E-boats operate in the coastal waters. The present bases in the BAY OF BISCAY have a capacity of 127 submarines. In addition to the above forces, there are 18 divisions in strategic reserve in GERMANY proper.

13. The German defense is based on the counter-attack. Offensive divisions in FRANCE and the LOW COUNTRIES can reach a threatened area within 24 hours (most of these reinforcements will move by rail). Reinforcements from GERMANY could begin to arrive in 4 days and the 18 divisions now available there could be in FRANCE in three weeks. Divisions from the Russian front could begin to arrive in about 13 days. The number of planes presently in FRANCE could be increased to 1766 aircraft (1158 of these would be fighters) by stripping all areas and not touching the MEDITERRANEAN and Eastern Front. The airfields and facilities in the area are in excess of the number required for the above force. The light naval units could be increased to 100 E-boats in three days and heavier units could make their appearance shortly thereafter.

14. The coastal defenses vary in strength in both directions from the strongest point in the CALAIS area. The most heavily fortified areas are those favorable to an attack and within fighter support of the UNITED KINGDOM. The defenses of the coast proper vary in depth from 5 to 15 miles. In rear of these coastal defenses a general defensive zone 20 to 50 miles wide has been established. Beyond this belt three additional zones including the MAGINOT LINE have been organized. All of these defensive areas must be reduced or neutralized before the line of the German "West Wall" is reached if the attack is made through FRANCE.

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15. Construction of new fortifications continues at a rapid rate as well as the replacement of installation that are destroyed by our action.

16. It is estimated that in the spring of 1944, with RUSSIA still actively in the war, the Germans could, by effecting reductions on the Eastern Front, increase the Western European garrison to a grand total of 60 divisions.

UNITED NATIONS COURSES OF ACTION

17. It is deemed vital that the UNITED NATIONS now decide whether:

a. They are to conduct further operations in the MEDITERRANEAN on the present scale, or

b. They are to conduct major operations in the MEDITERRANEAN for the purpose of re-entering the continent from this area, or

c. They are to concentrate appropriate forces in the UNITED KINGDOM, while conducting a bomber offensive from this base, for the purpose of entering the Continent at the earliest possible time, while conducting limited operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

18. Further operations in the MEDITERRANEAN under the first two contingencies are being examined in other papers. The decisions reached for this area will determine whether or not troops should be transshipped in the theater from NORTH AFRICA to the UNITED KINGDOM. In this connection, a consideration which may assume even more importance after our HUSKY operation is the desirability of using battle-tested formations for the initial cross-Channel assault.

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SECTION 1

19. Cross-Channel operations are dependent on the ability of the bomber offensive to so reduce the German potential to resist that a successful assault can be made. The result of the bomber offensive cannot be positively evaluated nor can the results on the Eastern Front be forecast. Therefore, it is essential that a proper balance be maintained between landing craft and combat units while the build-up for a cross-Channel invasion is being effected.

BOMBER OFFENSIVE

20. J.C.S. 277 provides for a Combined Bomber Offensive against the EUROPEAN AXIS. Implications of this plan indicate that it can be carried out while meeting commitments of U. S. Air Units to other theaters though increased shipping required may cause reduction in the rate, but not the ultimate build-up, of ground forces in the UNITED KINGDOM.

21. The ability of the bombers to destroy strategic objectives, unless effectively opposed, has been demonstrated. Judging by past experiences, it is to be expected that the projected bomber offensive against GERMANY will result in the destruction of so many of her key industries that she will no longer be able to wage modern war and favorable conditions will be created for a re-entry to the Continent. Such favorable conditions may be predicted by continuously analyzing the effects of the bomber offensive as it progresses through its various phases. When the foregoing is integrated with other factors, it should be practicable to decide well in advance on a target date for implementing the plans being prepared for cross-Channel operations.

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22. GERMANY'S problem is how best to adequately oppose our coming effort. Her experience indicates that the fighter is the most effective defense. In the Battle of Britain most of the Luftwaffe was available for use against ENGLAND due to the fact that GERMANY was still at peace with RUSSIA. GERMANY was also in possession of adequate airdromes in close proximity to the target. ENGLAND, at this time, with an inferior airforce, had concentrated on fighters, and had 1180 fighters with which to oppose the total German strength of 5,800 combat aircraft. The failure of the Luftwaffe to accomplish its purpose was such as to have demonstrated the value of the fighter to the analytical German mind.

23. If GERMANY has correctly evaluated this lesson and has correctly interpreted our intention to conduct a sustained and constantly intensified air offensive against her, her reaction may be expected to follow the British pattern. Recent indications are that this is the case. Fighter production is being increased at the expense of bomber production. Due to complications involved in major production shifts, this reflects a decision made from nine to eighteen months ago and the full implications will not become evident for some time.

24. The results of our forthcoming bombing offensive will be measured by the timeliness and effectiveness of German counter-measures. If they have failed to forecast our intentions and prove unable to duplicate the earlier British defensive measures, our bombing offensive can be depended upon to prepare the way for a cross-Channel invasion. On the contrary, there is a possibility that, with large numbers of fighters of improved types, they may be able to successfully oppose the largest scale bomber offensive we can throw against them.

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25. German success or failure will also be affected by the timeliness of our own actions. Any delay on our part will operate to her advantage, and any acceleration will increase her difficulties.

26. It appears essential that the effects of the bomber offensive be analyzed and reports thereon be submitted frequently together with a forecast for the ensuing period. These reports should be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and other interested agencies (such as the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander for cross-Channel operations).

AVAILABILITY OF GROUND FORCES

27. There is at present 1 U. S. division in the UNITED KINGDOM. This will be increased by an additional division when the shuttle of the ICELAND division is completed. Through December 31, 1944, 53 divisions will become available in the UNITED STATES for use in the UNITED KINGDOM, if commitments in other theaters are maintained at the 1943 level. Shortages in supporting and service units, which will require correction, may appear at times but there will be sufficient major units to initiate operations. In addition to the above, there will be in the MEDITERRANEAN area 2 armored, 6 infantry, and 1 airborne divisions.

SHIPPING CAPABILITIES FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM BUILDUP

28. Cargo shipping will be available to move and maintain troops up to the limit of troopship capacity.

29. Reckoning the initial movement requirements at 7 ship tons per man, monthly maintenance at 1 ship ton per man, monthly replacements at 4,000 men, and the strength for a division at 40,000 men, the following build-up can be attained in the UNITED KINGDOM. Army Air Forces are given priority over ground units (all figures are cumulative).

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BUILD-UP IN PERSONNEL

	<u>In the United Kingdom</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Ground</u>	<u>Div.</u>
July 1, 1943	193,000	117,876	75,124	1
Oct. 1, 1943	503,000	169,918	333,082	9
Jan. 1, 1944	833,500	278,158	555,342	14
Apr. 1, 1944	1,142,500	380,864	761,636	19
July 1, 1944	1,331,000	406,424	924,576	23
Oct. 1, 1944	1,449,000	406,424	1,042,576	26
Dec. 31, 1944	1,522,500	406,424	1,116,076	28

The above will be increased 1 division by the Iceland division.

30. There will be 10 divisions (British and Canadian) available for cross-channel operations on October 1, 1943. If the target that has been set for April 1, 1944 is met in the conversion of defensive divisions to an offensive role this may be increased to 14 divisions and 2 equivalent divisions.

31. On April 1, 1944, a total of 30 divisions (U. S., British, and Canadian) can be found for cross-channel operations. This might be further increased by the conversion of still more British divisions from the defensive to the offensive type.

32. Port capacity is estimated by British Military War Transportation at 125,000 personnel and 150 BOLERO cargo ships per month if U. S. dock labor and locomotives are furnished; but only in summer, not winter months. It is further estimated that 150,000 personnel and 200 cargo ships could be handled by the UNITED KINGDOM ports working at a maximum peak load for a short period. The above estimates are based on the saturation point occurring by April 1, 1944. If operations have secured continental ports through which troops and cargo may pass, or if the capacity of UNITED KINGDOM ports could be increased, the above build-up can be increased to the following:

July 1, 1944

29 Div.

Oct. 1, 1944

34 Div.

Dec. 31, 1944

37 Div.

34. A time lag of 4 weeks should be allowed between the arrival of troops in the UNITED KINGDOM and the completion of distribution of equipment to their units. It is also estimated that units should be in the UNITED KINGDOM 3 months prior to the initiation of operations to provide for the completion of the distribution of equipment, training, planning, rehearsals, and final organization.

35. If it is decided to move American divisions in the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM for the initial cross-channel invasion, this could be done in the last quarter of 1943. Such a move of up to 6 divisions with supporting troops could be accomplished by using all available troopships except the fast unescorted British troopships that can not be employed in the MEDITERRANEAN. This move would allow the same rate of personnel build-up indicated in paragraph 30, but would reduce the movement from the UNITED STATES by a like amount.

AVAILABILITY OF LANDING CRAFT

36. A study has been made of the availability of landing craft (See Appendix "A"). This shows that, provided production is increased within limits which will not jeopardize DE and combatant class programs and certain delays are accepted in the build-up of U. S. landing craft now allocated to the PACIFIC area, the requirements for ROUNDUP as set forth in C.C.S. 105/2 can be met by April 1, 1944. The implications of this decision on operations in the PACIFIC in 1943 and 1944 should be carefully

In order to afford comparison with C.C.S. 105/2, the troop and medium tanks lifts which they would provide is shown below. These figures must be reduced in proportion to the degree it is found necessary to substitute vehicles and freight.

	July 1, 1943	Oct. 1, 1943	Jan. 1, 1944	Apr. 1, 1944	C.C.S. 105/2
Troops	115,542	157,620	203,976	226,632	226,452
Tanks	4,515	5,250	6,405	6,925	5,700

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CAPACITIES OF PORTS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT

36. The initial assault and maintenance on the Continent will be over the beaches. However, to meet German reserves, ports must be captured immediately for an early build-up of our forces. The bridgehead should be established in an area affording port capacities sufficient to move to the Continent the forces that will be required for operations of major proportions.

37. The following is an estimate of the build-up that can be attained during the first 12 months after operations are initiated in any one of the following areas. These estimates are based on probable port destruction and maximum capacities being obtained after 90 days.

Build-up and maintenance in number of men.

<u>Area</u>	<u>Number of Men</u>
HOLLAND	1,465,970
BELGIUM	3,500,800
CALAIS (BELGIUM to the SOMME RIVER)	2,554,160
SOMME RIVER to the SEINE RIVER	3,846,682
CAEN (SEINE RIVER to COTENTIN PENINSULA)	334,010
COTENTIN PENINSULA	578,000
BRETON PENINSULA	955,060
BAY OF BISCAY	2,374,060

38. The two most promising areas for assault operations, the CAEN and COTENTIN PENINSULA sectors, will afford port capacities for a build-up in 12 months of 912,010 men. By extending this bridgehead to include the SEINE RIVER and the ports of LE HAVRE and ROUEN the build-up in 12 months would be 4,012,110 men. This force of approximately 100 divisions would be capable of major operations.

39. In the selection of areas for the assault, consideration should be given not only to the tactical requirements of an amphibious operation but also to the necessity of obtaining ports of the required capacity to place a force on the Continent that can defeat the German forces in NORTHWEST EUROPE.

CONCLUSIONS

40. In arriving at the date on which a full scale invasion of the EUROPEAN CONTINENT can be launched the bomber offensive will be the determining factor.

41. The effects of the bomber offensive, if continuously examined as it progresses through its various phases, and when integrated with other factors, will determine well in advance the target date for implementing the plans now being prepared for cross-channel operations.

42. Priority should be given to the Army Air Forces in the UNITED KINGDOM build-up.

43. The build-up in the UNITED KINGDOM should be implemented in a manner to afford extreme flexibility to the cross-Channel planners; this to be obtained as far as possible by the movement of units and landing craft in proportion to effect a balanced invasion force capable of operations at any time.

44. Invasion forces in the UNITED KINGDOM can be built up at the rate indicated in the following table. UNITED STATES ground forces should be in the UNITED KINGDOM 3 months prior to the initiation of operations in order to provide for planning, training, rehearsals, and final grouping and organization.

	U. S. Divs.	British Divs.	Total	Personnel and Tank lift at one time
July 1, 1943	2	?	2+	113,868 troops 2,690 tanks
Oct. 1, 1943	10	10	20	159,840 troops 4,070 tanks
Jan. 1, 1944	15	13?	28?	203,898 troops 5,430 tanks
Apr. 1, 1944	20	16?	36?	224,244 troops 6,020 tanks

45. Careful consideration should be given to the movement of battle-tested troops from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM as an added insurance for the success of the initial assault.

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46. In the selection of areas for the assault full consideration must be given to port capacities since adequate port facilities will be required immediately to facilitate the initial build-up. Port capacities must further lend themselves to sufficient development for the provision of the required forces to defeat the AXIS in NORTHWESTERN EUROPE.

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APPENDIX "A"

LANDING CRAFT STUDY

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

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47. Under present production program and based on presently planned U. S. deployments, what landing craft can be made available in the UNITED KINGDOM by quarters from July 1, 1943, to December 31, 1944, and how do these meet the requirements for ROUNDUP as set forth in C.C.S. 105/2.

DISCUSSION

48. The following tables (attached) set forth the best informations available on this subject.

a. Table I - British Landing Craft from UNITED STATES Production.

b. Table II - - UNITED STATES Landing Craft available for ATLANTIC areas.

c. Table III - UNITED STATES Landing Craft available for PACIFIC areas.

d. Table IV - Best information available on British Landing Craft from British Production.

e. On the assumption that no UNITED STATES landing craft assigned to PACIFIC areas can be made available for operations in the ATLANTIC area, Table V has been made up as a composite of Tables I, II, and IV and requirements of C.C.S. 105/2 have been included for the sake of comparison. It should be emphasized that such comparison is subject to large error due to the fact that no provision has been made for training, ANAKIM, operations subsequent to HUSKY, or battle losses incurred in HUSKY. However, this table shows that such a large margin exists in case of landing craft of less than 50 feet in length and in LCT(5)'s as to indicate no problem in these classes. Also, while it is not apparent from the Table, the same is true of LCM(3)'s. This is explained as

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follows: (U. S. LCM(3)'s are not shown due to the fact that U. S. production (less assignments to U. K.) are now allocated to APA's, etc. Considerable numbers can be made available by diversion from these vessels should it be considered warranted. Also, a large additional program of LCM(3)'s is underway, which is likely to be in excess of current needs because of a change in U. S. Army requirements that is expected to come through soon.

50. From a review of the foregoing, it appears that the problem is one of providing sufficient LST's and LCI(L)'s. An examination of possible production increases in these types indicates the following:

a. LST's. From informal estimates obtained from the Navy Department, it appears feasible to increase the tailing on program to 12 per month for a total of 108 additional LST's without too great sacrifice in the DE and combatant class programs. This is subject to confirmation by the Navy Department.

b. LCI(L)'s. It also appears feasible to increase present rate from 16 per month to 20 per month and present program from 192 to 300 with same remarks as under a. above.

51. Provided all additional construction thus made available is allocated to the ATLANTIC area, the situation will be greatly improved (See Table VI). However, it is still evident from this Table that, although conditions are improved, an insufficient margin still exists in April, 1944, when battle losses, training requirements, and necessary diversions to other operations are considered. The only remaining source from which to make up deficiencies is by reductions in presently planned U. S. deployments to the PACIFIC area. This would appear essential but need not be of a permanent nature. Earlier reductions in planned PACIFIC deployments can be made up from production surpluses which will become available after the requirements for ROUNDUP have been met.

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52. Table VII represents an estimate of landing craft availability provided production is increased as outlined and temporary diversions are made from the PACIFIC to the ATLANTIC. In this Table every effort was made to account for battle losses, other demands on the British, training requirements, and normal attrition. LST's, LCI(L)'s and LCT's only were subject to careful analysis, and it was assumed for purposes of study that the increase in other types would progress at a parallel rate. Actually they may be expected to exceed the numbers shown.

53. In arriving at the figures obtained in Table VII, the following assumptions were made:

a. Landing craft used in HUSKY will be available subject to 30 percent attrition losses (44 LST, 71 LCI(L) and 69 LCT).

b. British commitments elsewhere will reduce the availability in the U. K. by 10 LST, 20 LCI(L) and 20 LCT.

c. The UNITED STATES planned deployment to the PACIFIC will be altered as follows:

	<u>Oct 1 '43</u>	<u>Jan 1 '44</u>	<u>Apr 1 '44</u>	<u>Jul 1 '44</u>	<u>Oct 1 '44</u>
LST	-13	-22	0	-35	0
LCI(L)	-34	-36	-6	+36	+40

d. Due to training requirements and normal attrition losses, final figures were subject to an arbitrary reduction of 10 percent.

54. Table VII shows that the requirements for ROUNDUP as set forth in C.C.S. 105/2 will be met by 1 April 1944 and that the following troop and medium tank lifts will be available on the dates indicated.

	<u>Jul 1 '43</u>	<u>Oct 1 '43</u>	<u>Jan 1 '44</u>	<u>Apr 1 '44</u>	<u>CCS 105/2</u>
Troops	115,542	157,620	203,976	226,632	226,452
Tanks	4,515	5,250	6,405	6,925	5,700

NOTE: A table showing characteristics of Landing Craft discussed in this paper is attached for ready reference. See Table VIII.

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TABLE I

BRITISH LANDING CRAFTFROM U.S. PRODUCTIONS (E)

TYPE	AS OF 7/1/43	DELIVERIES TO					
		10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	7/1/44	10/1/44	12/31/44
LSD	0	1 (1)	1 (2)	2 (4)	0 (4)	3 (7)	0 (7)
LST	58	15 (84)	19(C) (103)	17(C) (120)	0 (120)	0 (120)	0 (120)
LCI(L)	150	8(F) (153)	12 (170)	12 (182)	4 (186)	0 (186)	0 (186)
LCT(5)	138	12(B) (150)	0 (150)	0 (150)	0 (150)	0 (150)	0 (150)
LCM(3)	477	117 (594)	0 (594)	0 (594)	0 (594)	0 (594)	0 (594)
LCP, LCV & LCVP(A)	914	260 (1174)	0 (1174)	0 (1174)	0 (1174)	0 (1174)	0 (1174)

(A) This type only in production now.

(B) Probable delivery. 150 originally delivered. 12 lost and expected to be replaced this quarter.

(C) Assuming 36 additional LST's allocated to U.K. prior to 1 March, 1944. (This now under discussion.)

(E) Discussions of deliveries beyond 1 August have not been entered into.

(F) Figure of 22 additional LCI(L) has been discussed as a probable allocation to the British. A total of 36 LCI(L)'s are shown here as a possible allocation to the British. No discussion of these figures should be made with them.

(G) Parenthetical figures are cumulative.

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TABLE II

U. S. LANDING CRAFT AVAILABLE FOR ATLANTIC AREAS UNDER
PRESENT PRODUCTION PROGRAM AND PLANNED DEPLOYMENT (A)

TYPE	AS OF 7/1/43	DELIVERIES TO					
		10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	7/1/44	10/1/44	12/31/44
LSD	0	0	2 (2)	0 (2)	0 (2)	0 (2)	0 (2)
LST	92	4 (96)	16 (112)	6 (118)	0 (118)	0 (118)	0 (118)
LCI(L)	102	6 (108)	0 (108)	0 (108)	0 (108)	0 (108)	0 (108)
LCT(5)	139	9 (148)	12 (160)	12 (172)	12 (184)	0 (184)	0 (184)
LCM(3)(B)							
LCP, LCV & LCVP(3)							

(A) Includes all landing craft in ATLANTIC and MEDITERRANEAN areas (does not take into account sinkings or landing craft which, because of other ATLANTIC - MEDITERRANEAN demands, will not be available. Their exact location will be variable. If not in the UNITED KINGDOM, any time lag that will be required to move them there should be added. There will also be an additional time lag of about one month for training and shake-down of the limited numbers of craft added the latter part of each quarter.

(B) None provided specifically at present time for UNITED STATES use in operations from UNITED KINGDOM. UNITED STATES production (less UNITED KINGDOM assignments) now allocated to UNITED STATES APA's, AKA's, LST's and training. Considerable numbers could be made available by diversion from these vessels, should it be considered warranted.

TABLE III

U. S. LANDING CRAFT AVAILABLE FOR PACIFIC AREAS UNDER
PRESENT PRODUCTION PROGRAM AND PLANNED DEPLOYMENTS (A)

TYPE	AS OF 7/1/43	DELIVERIES TO					
		10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	7/1/44	10/1/44	12/31/44
LSD	2	3 (5)	1 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)
LST	34	38 (122)	22 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)	0 (144)
LCI(L)	70	34 (104)	36 (140)	36 (176)	24 (200)	0 (200)	0 (200)
LCT(5)	180	9 (189)	18 (207)	18 (225)	18 (243)	0 (243)	0 (243)
LCM(3)(B)							
LCP, LCV & LCVF(B)							

(A) Based on what is considered necessary to support PACIFIC operations as presently envisaged for 1943. Any reduction possible will permit increases in the ATLANTIC. Does not take into account sinkings.

(B) U. S. production assigned to APA's, etc.

(C) Parenthetical figures are cumulative.

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TABLE IV

BRITISH LANDING CRAFT FROM
U.K. PRODUCTION

TYPE	AS OF 7/1/43	DELIVERIES TO					
		10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	7/1/44	10/1/44	12/31/44
LST	6	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)	0 (6)
LCT (3) & (4)	183	7 (190)	7 (197)	7 (204)	7 (211)	7 (218)	7 (225)
LCF & LCU (M)	168	98 (266)	98 (364)	98 (462)	98 (560)	98 (658)	98 (656)
LCI (S)	28	15 (43)	0 (43)	0 (43)	0 (43)	0 (43)	0 (43)
LCM (3)	100	0 (100)	0 (100)	0 (100)	0 (100)	0 (100)	0 (100)
LCM (1)	215	45 (260)	45 (305)	45 (350)	45 (395)	45 (440)	45 (485)
LCS (L)	5	0 (5)	0 (5)	0 (5)	0 (5)	0 (5)	0 (5)
LCA	337	233 (570)	159 (729)	120 (849)	120 (969)	120 (1089)	100 (1189)
LCS (M)	91	31 (122)	21 (143)	21 (163)	21 (184)	21 (205)	17 (222)
LCV	200	0 (200)	0 (200)	0 (200)	0 (200)	0 (200)	0 (200)
LCP (M)	13	0 (18)	0 (18)	0 (18)	0 (18)	0 (18)	0 (18)
LCP (S)	50	0 (50)	0 (50)	0 (50)	0 (50)	0 (50)	0 (50)

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Table IV to Appendix "A".

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TABLE VI

INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF LST's AND LCI's
IN THE ATLANTIC AREA RESULTING FROM INCREASED PRODUCTION
AND ALLOCATION OF SURPLUSES THUS MADE AVAILABLE.

TYPE	AS OF 7/1/43	DELIVERIES TO					CCS 105/2
		10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	7/1/44	10/1/44	
LSD	0	1 (1)	3 (4)	2 (6)	0 (6)	3 (9)	0 (9)
LST	166	20 (186)	35 (221)	23 (244)	36 (280)	36 (316)	36 (352)
LCI (L)	270	26 (296)	24 (320)	24 (344)	36 (380)	40 (420)	
LCT (5)	643	35 (678)	26 (704)	26 (730)	26 (756)	14 (770)	14 (784)
LCM (3)	577	117 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)	0 (694)
LC Less than 50'	1850	569 (2399)	225 (2624)	186 (2810)	186 (2996)	186 (3182)	162 (3344)

Parenthetical figures are cumulative.

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TABLE VII

AVAILABILITY OF LANDING CRAFT FOR "ROUNDUP"

TYPE	7/1/43	10/1/43	1/1/44	4/1/44	C.C.S. 105/2
LSD	0	1	4	5	
LST	101 18,786 troops and 2020 tanks	130 24,180 troops and 2600 tanks	182 33,852 troops and 3640 tanks	202 37,572 troops and 4040 tanks	200 37,200 troops and 4000 tanks
LCI(L)	161 30,912 troops or 12,075 tons	215 41,280 troops or 16,125 tons	269 51,648 troops or 20,175 tons	299 57,408 troops or 22,425 tons	300 57,600 troops or 22,500 tons
LCT (5)	499 2495 tanks	530 2650 tanks	553 2765 tanks	577 2885 tanks	340 1700 tanks
LCM(3)	375 45,000 troops or 375 tanks or 10,012 tons	525 63,000 troops or 525 tanks or 14,017 tons	675 81,000 troops or 675 tanks or 18,022 tons	750 90,000 troops or 750 tanks or 20,025 tons	750 90,000 troops or 750 tanks or 20,025 tons
LCVP, etc.	579 20,844 troops or 579 trucks or 2,022 tons	810 29,160 troops or 810 trucks or 2,835 tons	1041 37,476 troops or 1041 trucks or 3,643 tons	1157 41,652 troops or 1157 trucks or 4,049 tons	1157 41,652 troops or 1157 trucks or 4,049 tons
TOTAL LIFT	115,542 troops and 4,515 tanks	157,620 troops and 5,250 tanks	203,976 troops and 6,405 tanks	226,632 troops and 6,925 tanks	226,452 troops and 5,700 tanks

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TABLE VIII (Cont'd)

TYPE	DESIG. LTR.	CAPACITY	DRAFT	WEIGHT (lb)	ARMOR	ARMAMENT	SPEED (knots)	ENDUR- ANCE (Miles)	LENGTH	BEAM	CREW
LAND. CRAFT, GUN	LOC	Crew only	3' fwd. 5'8" aft.	328 long tons	2-1/2" & Splinter	2 4.7 Q.F. 2 20 mm.	10	2,000	192'	31'	36
LAND. CRAFT, FLAK	LCF	Crew only	2'4" fwd. 6' aft	440 long tons	Control Station	8 2-pdrs 4 20 mm.	14	1,000	191'	30'	60
LAND. CRAFT, INF. (LARGE)	LCI(L)	192 troops; or 75 tons cargo	2'6" fwd. 4'6" aft	216 long tons	1/4" sides & fwd, Control Sta	4 20 mm.	17	4,000 Ocean 500 Landing	158'	23'	23
"(SMALL)	LCI(S)	200 troops	3'6"	115 long tons			17.5		125'	21'	9
"MECHA- NIZED, TANK I	LCM(I)	1 Lt (16-ton) tank; or 2 Bren carriers; or 100 troops	1'6" fwd. 4' aft	45,000	1/4"		8.5	100	40'	14'	6
"TANK III	LCM(3)	1 med. (30-ton); or 60,000 lbs. cargo; or 120 troops	3'6"	22 long tons	Control Station 1/4"	2 .50 Cal.	8.5	125	50'	14'	4
LAND. CRAFT, SUPPORT (LARGE)	LCS(L)	Crew only	3' fwd 4' aft	56,000	1/4"	2 2 pdr. 2 .50 Cal. 2 .30 Cal. 1 Mortar	11.5	70	47'	12'	12

NOTES: SPEED is with normal load, average sea
ENDURANCE is at full speed unless otherwise noted
WEIGHT is light unless otherwise noted
LENGTH is overall

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TABLE VIII (Cont'd)

TYPE	DESIG. LTR.	CAPACITY	DRAFT	WEIGHT (lb)	ARMOR	ARMAMENT	SPEED (knots)	ENDUR- ANCE (miles)	LENGTH	BEAM	CREW
LAND. CRAFT. SUPPORT (MEDIUM)	LCS(M)	Crew only	1'6" fwd. 4'6" aft	20,000	1/4"	2 .50 Cal. 2 .30 Cal. 1 Mortar	11.5	70	39'	10'	12
LAND. CRAFT ASSAULT	LCA	35 troops; or 3.5 long tons cargo	1'6" fwd. 2'6" aft	18,000	1/4"	1 Bren	11.5	70	41'	10'	4
" VEHICLE	LCV	36 troops; or 1 1-ton truck; or 10,000 lbs. cargo	3'	13,000			8.5	80 or 200	36'	11'	3
" PERSON- NEL (MEDIUM)	LCF(M)	20 troops		14,000	Engine only		8.5		36'	10'	
" SMALL	LCF(S)								28'		
LAND. CRAFT. VEH. PIERS.	LCVP	36 troops; or 1 1-ton truck; or 8,100 lbs. cargo	3'2"	17,850	1/4" sides & ramp	2 .30 Cal.	8.5	100	36'	11'	4

NOTES: SPEED is with normal load, average sea
ENDURANCE is at full speed unless otherwise noted
WEIGHT is light unless otherwise noted
LENGTH is overall

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT FROM
BASES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44

References: a. JCS 272
b. JCS 76th Mtg.,
Item 1.

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosed study was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this date.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date

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INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT
FROM BASES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44

Reference: J.C.S. 272

REPORT BY JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

1. A detailed examination of the merits and possibilities of the defeat of the EUROPEAN AXIS by operations launched from the MEDITERRANEAN is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The courses of action examined and conclusions reached are indicated below:

a. Invade EUROPE via the IBERIAN PENINSULA

(1) Rejected. Not suitable strategically.

b. Invade EUROPE via SOUTHERN FRANCE

(1) Retained for further examination. Suitable -- would create the "Second Front." Feasibility questionable -- would require seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA; adequate land-based air cover cannot be provided and doubtful if shipping capabilities could support an operation of this magnitude until late 1944. Acceptable only if we are prepared to face heavy losses in ships and personnel.

(2) The inherent decisive possibilities warrant retention for further examination.

c. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE

(1) Rejected. Suitable only in eliminating ITALY from the war. Not suitable as ITALY is not a vital AXIS area, would require substantial diversion of shipping to maintain Italian economy. Perhaps feasible but large forces required (estimated 40 to 50 divisions), adequate land-based air cover not available, and the shipping problem comparable to or worse than SOUTHERN FRANCE. Chances of a successful conquest of ITALY appear acceptable, but further exploitation toward FRANCE extremely doubtful.

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d. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and HUNGARY or GREECE and YUGOSLAVIA

(1) Rejected. The conclusion reached in 2 c. above is equally applicable.

e. Invade EUROPE via EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN - TURKEY, GREECE and the AEGEAN ISLANDS

(1) Rejected. Not logistically practicable (except as provided for limited operations in J.C.S. 293).

f. Reexamination of "Invade EUROPE via SOUTHERN FRANCE."

(1) Rejected. Reexamination in connection with other courses of action with a view to improving our chances of success indicate little hope of achieving such a position.

3. Conclusion

The application of the tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability to the various routes from the MEDITERRANEAN region for reentry to the Continent, and there to engage the AXIS armies in decisive combat, rejects them all as being unsound.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

INVASION OF THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT
FROM BASES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
IN 1943 - 1944

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

4. Determine the merits and possibilities of the defeat of the EUROPEAN AXIS by operations launched from the MEDITERRANEAN.

ASSUMPTIONS

5. It is assumed that:

a. Maximum air operations from the UNITED KINGDOM against GERMANY continue, and that minimum garrison forces be maintained in the UNITED KINGDOM.

b. TURKEY

(1) Remains neutral.

(2) Becomes an active UNITED NATIONS ally.

c. SPAIN continues her neutrality.

d. ITALY

(1) Continues as an active AXIS participant.

(2) Collapses or reaches terms of unconditional surrender with the UNITED NATIONS.

e. GERMANY resumes the offensive against RUSSIA, assumes the defensive on other fronts and intensifies the war of attrition against UNITED NATIONS shipping. No final decision is reached on the EASTERN FRONT.

f. JAPAN remains on the strategic defensive and consolidates her gains.

GENERAL COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS

6. Invade EUROPE from the MEDITERRANEAN:

a. Via IBERIAN PENINSULA.

b. Via SOUTHERN FRANCE.

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- c. Via ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE.
- d. Via ITALY and HUNGARY.
- e. Via ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA.
- f. Via EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN--TURKEY, GREECE, and the
AEGEAN ISLANDS.

GENERAL EXAMINATION OF COURSES OF ACTION

7. Invade EUROPE via IBERIAN PENINSULA

a. Suitability

Assuming that the IBERIAN PENINSULA will be defended by SPAIN and PORTUGAL and that AXIS support will be requested or accepted by SPAIN, the conquest of the Peninsula itself will require major effort to subjugate the Spanish and Portuguese forces and to hold the PYRENEES line until sea-ports and transportation facilities can be made available to our forces to support the eventual assault through the PYRENEES into FRANCE.

Initial success will not bring our forces to bear on a vital AXIS area unless the AXIS chooses to make SPAIN a battle ground of major proportions. AXIS security is not seriously threatened, and the terrain in SPAIN and through the PYRENEES into FRANCE does not favor further offensive Military operations.

Logistically, the installations are wholly inadequate for the large scale of operations ultimately envisaged. It is estimated that the route will only support 260,000 troops initially and has an ultimate monthly maintenance tonnage capacity for 1,200,000 troops.

Unless the initial action can be overwhelming, cheap in cost of neutral life and property, move rapidly into FRANCE toward a vital AXIS area, not make SPAIN a battle

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ground for a long period, and quickly establish favorable relations with the Spanish and Portuguese, this course of Military expediency will be comparable to the German invasions of HOLLAND, BELGIUM and NORWAY. Such a course would be incompatible with the announced UNITED NATIONS policy and would, therefore, be totally unacceptable to the American people.

It would cause severe repercussions in LATIN AMERICA, and the hand of the AXIS propagandists would be strengthened. The political and psychological implications of this course are distinctly unfavorable.

b. Conclusion

The course is unsuitable and is rejected. This conclusion is consistent with previous studies.

8. Invade EUROPE via SOUTHERN FRANCE

a. Suitability

The suitability of a UNITED NATIONS invasion of SOUTHERN FRANCE can be accepted virtually without discussion. Success in such an invasion would place our forces on the Continent in a geographic area that, from almost every point of view (climate, terrain, and communications, as well as the political and economic circumstances of the region), favors the engagement and destruction of the AXIS forces in decisive combat. Of itself, the invasion of SOUTHERN FRANCE by the UNITED NATIONS would be a serious threat to the AXIS stranglehold on the fortress of EUROPE. This invasion would force strong AXIS reaction, thereby affording an important degree of relief to RUSSIA. Such an invasion, moreover, would take full advantage of the present concentration of UNITED NATIONS Military forces in the MEDITERRANEAN region. Further, the wide choice of possible objectives in SOUTHERN EUROPE would permit exploiting threat and deception measures,

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thus facilitating the achievement of strategic surprise. Finally, the political and psychological implications of such an operation are entirely favorable; the friendly and virile French people in the battle area will assist our effort to the full extent of their capability.

Logistically, the existing facilities along the southern coast of FRANCE will support the operations.

b. Feasibility

The strategic concept of invading SOUTHERN FRANCE obviously presupposes a reasonably secure line of communications to the points of landing. This will require the seizure of both SARDINIA and CORSICA and assurance that SPAIN will remain neutral. Otherwise, our assault convoys and related shipping might suffer excessive losses from AXIS air forces operating from bases in SARDINIA, CORSICA, the Spanish mainland, and the BALEARICS.

The strategic concept envisages the initial seizure of beachheads in the area between MARSEILLES and the Spanish border by amphibious operations. These operations would be ship-to-shore from bases in the UNITED STATES, UNITED KINGDOM, and NORTH AFRICA, and possibly shore-to-shore from CORSICA and SARDINIA. Thereafter, the beachheads would be extended promptly to include the TOULON area and pressed inland sufficiently to provide a firm lodgement for use as a base for future operations. The invading forces operations would either strike westward through TOULON to the BORDEAUX region on the BAY OF BISCAY or north through the RHONE valley, or both.

The intensity of the air attack prior to the initial assaults will be determined, to an important extent, by the degree to which it is believed such air action might interfere with the achievement of strategic surprise. In any event, the large-scale use of parachute troops and air-borne troops to facilitate the initial landings is indicated.

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Effective land-based air cover for the passage of assault convoys and close air support for the initial landings will not be available. Support, therefore, could only be rendered by carrier-borne air forces.

Due to the excellent road and rail net that is available, the AXIS capabilities for immediate reaction and reinforcement in great strength are such that this operation will require striking with the maximum amphibious and aircraft carrier forces which the UNITED NATIONS are capable of providing. It is believed that this operation would require the simultaneous lifting of no less than 15 combat divisions, with at least half of them in combat loaders, which will not be available. Likewise, the build-up of forces in the seized area must be as rapid as the combined Anglo-American shipping will permit. These great demands on shipping would necessarily transcend all others and would include the temporary suspension of Lend-Lease commitments. It is estimated that a force of 2 - 2 1/4 million men could be supported ultimately through the ports of SOUTHERN FRANCE. This total could be increased if and as ports on the BAY OF BISCAY are seized.

c. Acceptability

It is by no means certain that a secure line of communications to the points of landing can be assured. More important, very heavy--probably excessive--losses in ships and human life must be anticipated due to the lack of land-based air cover for the assault convoys and adequate close air support for the initial assaults. Interdiction by AXIS submarines will present the normal hazard to the assault convoys.

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This operation is considered hazardous and difficult of accomplishment. It is probably unacceptable. The decisive possibilities inherent in the operation, however, warrant its retention for further examination.

9. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE

a. Suitability

(1) Assuming a collapse, or a successful invasion of ITALY and an unconditional surrender to the UNITED NATIONS, it becomes necessary to assess the effects on the ultimate defeat of the EUROPEAN AXIS.

(2) The effects, from an economic and Military view, can be considered in four general categories:

(a) The AXIS would be deprived of certain goods and services now being supplied to the total AXIS effort by ITALY.

(b) The AXIS would be relieved of the necessity for furnishing goods and services to ITALY.

(c) The UNITED NATIONS would gain any surpluses of goods and services not required to maintain Italian economy.

(d) The UNITED NATIONS would be required to insure the supply of goods and services to support Italian economy.

(3) After careful consideration of existing studies, it is concluded:

(a) The principal disadvantages to the AXIS of an Italian collapse or surrender would be:

(1) The necessity of diverting about 15 German divisions to replace Italian divisions on occupational duties.

(11) The loss of the Italian fleet.

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(iii) The loss of some industrial and agricultural products which, while they contribute to German economic welfare, would not measurably effect Military capabilities.

(iv) Loss of an area from which air operations could be conducted against industrial Germany.

(b) The principal gains to GERMANY of an Italian collapse or surrender would be:

(i) The release of German transport equipment now required to move 12,000,000 metric tons annually to ITALY. If Italian rolling stock be seized and evacuated, this could exceed the German total 1943 building program.

(ii) Industrial resources being shipped to Italy, such as coal, iron ore, bread grains, etc.; however, these materials are not critical items to German Military effort.

(c) The principal advantages to the UNITED NATIONS of an Italian collapse or surrender would be:

(i) The acquisition of small quantities of critical non-ferrous metals (mercury, alumina, magnesium, zinc and copper sulphate).

(ii) Supplemental supplies of agricultural products.

(iii) The additional safety afforded to ship traffic through the MEDITERRANEAN.

(iv) Acquisition of an area from which operations can be conducted against industrial Germany.

(d) The principal disadvantages to the UNITED NATIONS of an Italian collapse or surrender would be:

(i) The large occupational and administrative force required, estimated on the order of 15 divisions, with supporting service force and administrative units.

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(11) The almost certain drain in shipping. It is considered most unlikely that the UNITED NATIONS would be able to obtain control of the estimated 1 1/2 million deadweight tons of Italian merchant vessels required to maintain Italian economy at a minimum level.

(4) Finally, it is concluded that, without regard to political and psychological considerations, ITALY is not a vital AXIS area and that a substantial diversion of Allied shipping would be required to maintain Italian economy.

(5) Political and Psychological

The political and psychological reactions of the collapse or unconditional surrender of ITALY are speculative, but would unquestionably be generally advantageous to the UNITED NATIONS. Such an event would certainly place SPAIN and PORTUGAL more firmly in the neutral column, probably persuade TURKEY to join the Allied cause as an active belligerent, cause definite unrest in the Balkan countries, strengthen Swedish resistance, and result in further disorder, sabotage, and subversive activities in the occupied countries.

On the other hand, the invasion of ITALY might result in a long, drawn-out, indecisive operation. It is firmly believed that in this case the political and psychological reactions in our own and other UNITED NATIONS countries are likely to result in a weakening of the will of these peoples to continue the war to the decisive defeat of GERMANY and JAPAN.

(6) It has been estimated that the capacity of the existing communication facilities from ITALY to SOUTHERN FRANCE would be sufficient to support about 500,000 men

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10. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and HUNGARY

11. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA

The conclusion reached in the examination of the course of action, "Invade EUROPE via ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE," is equally applicable to the two courses of action listed above (paragraphs 10 and 11). They are therefore rejected.

12. Invade EUROPE via the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN - TURKEY, GREECE, and the AEGEAN ISLANDS

a. Suitability

(1) The suitability of the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Turkey, Greece, and the Aegean Islands) route of re-entry to the Continent, and thereafter pressing northward into the heart of the AXIS citadel, is a problem involving many considerations.

(2) It may be assumed that such a determination on the part of the UNITED NATIONS will bring TURKEY into the war as an ally. Initially, this analysis is based on this assumption. Obviously, the reverse assumption--that of a neutral or belligerent TURKEY--would materially affect the problem presented. This variation is discussed at a later point in this paper.

(3) Factors from a general strategic point of view:

(a) Favorable

For the AXIS, the BALKANS are a critical region. There are found commodities (oil, chromium, copper, and others of less importance) without which the AXIS could not long maintain its war effort. The BALKANS lie on the flank of AXIS lines of communication to RUSSIA. The severance of these lines by the UNITED NATIONS would be disastrous to the AXIS war effort in RUSSIA. There,

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10. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and HUNGARY

11. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA

The conclusion reached in the examination of the course of action, "Invade EUROPE via ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE," is equally applicable to the two courses of action listed above (paragraphs 10 and 11). They are therefore rejected.

12. Invade EUROPE via the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN - TURKEY, GREECE, and the AEGEAN ISLANDS

a. Suitability

(1) The suitability of the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Turkey, Greece, and the Aegean Islands) route of re-entry to the Continent, and thereafter pressing northward into the heart of the AXIS citadel, is a problem involving many considerations.

(2) It may be assumed that such a determination on the part of the UNITED NATIONS will bring TURKEY into the war as an ally. Initially, this analysis is based on this assumption. Obviously, the reverse assumption--that of a neutral or belligerent TURKEY--would materially affect the problem presented. This variation is discussed at a later point in this paper.

(3) Factors from a general strategic point of view:

(a) Favorable

For the AXIS, the BALKANS are a critical region. There are found commodities (oil, chromium, copper, and others of less importance) without which the AXIS could not long maintain its war effort. The BALKANS lie on the flank of AXIS lines of communication to RUSSIA. The severance of these lines by the UNITED NATIONS would be disastrous to the AXIS war effort in RUSSIA. There,

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10. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and HUNGARY

11. Invade EUROPE via ITALY and YUGOSLAVIA

The conclusion reached in the examination of the course of action, "Invade EUROPE via ITALY and SOUTHERN FRANCE," is equally applicable to the two courses of action listed above (paragraphs 10 and 11). They are therefore rejected.

12. Invade EUROPE via the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN - TURKEY, GREECE, and the AEGEAN ISLANDS

a. Suitability

(1) The suitability of the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN (Turkey, Greece, and the Aegean Islands) route of re-entry to the Continent, and thereafter pressing northward into the heart of the AXIS citadel, is a problem involving many considerations.

(2) It may be assumed that such a determination on the part of the UNITED NATIONS will bring TURKEY into the war as an ally. Initially, this analysis is based on this assumption. Obviously, the reverse assumption--that of a neutral or belligerent TURKEY--would materially affect the problem presented. This variation is discussed at a later point in this paper.

(3) Factors from a general strategic point of view:

(a) Favorable

For the AXIS, the BALKANS are a critical region. There are found commodities (oil, chromium, copper, and others of less importance) without which the AXIS could not long maintain its war effort. The BALKANS lie on the flank of AXIS lines of communication to RUSSIA. The severance of these lines by the UNITED NATIONS would be disastrous to the AXIS war effort in RUSSIA. There,

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too, are AXIS allies whose loyalty is known to be wavering. Guerrilla action in GREECE and YUGOSLAVIA would certainly accelerate, and might develop to significant proportions elsewhere in the Balkan region. It follows logically that an invasion of the BALKANS by the UNITED NATIONS would precipitate large-scale AXIS reaction. If set back initially the AXIS would probably make a determined defense at the DANUBE.

The basing of a large-scale invasion of the Continent in the MEDITERRANEAN area would take full advantage of the sizable concentration there of UNITED NATIONS Military forces. It is also evident that the clearance of EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN waters would greatly simplify and expedite the supply of war munitions to RUSSIA, by shipment through the DARDANELLES. Further, UNITED NATIONS success would ultimately permit the uniting and coordinating of the UNITED STATES - British Military effort with that of RUSSIA. However, it is important to note that this would result in a "one-front" war, rather than the "two-front" war the AXIS desires, if possible, to avoid.

(b) Unfavorable

The invasion of EUROPE via the BALKANS would represent the ultimate in the UNITED NATIONS encirclement strategy set in motion by operation TORCH. Logistically, the operation presents a bleak picture; it would be both based upon and strike into relatively barren areas. It is estimated that the existing logistical installations in the entire Balkan area, including EUROPEAN TURKEY, will only support a force of 1 - 1 1/4 million men. To exceed this total would require the

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progressive expenditure of time, effort, and materials in steadily increasing proportions. The build-up of UNITED NATIONS forces will be slow for geographic (as well as logistical) reasons, for the Balkan route to EUROPE is the longest possible, from either the UNITED STATES or the UNITED KINGDOM. The general nature of the terrain, the relative absence of decisive objectives, and the long, hard road northward into CENTRAL EUROPE would all combine to make such an invasion a time-consuming and tedious campaign. Indeed, it is probably not overstating the case to conclude that it will probably take longer to bring the full weight of the UNITED NATIONS to bear on GERMANY by an invasion through the BALKANS than it will if any other route to the Continent is selected.

(4) From an economic point of view, the considerations are largely unfavorable to the UNITED NATIONS. The PLOESTI oil fields and the BOR copper mines will either be destroyed by our air attack from bases in TURKEY, or by the enemy, prior to seizure by us. There are no other comparable economic prizes in the Balkan area. Worse, until after the first harvest period following our invasion, each area conquered will represent a serious economic liability. This is because the entire region has been so ravaged by the AXIS that the living standard is everywhere at or below the existence level, and in GREECE, at least, starvation is widespread. The full responsibility for feeding these unfortunate people would be ours, and their minimum needs would constitute an increased drain on UNITED NATIONS shipping. These demands could not be denied.

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(J.C.S. 293)

May 7, 1943

Pages 1-15, incl.

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

LIMITED OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-1944

Reference: (a) J.C.S. 272 and 272/1
(b) J.C.S. 76th Mtg., Item 1

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

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LIMITED OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44

Reference: J.C.S. 272

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. A detailed examination of the operations that may be undertaken in the MEDITERRANEAN, subsequent to HUSKY, with the forces now available in the area is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The courses of action examined and the conclusions reached are indicated below:

a. Seizure of the DODECANESE.

(1) Retained. If TURKEY an ally, course is both suitable and feasible.

(2) Rejected. If TURKEY not an ally - not suitable; cause little or no dispersion of AXIS forces.

b. Seizure of CRETE and the DODECANESE.

(1) Rejected. Feasibility questionable, and not suitable strategically in view of limited advantages gained at the expense of operations excessively costly in time and forces.

c. Seizure of CRETE.

(1) Rejected. Lacking land-based air support from DODECANESE bases, becomes more costly and less advantageous than operations against CRETE and DODECANESE, already rejected.

d. Seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA.

(1) Retained. Limited in size - acceptable if we must "do something" between HUSKY and ROUNDUP.

e. Seizure of the Heel of ITALY.

(1) Retained. Course is both suitable and feasible, provided Military operations can be limited to Heel of ITALY. Acceptable if required to divert AXIS forces or has reasonable chance to force ITALY out of the war.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

LIMITED OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44

PROBLEM

5.- To determine what operations the UNITED NATIONS should undertake in the MEDITERRANEAN, subsequent to HUSKY, with forces then available in the area.

ASSUMPTIONS

6. It is assumed that:

a. Maximum air operations from the UNITED KINGDOM against GERMANY will continue and that build-up continues in the United Kingdom for the defeat of GERMANY to be attained by operations initiated in 1944 from the United Kingdom.

b. TURKEY.

(1) Remains neutral.

(2) Becomes an active UNITED NATIONS ally.

c. SPAIN continues neutral.

d. ITALY.

(1) Continues as an active AXIS participant.

(2) Collapses, or reaches terms of unconditional surrender with the UNITED NATIONS.

e. GERMANY resumes the offensive against RUSSIA, assumes the defensive on other fronts and intensifies the war of attrition against UNITED NATIONS shipping. No final decision is reached on the ^{Russian} ~~Western~~ Front.

f. JAPAN remains on the strategic defensive and consolidates her gains.

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DISCUSSION

7. Two ways that the forces released upon the successful conclusion of HUSKY, may be profitably employed are:

a. By transferring to the UNITED KINGDOM that part of these forces not required for permanent garrisons in the MEDITERRANEAN area with a view to concentrating appropriate forces in preparation for decisive cross-channel operations in 1944. These forces will be 11 divisions (American and British), 2 Heavy and 1 Medium Bombardment, 1 Fighter, and 5 Troop Carrier Groups (American), and 4 Bomber, 17 Fighter, and 6 other Squadrons (British).

b. By undertaking further offensive operations in the MEDITERRANEAN area with a view to diverting the maximum AXIS forces from the Russian front in 1943.

8. The decision, reiterated at CASABLANCA, that the ultimate defeat of the EUROPEAN AXIS should be attained on the continent as a result of operations from the UNITED KINGDOM, remains sound. This decision should be adhered to. Contemplated operations in the EUROPEAN - MEDITERRANEAN area should therefore be weighed with respect to their effects on the accomplishment of this objective.

9. Cross-channel operations.

a. In order to assess the value of moving to the UNITED KINGDOM forces available upon the successful conclusion of HUSKY, it is necessary to make a comparative estimate of the total forces that can be assembled in the UNITED KINGDOM by

October 1, 1943, and April 1, 1944:

(1) Moving maximum UNITED NATIONS forces from the MEDITERRANEAN and the UNITED STATES, and

(2) Moving forces only from the UNITED STATES while maintaining present UNITED NATIONS forces in continued offensive operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

b. This comparative estimate shows that the major units in the UNITED KINGDOM for cross-channel operations on October 1, 1943, are substantially the same, whether or not a transfer is made from the MEDITERRANEAN. On April 1, 1944, by moving forces from the MEDITERRANEAN, an increase of two divisions in a total of 32 in the UNITED KINGDOM is achieved.

c. In addition to the facts developed in the above comparative estimate, the following comments on the advisability of shifting available UNITED NATIONS forces from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM subsequent to the successful completion of HUSKY, are pertinent:

(1) Even if shipped immediately after HUSKY, these forces would not arrive in the UNITED KINGDOM in time to participate in cross-channel operations in the fall of 1943, and hence would be inactive until the next favorable weather period--spring of 1944.

(2) Critical shipping would be utilized in a large scale shifting of UNITED NATIONS forces within the EUROPEAN - MEDITERRANEAN region. By utilizing this shipping for troop movement from the UNITED STATES to the UNITED KINGDOM, an approximately equal increase, rather than shift, in UNITED NATIONS forces in the EUROPEAN -

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MEDITERRANEAN region will result. Cargo shipping for the support of the additional forces in the UNITED KINGDOM is available. Trained forces for such a movement will be available in the UNITED STATES. Considering the critical factor of time, an increase rather than a shift of forces will be the more desirable.

(3) It would sacrifice the initiative, and the potential threat to the AXIS of the concentration in the WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN of some 20 American and British divisions, and approximately 5,000 aircraft.

d. It is therefore concluded that the initiation, in mid-August 1943, after a successful HUSKY, of a movement of available UNITED NATIONS forces from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM is unsound.

10. Further operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

If it is decided to conduct an operation in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY, it must be with the firm understanding that the forces committed will be limited to those presently allocated to the MEDITERRANEAN area. Therefore, the objectives selected in the MEDITERRANEAN must be well within the capabilities of those forces, so as to obviate the usual demands for additional forces and such that further exploitation will not be essential.

11. General disadvantages of MEDITERRANEAN operations.

J.C.S. 288, "Invasion of the European Continent from Bases in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943-44," concludes that:

"The application of the tests of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability to the various routes from the MEDITERRANEAN region for re-entry to the Continent, and there

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to engage the AXIS forces in decisive combat, rejects them all as being unsound."

This conclusion is entirely consistent with the present UNITED NATIONS decision to invade the Continent by cross-channel operations based in the UNITED KINGDOM. It follows, logically, that any operation in the MEDITERRANEAN, subsequent to HUSKY, will necessarily be subject, in varying degree, to the strategic disadvantage of not contributing to the ultimate decisive objective. The degree of strategic disadvantage obviously depends upon the total, air, ground, and naval forces and equipment involved. Each limited-objective operation, hereinafter analyzed is subject to the general strategic disadvantage of being located in an indecisive region and consequently of not contributing directly to the main effort. Almost equally important is the fact that the mounting of any such limited-objective operations might precipitate a situation that would demand increasing, more and more, the forces and equipment originally committed.

12. Considerations affecting the timing of an operation subsequent to HUSKY.

The personnel casualties suffered by the combat divisions of HUSKY and destruction or damage to amphibious materiel cannot be closely estimated. However, it is reasonable to assume that the regrouping of divisions and their amphibious training for a subsequent operation, together with logistical redistribution will require a period of at least two to three months after the successful completion of HUSKY. This would mean that the operation could not be initiated earlier than mid-October or November 1943.

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13. Naval aspects of an amphibious operation in the MEDITERRANEAN subsequent to HUSKY.

Any amphibious operation demands the employment of amphibious assault ships to the utmost strain on the UNITED NATIONS presently inadequate resources. If the limited pool of these special naval forces is used in an indecisive MEDITERRANEAN operation, other offensives of great importance in the INDIAN and PACIFIC theaters must necessarily be delayed.

In addition, an amphibious operation in the MEDITERRANEAN will withdraw fleet destroyers and other escort vessels from their paramount tasks in the Battle of the ATLANTIC, with the resultant increased loss of ships in the regular ATLANTIC convoys. Such an operation, due to the necessary time for regrouping and amphibious training of troops, cannot be mounted before late 1943. This will occur during the months favorable to convoys to NORTH RUSSIA. The cessation of these convoys for a considerable period due to withdrawal of covering forces to the MEDITERRANEAN must be weighed as a disadvantage to "doing something for RUSSIA" in the MEDITERRANEAN.

COURSES OF ACTION

14. Seizure of the DODECANESE.

a. Providing TURKEY becomes an ally or by prior agreement will enter the war at the appropriate stage of the operation, this course is entirely suitable. In view of British commitments to defend TURKEY, the forces for this defense could be found in the MIDDLE EAST with little interference from forces available after HUSKY, but would require the opening of sea communications to Western Turkish ports for the supply of our forces in ANATOLIA.

b. The advantages of this course are:

(1) Will facilitate bombing of Balkan targets from TURKEY.

(2) Might draw substantial AXIS forces from the Russian front due to the threat of invasion of the BALKANS.

(3) A heavy attrition of AXIS air forces will result from operations in the DODECANESE, the Battle of TURKEY,

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and the air assaults on PLOESTI, the DANUBE, and BOR copper installations.

c. This course of action is subject to the general strategic disadvantages outlined in paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, above.

d. If TURKEY remains neutral, the suitability of the course is limited to the advantages of disrupting AXIS sea traffic in the AEGEAN and providing inducement for TURKEY to become an active partner of the UNITED NATIONS. These minor strategic advantages are not commensurate with the cost and the inherent potential disadvantages to UNITED NATIONS operations in the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. In this case, the course is unsuitable.

e. Even if GERMANY is convinced of the ultimate alignment of TURKEY with the UNITED NATIONS, she is unlikely to invade ANATOLIA, but may occupy THRACE, and conduct an air offensive on TURKEY. BULGARIA will most probably become an active AXIS partner in these operations. As BULGARIA and TURKEY are about equal in strength, the issue in TURKEY will be determined by the amount of German reinforcement from other areas.

f. The Amphibious operations in the DODECANESE will require 4 divisions, including 1 airborne. The amount of carrier air support required will depend upon availability of Turkish air bases. If the Turkish bases are not available the carrier air requirements will be greater than those for HUSKY and the losses in the operation probably will be prohibitively costly, and therefore not acceptable.

g. The course is acceptable only if TURKEY becomes an active ally.

15. Seizure of CRETE and the DODECANESE.

a. The discussion of the attitude of TURKEY, above, with regard to the seizure of the DODECANESE is equally applicable

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here. The additional advantages of capturing CRETE lie in closing the AEGEAN to the AXIS, removing AXIS air threat from UNITED NATIONS sea communications in the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, and posing the threat of invasion of GREECE which might have the effect of forcing the AXIS to reinforce GREECE. UNITED NATIONS aid to guerrilla forces in GREECE and YUGOSLAVIA will be facilitated. The general tactical plan envisages the seizure of the DODECANESE prior to the assault on CRETE. This will provide some, but inadequate, land-based air cover for the landings on the eastern end of the Island.

b. This course of action is subject to the general strategic disadvantages outlined in paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, above.

c. Assuming the determined defense of CRETE, the seizure of this island will be a more hazardous operation than HUSKY inasmuch as it will depend on carrier air support. It is estimated that six fleet carriers will be required. This is in excess of UNITED NATIONS capabilities, without crippling the strength of these vessels in all other theaters.

d. It is estimated that a total of 12 divisions will be required: 4 for the DODECANESE and 8 for CRETE, including 2 airborne. This total exceeds by 1 division the 11 divisions that it is estimated will become available in the MEDITERRANEAN following a successful HUSKY. The shortage might be found among British defensive forces in EGYPT and the MIDDLE EAST. This operation could not be undertaken except after a lengthy period of regrouping and amphibious training, together with extensive logistical readjustment.

e. This course of action will be excessively costly in both time and forces and is therefore rejected.

16. Seizure of CRETE

The premise on which this course of action would be undertaken would undoubtedly be that TURKEY remains neutral. Otherwise the more feasible plan of capturing first the DODECANESE with aid of Turkish bases and then seizing CRETE would be used.

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Lacking land-based air support from DODECANESE bases, this operation becomes more difficult than the seizure of CRETE and the DODECANESE. Being more costly and less advantageous than an operation already rejected, this course of action must also be rejected.

17. Seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA

a. The invasion of SOUTHERN FRANCE or ITALY are beyond the capabilities of forces remaining in the MEDITERRANEAN after HUSKY, as well as being unacceptable as avenues of entry into the Continent for the ultimate defeat of GERMANY.

b. In addition to the general strategic disadvantages outlined in paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, above, the favorable and unfavorable factors of this course are:

(1) Favorable

(a) Further improvement in the safety of shipping in the WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

(b) Continued attrition of AXIS forces, especially air.

(c) Provide additional advanced air bases for attacks on NORTHERN ITALY and the SOUTHERN REICH.

(d) Maintain the threat of invasion toward SOUTHERN FRANCE.

(e) Satisfy political pressure to "do something" during the extended period between a successful HUSKY and a ROUNDUP.

(f) Ground and air forces available.

(2) Unfavorable

(a) Due to lack of adequate land-based air cover, carrier based aircraft is required. This may result in heavy, possibly prohibitive losses in ships, aircraft, and men.

(b) There are no vital strategic targets in NORTHERN ITALY and the SOUTHERN REICH that are not within tactical range of bases already in our hands.

c. This course of action is retained for further consideration.

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18. Seizure of the Heel of ITALY

a. Following HUSKY, operations against the Heel of Italy would be another blow to Italian morale. By increasing the Italian jitters, such an operation might well result in the recall of Italian garrison forces from either the BALKANS or SOUTHERN FRANCE. This would require their replacement by GERMANY. In fact, it is not entirely improbable that UNITED NATIONS success in such an operation might cause the collapse or surrender of Italian Government. The repercussions on the AXIS political and military framework, especially in SOUTHERN EUROPE, of the collapse or surrender of Italy, would be widespread. Should this happen prior to or during operations against the Heel, the strategic dispositions of the UNITED NATIONS forces would facilitate taking prompt advantage of the situation presented.

b. A large scale air battle, with the attendant attrition of AXIS air forces, would undoubtedly develop. Moreover, once air fields were secured, the effective range of our heavy bombers would be advanced some 200 miles. This would permit bombing the PLOESTI oil fields, the BOR Copper Mines, and DANUBE river traffic.

c. Control of the Heel of ITALY would further restrict the activities of the Italian fleet. Further, our position on the Heel would constitute a potential threat to the BALKANS.

d. Logistically, the mounting of this operation would require a minimum of readjustment following a successful HUSKY. The size of the operation (estimated at 9 divisions) is such that much shifting of divisions, following HUSKY, would be required. It is unlikely that a target date could be set earlier than two to three months after the completion of HUSKY.

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e. If offensive operations against ITALY, once initiated, could be limited merely to the Heel, the undesirable aspects of UNITED NATIONS possible ultimate control of, and responsibility for, the whole of ITALY could be successfully avoided. It is most important to note, however, that when two opposing armies face each other on suitable terrain, decisive military action almost invariably develops. In this case, if the AXIS chooses to react offensively, the UNITED NATIONS would, perforce, have to either accept the challenge and build up our forces to continue the battle or evacuate. This might lead to a long and indecisive campaign which is contrary to the National Policy of the United States.

f. We will be unable to provide adequate land-based air cover for amphibious operations against the Heel of ITALY; and unless these operations are preceded by operations against the Toe, heavy losses must be expected. Operations against both the Heel and Toe will exceed the capabilities of UNITED NATIONS forces available in the MEDITERRANEAN region.

g. It is estimated that the Heel of ITALY can be seized with a force of 9 or 10 divisions. The soundness of this estimate will depend upon both the AXIS dispositions in ITALY subsequent to HUSKY and the extent of German reinforcement following our landings on the Heel.

h. Operations by the UNITED NATIONS against the Heel of ITALY in 1943-44 should be avoided, if possible, because if the AXIS reacts in great force we would either have to accept another DUNKIRK or take up the challenge and engage in a major campaign on the Italian Peninsula. Strategically, the latter is not desired.

i. This course of action is retained.

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(5) The decision as to which of the three acceptable operations (DODECANESE, Heel of ITALY, or SARDINIA and CORSICA), if any, will be conducted subsequent to a successful HUSKY, must be delayed as long as possible. This will permit more reliable assessment of the several motives that may impel additional operations in the MEDITERRANEAN.

RECOMMENDATIONS

20. It is recommended that operational plans be prepared, without delay, for:

- a. The seizure of the DODECANESE
- b. The seizure of the Heel of ITALY, and
- c. The seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA.

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By RHP, NLR, Date

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(J.C.S. 294)

May 7, 1943

Pages 1-9 incl.

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SECRET - SECURITY

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DEFENSIVE GARRISONS REQUIRED AND FORCES
AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER TO OTHER AREAS OR
FOR LIMITED OFFENSIVES IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN, 1943-44.

Note by the Secretaries

The attached report, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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JCS MEMO 1-4-74

By LRP, ALR, Date FEB 19 1974

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DEFENSIVE GARRISONS REQUIRED AND FORCES
AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER TO OTHER AREAS OR
FOR LIMITED OFFENSIVES IN THE
MEDITERRANEAN, 1943-44

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. An examination of the strength and composition of the major combat units: (a) required to secure lines of communication through the MEDITERRANEAN, (b) required to garrison occupied territory in the MEDITERRANEAN, and (c) available for transfer to other areas, or for limited offensives in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943-44, is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. After the successful completion of HUSKY, garrisons will be required as follows:*

a. Ground forces:

FRENCH MOROCCO**	3 U. S. and 4 French Divisions***
ALGERIA and TUNISIA	2 U. S. or British Divisions (other French forces not listed will be available for local security)
SICILY	4 U. S. or British Divisions
Total -	13 Divisions

* An estimated 16 British Divisions, of mixed character, will remain in TRIPOLITANIA and eastward including the entire MIDDLE EAST. A critical examination of the need for retention of these forces should be made with a view to transfer to other more vital areas if practicable.

** These forces required to protect lines of communication through STRAIT OF GIBRALTAR.

*** It is estimated that 4 well-equipped, offensive French Divisions can be made available. In addition, adequate French forces are available to provide local security in FRENCH MOROCCO and WEST AFRICA.

b. Air forces:

NORTH AFRICAN LITTORAL and SICILY	BH	BM	BL	F	TR.	CAR.	SPEC. PURPOSE
U. S. Groups	4	3	6	9 $\frac{1}{4}$	2		2 3-3/4
British Squadrons	2	11	6	41	3		17

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	U. S. Groups			British Squadrons		
	Bomb.	Ftr.	Other	Bomb.	Ftr.	Other
SARDINIA and CORSICA	9	9	4	15	36	8
DODECANESE	6	9	4	15	36	8
CRETE	9	9	4	15	36	8
Heel of ITALY	9	9	4	15	36	8

5. Garrisons in the event of seizure of any of the below named objectives are as follows:

a. Ground forces

SARDINIA and CORSICA	3 1/2 - 4 divisions
DODECANESE	2 divisions
CRETE	2 divisions
Heel of ITALY	estimate impracticable

b. Air forces

Air garrison will be obtained, regardless of objective seized, by regrouping and relocating forces specified in par. 2 b. above, with the addition of 2 fighter groups.

6. Operations subsequent to HUSKY will reduce the forces available for transfer (paragraph 3, above) to other areas to the totals shown below:

a. Ground forces

SARDINIA and CORSICA	5 divisions
DODECANESE	7 divisions
CRETE	3 divisions
Heel of ITALY	2 divisions

b. Air forces

Regardless of objective listed above

	B(H)	B(M)	B(L)	F	TR. CAR.	SPEC. PURP.
U. S. Groups	2	4 X	-	2 X	5 X	----
Br. Squadrons	-	-	4	4	-	----

c. It is most important to note that the initiation, subsequent to HUSKY, of a troop movement, regardless of size, from the MEDITERRANEAN to the UNITED KINGDOM (or other theater) should only be made after careful study and evaluation of a number of partially conflicting strategic and logistical factors, not here discussed.

ENCLOSURE "A"

DEFENSIVE GARRISONS AND FORCES AVAILABLE
FOR TRANSFER TO OTHER AREAS OR FOR LIMITED OFFENSIVES
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN IN 1943-44

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

7. Determine the strength and composition of the major combat units.

a. Required to secure lines of communication through the MEDITERRANEAN.

b. Required to garrison occupied territory in the MEDITERRANEAN.

c. Available for transfer to other areas or for limited offensives in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943-44.

ASSUMPTIONS

8. It is assumed that:

a. The primary objective of the UNITED NATIONS is the final defeat of the WESTERN AXIS by invasion of the Continent from the UNITED KINGDOM.

b. GERMANY'S offensive against the Russian Army in 1943 will be unsuccessful, which will necessitate holding the bulk of her ground forces on the Russian front during 1944.

c. The AXIS will not invade the BRITISH ISLES, TURKEY, or the IBERIAN PENINSULA. SPAIN and PORTUGAL will remain neutral.

d. The Battle of the ATLANTIC remains serious in its shipping implications.

e. UNITED NATIONS commitments to other theaters will remain substantially as presently planned.

f. RUSSIA and JAPAN will remain at peace.

g. HUSKY will be executed as will possibly a subsequent limited objective operation in the MEDITERRANEAN with the forces available there.

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13. Two divisions (American or British) should garrison ALGERIA and TUNISIA.

14. Assuming a successful HUSKY, and African security garrisons as outlined above, 4 divisions (American or British) should provide an adequate garrison for SICILY.

15. The above security requirements total 9 (British or American) divisions. A total of 20 will be available. Therefore, disregarding the damage to be expected in operation HUSKY upon its successful conclusion, there will be a total of 11 divisions available either for transfer to another theater or for further offensive use in the MEDITERRANEAN. Due to the severity of the action to be expected in HUSKY and the time required to rehabilitate, re-equip, shift, and train units in preparation for further offensive operations, it is doubtful if more than 5 or 6 divisions could be made available for at least 2 months after a completed HUSKY.

16. The garrison requirements for SICILY and NORTHWEST AFRICA should not be affected materially by UNITED NATIONS operations against any one, or any combination, of the places listed below. Neither the relationship between these places themselves, nor between them and the areas controlled after a successful HUSKY, is such that the garrison requirements will vary materially, regardless of which place is seized. Further, the assumption that the security of our MEDITERRANEAN position will still be subject to the threat of an AXIS blow through SPAIN, requires that the garrison forces indicated for SICILY and NORTHWEST AFRICA be maintained, regardless of what additional territory is seized after HUSKY.

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JCS REG, 1-4-74

By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

17. J.C.S. 293, "Limited Operations in the MEDITERRANEAN in 1943-44," concludes that, depending on existing circumstances, one of three acceptable operations (DODECANESE, HEEL OF ITALY, SARDINIA and CORSICA) may be conducted, following a successful HUSKY. The forces required for the operations, as well as the security garrisons, are:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Forces Required*</u>	<u>Security Garrison*</u>
SARDINIA and CORSICA	6 divisions	2 divisions (SARDINIA) 1½ - 2 divs. (CORSICA)
CRETE	8 divisions, including 1 airborne	2 divisions
DODECANESE	4 divisions, including 1 airborne	2 divisions
HEEL OF ITALY	9 divisions, including 1 airborne	(See **, below)

*Does not include supporting combat troops.

**It is not believed that a firm recommendation can be made. The scope of this operation will depend on AXIS (especially German) reaction. Maximum enemy reaction would result either in our evacuation or in a major operation of increasing magnitude, whereas minimum enemy reaction, or the collapse of ITALY, would present an entirely different picture.

18. If, as the result of any one of several possible reasons (uprisings inspired by subversive activity, air attack, operation HUSKY, or any subsequent offensive operation against ITALY) the government of ITALY should collapse or surrender, the strategic dispositions of the UNITED NATIONS forces would be adequate for the situation presented.

AIR FORCES

19. It is estimated that the air garrison requirements for the NORTH AFRICAN LITTORAL and SICILY will be:

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15 May 1943

(1) J.C.S. 295

Pages 1 - 10 incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SIZE OF FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IF MAIN EFFORT
IS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Reference: (a) J.C.S. 79th Mtg., Item 12.

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan is a revision by the Joint War Plans Committee of J.C.S. 295, containing a reevaluation of the naval, ground, and air strengths required, as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reference (a)

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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By NLR, Date

FEB 19 1974

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SIZE OF FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
IF MAIN EFFORT IS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

1. An examination to determine the size of air, ground, and naval forces that should be maintained in the UNITED KINGDOM in the event it is decided to accomplish the ultimate defeat of the AXIS on the Continent of EUROPE by making the main effort in the MEDITERRANEAN, is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. As long as GERMANY is occupied on the Eastern Front, she does not have the capability of invading the BRITISH ISLES. Due to the intensity of preparations, it is estimated that a warning of 2 to 6 months can be expected of an attempted German invasion. The air offensive and the presence of so large an Air Force in the BRITISH ISLES will be added insurance against an AXIS invasion.

3. Under the above conditions the forces indicated below should be maintained in the UNITED KINGDOM to provide for its security and to conduct an air offensive:

a. Ground forces

Twenty UNITED NATIONS divisions plus the equivalent of four divisions and the Home Guard. This should be subsequently reviewed in the light of changes in the situation affecting the vulnerability of the UNITED KINGDOM.

b. Air forces

	B(H)	B(M)	F	TB	T/C	Others
U. S. Groups	51	9	10		2	4
R.A.F. Squadrons	39	15	57	6		36

No reduction in the Coastal Command is considered advisable.

c. Naval forces

BB	CV	ACV	CA	CL	OCL	DD	ODD
4	2	7	5	8	3	92	69

Plus numerous ships of the smaller classes.

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4. It is estimated that the following forces could be released from the UNITED KINGDOM for service elsewhere.

a. Ground forces

11 UNITED NATIONS divisions.

b. Air forces

	B(L)	F	FB	T/C	Obs
U. S. Groups	13	15	0	5-1/2	2
R.A.F. Squadrons	8	37	2	0	0

c. Naval forces

Three OBB might be made available for use elsewhere if one additional BB is maintained in the NORTH ATLANTIC. The diversion of certain vessels from the NORTH ATLANTIC to support specific operations for a limited period is a calculated risk which can be taken, and has been taken in the past.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

SIZE OF FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
IF MAIN EFFORT IS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

ASSUMPTIONS

1. It is assumed that:

- a. The security of the BRITISH ISLES will be maintained as a main charge upon the resources of both the UNITED KINGDOM and the UNITED STATES.
- b. Maximum air operations from the UNITED KINGDOM against GERMANY will continue and minimum garrison forces will be maintained in the BRITISH ISLES.
- c. TURKEY will remain neutral or become an active UNITED NATIONS ally. SPAIN and PORTUGAL will remain neutral.
- d. GERMANY will resume the offensive against RUSSIA while assuming the defensive on other fronts and intensifying the war of attrition against UNITED NATIONS shipping.
- e. GERMANY'S offensive against the Russian Army will be unsuccessful, which will necessitate holding the bulk of her ground forces on the Russian Front during 1944.
- f. The AXIS will not invade TURKEY or the IBERIAN PENINSULA.
- g. RUSSIA and JAPAN will remain at peace.

AXIS CAPABILITIES FOR AN INVASION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

2. As long as GERMANY is occupied on the Eastern Front, she does not have the capability of invading the BRITISH ISLES. There are approximately 400 Siebel Ferries, 100 E-boats, and some barges along the western coast of EUROPE and in the BALTIC that could be used for invasion purposes. However, the lift of these craft is so small that they cannot be considered as advance preparations of any magnitude. Also, due to the intensity of preparations, it is estimated that a warning of 2 to 6 months can be expected of an attempted German invasion of the UNITED KINGDOM.

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including the Home Guard, in the UNITED KINGDOM. The strength of the ground forces should continue to be reviewed in the light of the changing situation with a view to additional reduction in the Home Forces as more offensive units become available.

f. Due to the difficulties GERMANY encounters in obtaining confirmed information concerning U. S. forces in the UNITED KINGDOM, it is believed that limited forces, if active and frequently moved, would assist in creating doubt as to our intentions. It is considered that one U. S. division with appropriate service forces and a limited number of landing craft would be sufficient for deception purposes. Therefore, one U. S. division and all excess supporting and service forces should be moved from the UNITED KINGDOM.

g. These reductions would make available for use in areas other than the UNITED KINGDOM 10 British and Canadian divisions with adequate supporting and service units and one U. S. division with all excess U. S. service forces. Further British formations should become available for use overseas as the situation develops.

9. Naval.

a. The main units of the German Fleet in serviceable condition are: 2 battleships (TIRPITZ, 45,000 tons, 8-15", 30 knots, and SCHARNHORST, 32,000 tons, 9-11", 29 knots); 2 pocket battleships (SCHEER and LUTZOW, 10,000 tons, 6-11", 27 knots); 2 CA (HIPPER and EUGEN, 15,700 tons, 8-8", 32 knots); 4 CL (3 of 5,000 tons, 9-5.9", 32 knots, and one of 5,400 tons, 8-5.9", 29 knots); 1 CV (25,000 tons, 33 knots, 55(?) planes) and 30 destroyers, 54 torpedo boats and 452(?) submarines.

b. The British naval forces now maintained in the NORTH ATLANTIC are not based on the possibility of invasion, but are influenced by the necessity of containing the German Fleet. As of 7 May 1942, exclusive of ships out of service due to damage

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or overhaul, Royal Navy units and Allied Naval units under British operational control in the NORTH ATLANTIC, are as follows:

TABLE I.

BB	OBB	CV	ACV	CA	CL	OCL	DD	ODD
3	3	2	7	5	8	3	92	69

c. Assuming that GERMANY can choose a sortie date and have the majority of her units operationally available on this date, the Royal Navy should have deployed in the NORTH ATLANTIC a superior force. The minimum force required to be available for assembly as a striking force against the German Fleet should it sortie, is estimated below:

TABLE II.

BB	CV	CA	CL	DD
4	1	4	4	27

d. Data is not available on which to estimate the requirements for patrol, convoy, and escort, etc., in the NORTH ATLANTIC, but it appears that if the number of ships operationally available shown in Table I, is maintained, it will be sufficient for all requirements.. New construction and repaired ships becoming available in excess of these numbers should be available for use in other areas. It appears that three OBB might be made available for use elsewhere if one additional BB is maintained in the NORTH ATLANTIC. The diversion of certain vessels from the NORTH ATLANTIC to support specific operations for a limited period is a calculated risk which can be taken and has been taken in the past.

CONCLUSIONS

10. The following forces present in or projected for the UNITED KINGDOM are available for diversion elsewhere:

a. Air.

(1) R.A.F.

8 - Light Bomber Squadrons
37 - Fighter Squadrons
2 - Fighter Bomber Squadrons

(2) U.S.A.A.F.

13 - Light and Dive Bomber Groups
15 - Fighter Groups
2 - Observation Groups
6-1/2 - Troop Carrier Groups.

b. Ground.

10 - British and Canadian offensive divisions with appropriate supporting and service forces
1 - U. S. division
Excess supporting and service troops.

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c. Naval.

Three OBB if one additional BB is maintained in the NORTH ATLANTIC. Also, certain vessels may be diverted for short periods.

11. If the forces listed in paragraph 10 are transferred elsewhere, there will remain in the UNITED KINGDOM for the bomber offensive, the defense of the BRITISH ISLES, and the various fleet tasks (containing the German naval forces, and patrol, escort, and convoy duties), the following:

a. Air.

(1) R.A.F.

- 39 - Heavy Bomber Squadrons
- 15 - Medium Bomber Squadrons
- 6 - Torpedo Bomber Squadrons
- 16 - General Reconnaissance Squadrons
- 9 - Flying Boat Squadrons
- 57 - Fighter and Night Fighter Squadrons
- 6 - Photo Reconnaissance Squadrons
- 5 - Observation Squadrons.

(2) U.S.A.A.F. (deployment to 1 April 1944)

- 51 - Heavy Bomber Groups
- 9 - Medium Bomber Groups
- 10 - Fighter Groups
- 2 - Photo Reconnaissance Groups
- 2 - Observation Groups
- 2 - Troop Carrier Groups

The U.S.A.A.F. units to include the necessary service troops.

b. Ground.

- 19 - Allied divisions of all categories, except U. S.
The equivalent of 4 additional divisions.

Remainder of supporting and service forces

Miscellaneous forces including the Home Guard

- 1 - U. S. division with necessary service forces.

NOTE: The British ground forces should be subsequently reviewed with a view to additional reductions in the Home Forces.

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c. Naval.

BB	CV	ACV	CA	CL	OCL	DD	ODD
4	2	7	5	8	3	92	69

Plus numerous ships of the smaller classes.

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By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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C.I.C. 16/1 (4th Draft)

April 8, 1943

COMBINED INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

GERMAN STRATEGY IN 1943

Note by the Secretaries

(At their 72d meeting, the Combined Chiefs of Staff considered C.C.S. 151/2, a paper prepared by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff proposing certain revisions to the text of C.I.C. 16/1 (2d Draft), and directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit comments on C.C.S. 151/2, with particular reference to the revisions therein proposed. That paper was distributed to the Combined Intelligence Committee as Enclosure "A" of C.I.C. 16/3/D.

(In view of the changing situation, the Committee felt it advisable not only to consider the proposed revisions but to reconsider C.I.C. 16/1 (2d Draft) as well. Attached hereto is a new edition of C.I.C. 16/1 (2d Draft), revised in the light of the changing situation and of the revisions proposed in C.C.S. 151/2. Certain divergent views have been left in parentheses in columns.

A. SIDNEY BUFORD III,

P. O. A. DAVISON,

Combined Secretariat.

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By NRP, NLR, Date

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E N C L O S U R E

GERMAN STRATEGIC AIM

1. Germany's basic policy is to achieve world domination. In pursuing this policy she has encountered obstacles which compel her to conform her strategy to various limitations of short term necessity.

2. Within limits, the initiative lies in major part with the United Nations. Whilst this situation holds, the pattern of German strategy must be influenced by the choices made and operations launched by the United Nations.

3. In order to eliminate the greatest present threat to her, Germany must make the Russian front her chief preoccupation for the time being. Her task elsewhere will be to delay by every means available the build-up of the striking power of the other United Nations and simultaneously to exploit the industrial and agricultural potential of the conquered regions in order to strengthen her own position.

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

4. Relationship to Japan. Regardless of the alliance between Japan and Germany, neither will adopt any line of action which it does not consider likely to further its own basic policy and strategic aims.

5. Strategic Position. The German position may be considered as a huge strategic triangle running from the North Cape to the Pyrenees, thence to the Caucasus, and back to the starting point. Germany has the advantage of fighting on interior lines and possesses good internal communications.

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By RHP, NLR, Date

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6. Limitations upon striking power. Due largely to inescapable commitments, logistic difficulties, the present critical shortage of oil, and to limitations of air and man power, Germany cannot conduct another major land offensive unless she can substantially neutralize the striking power of the Russian armies. Her lack of naval power and deficiency in air power limit her ability to conduct and support amphibious operations.

7. Time. Strategically time is not on the side of the Axis so long as offensive action is vigorously pressed against them.

8. Economics. Germany's war potential cannot be substantially increased if the present rate of military activity continues. Exploitation of the industrial and agricultural potentials of the conquered regions can only be partially achieved during 1943.

9. Morale. It is improbable that German military and civilian morale will crack in 1943, but its present state renders it vulnerable to the results of the 1943 campaign.

10. Prestige. The problem of impaired German prestige among Axis partners and satellites and in occupied countries will influence the German plans for 1943.

11. Personal Factor. Hitler himself has hitherto made all major decisions, often overruling sound advice; but there are some indications that the influence of the senior military leaders is increasing, which may result in an improvement in German strategy.

12. Negotiated Peace. A negotiated peace between Germany on the one hand and England and the United States on the other is ruled out. A negotiated peace between Soviet Russia and Germany cannot be regarded as an impossibility. Japan is reported to be

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(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. It would still not be possible for the Germans to release major units for employment elsewhere unless they were prepared to fall back to a line further west than one based on the River Dneiper - the Pripet Marshes - Lake Peipus. But withdrawal to such a line would expose the Rumanian oil fields to air attack and result in the loss of some of the Ukraine. It would also endanger the German hold on the Balkans and might result in defection on the part of some of their satellite allies. The result, therefore, of any such withdrawal might well be to increase Germany's defense commitments in other parts of Europe and to this extent nullify the gain.

b. It would still commit Germany to active aerial combat which, with her present deficiency and over-all commitments, she can ill afford to face.

c. A defensive attitude, even if it is intended to be an active one, would not be appreciated by the German people and would, therefore, not lead to the bolstering up of their spirits which their defeats in Russia have brought to a low level.

d. Unless the Russians undertake and maintain the offensive, the adoption by Germany of an active defense would eliminate the possibility of a destruction of the Russian armed forces in 1943.

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g. It facilitates the continuance by the Axis of subversive activities among the native peoples of North Africa.

h. It tends to maintain Franco's attachment to the Axis.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. There is inevitably heavy attrition due to the insecure line of water communication across the Mediterranean to Tunis.

b. The United Nations have the capability to build up and maintain superior air forces in this area. Maintaining this bridgehead and the air forces necessary for that purpose entails a heavy drain on Axis air strength which they can ill afford.

c. A clear-cut military defeat in this area would have serious political and psychological repercussions, particularly in Italy.

(3) Conclusion: Since Germany's commitment in North Africa pays a high dividend in the delay and embarrassment which it causes the United Nations, and is an important factor in maintaining the will to fight among the Italians, Germany is likely to continue to maintain the bridgehead until she is defeated there, although this will not constitute the major portion of German military activity in 1943.

Course E: To withdraw to and defend the Mediterranean Island Line.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. The islands (Crete, Sicily, Sardinia) are suitable for effective defense, as they can only be taken by amphibious operations.

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b. It would still be possible to hamper any offensive action by the United Nations against southern Europe.

c. It would permit Germany to use the bulk of her forces against Russia.

d. It would still be possible to interfere seriously with United Nations' shipping through the Mediterranean.

e. It would avoid the costly attrition and danger of a defeat inherent in operations in and against North Africa.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. It would entail the diversion of German forces from other fronts to garrison the islands, Italy, and the Balkans.

b. It would entail loss of prestige and consequent damage to the Axis, and especially Italian, morale.

c. It would result in an improvement in the shipping situation of the United Nations to the extent that it permitted passage of United Nations' shipping through the Mediterranean.

d. It would practically eliminate the hope of future major operations toward the Middle East or Northwestern Africa.

(3) Conclusion: As a defensive measure this course logically comes next to that of maintaining the Tunisian bridgehead, since it would still give some protection to the base of the German strategic triangle and might prevent an early collapse of Italian morale.

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Course F: To occupy the Iberian Peninsula.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. Occupation of the Iberian Peninsula could deny to the Allies free passage through the Straits of Gibraltar and would secure to the Axis airfields and naval bases, particularly for submarines operating in the Atlantic.

Operations from these bases would greatly assist Axis capability to interfere with Allied shipping in the Atlantic and impede air communications.

b. It would seriously hamper Allied operations in, and extending from, North Africa.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. It would open another active front and necessitate the diversion of Axis forces from other areas, especially Russia.

b. It would greatly increase the dispersion of Axis forces and result in very important logistic problems.

c. The supply line through Spain would be very limited in view of the transport situation there.

d. Under the best of circumstances it would saddle Germany with another economic liability.

e. It might be countered by a United Nations' landing in the Iberian Peninsula and would almost certainly lead to the seizure of the Atlantic islands. This latter would not only give the United Nations an advantage in the protection of their shipping, but would enable them better to combat the U-boat campaign.

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f. The attitude of the people of Spain is such that Franco would find it difficult to insure even passive cooperation with the plan.

g. It would eliminate an important point of Axis contact with the outside world (Lisbon).

h. If Spain resisted or suffered in consequence, it would antagonize elements in Latin America which are now lukewarm to the United Nations' cause.

(3) Conclusion: Were Germany in a position to make available the necessary forces to insure the success of this course in all eventualities which may arise in the Iberian Peninsula, it would provide the best means of countering the Allied invasion of North Africa. Whilst Russia remains her chief preoccupation, Germany cannot make these forces available. This course is therefore not probable in 1943.

Course G: To take the offensive against Allied Forces in North Africa, either directly across the Mediterranean, or through the Iberian Peninsula, or both.

(i) Directly across the Mediterranean;

(ii) Through the Iberian Peninsula (extension of Course "F") and into Spanish Morocco.

It is assumed in both cases (a) that the maintenance of the Tunisian bridgehead is a necessary part of this Course, and (b), that attempts will be made at harassing Allied communications by means of raids based on Sardinia.

Course (1) is ruled out since the Axis would be unable to establish naval superiority and is unlikely to be able to provide the air superiority and sufficient

shipping successfully to launch a large amphibious operation of this nature. Much less would they be able to maintain and supply the force necessary for such an operation.

Course (11)

NOTE: Such an offensive as is here visualized must be made in the form of a pincers movement, and one claw of the pincers must move from the Iberian Peninsula after its complete occupation; even if the crossing to North Africa did not succeed, the Axis would then at least gain the advantages mentioned in Course F. The other arm would take the form of at least maintaining the Tunisian bridgehead assisted, to some degree, by raids from Sardinia aimed at Allied communications between Tunisia and Algeria.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. The Mediterranean front offers the only opportunity of any promise of obtaining important results and a desperately needed victory with relatively small ground forces compared with those employed in Russia.

b. If made in sufficient force, and successful, it would remove the Allied threat against Southern Europe and the consequent necessity of providing strong defensive forces along the north coast of the Mediterranean and the Island chain.

c. If successful, it would render the passage of the Straits practically impossible to the Allies.

d. Complete success in North Africa would have a profound psychological effect not only in Germany and in Italy, but in the satellite

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e. It would open another active front and necessitate the diversion of Axis forces from Russia.

(3) Conclusion: Germany's preoccupation in Russia, the difficulties of land approaches, and her inability to provide sufficient naval and air forces to gain the superiority necessary were the operation to be amphibious, together with the probable addition of Turkish forces to those of the United Nations, make it impracticable for her to undertake such an operation during 1943.

Course I: To make an all-out attack against Great Britain

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. It would weaken or eliminate a major enemy and the most important nearby bases of hostile air and naval power.

b. It would greatly bolster Axis morale and discourage the conquered peoples.

c. It would provide a possible means of stimulating, in certain elements in the United States and the British Dominions, a desire to make a compromised peace.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. It would be an unsound military operation, inasmuch as Germany does not and with its available forces cannot have control of the Channel and the air over England.

b. It would open another active front and necessitate the diversion of Axis forces from Russia.

c. Its failure would constitute a disastrous reverse for the Axis.

(3) Conclusion: It is considered that Germany has not the resources to make practicable an all-out attack on Great Britain in 1943.

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Course J: To assume a strategic defensive on all fronts.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. The Axis could devote more of its military effort to the preparation of defenses and the production of armaments, including submarines and aircraft, with the aim of making the Strategic Triangle impregnable as swiftly as possible.

b. Manpower, productive capacity, and transport would be relieved for the economic and political consolidation of Europe as far as Allied action permits.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. It would mean the abandonment of the German basic policy (see paragraph 1), and would permit the Allies definitely to seize the initiative.

b. The war with Soviet Russia, even if a passive defensive were adopted, would still consume a large portion of the German Army and Air Force and ultimately reduce to a dangerous extent German defensive capabilities in other theaters.

c. It would commit the war to a phase of aerial combat in which the Axis cannot hope to match the United Nations.

d. It would commit the Axis to a competition in production in which it cannot hope to match the United Nations.

e. It would permit a more complete build-up of the military power of the United Nations.

f. It would be an admission to the people of the Axis and occupied countries that a decisive military victory for the Axis is impossible in 1943.

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(3) Conclusion: This course would do much to enable Germany to consolidate her gains, reorganize her army and relieve her economic situation, but is unlikely because it could succeed only in the event the United Nations failed fully to exploit the initiative. It is, however, retained for further consideration.

COURSES OF ACTION RETAINED

16. Whatever course of action Germany decides or is forced to take in Russia, this front perforce will absorb the larger portion of her army and air force for months to come. After consideration of the foregoing courses of German action in 1943, we consider that her possible courses are as follows:

(a) To intensify the war of attrition against United Nations' shipping, and at the same time:

U. S. version

(1) To continue to employ the great bulk of her forces against Russia with the strategic aim of destroying Russian military power and, at the same time, either:

a. Maintain the Tunisian bridgehead in order to defend Italy and the Islands, remaining elsewhere strictly on the defensive with the main line of resistance along the shores of the "Fortress of Europe," or

British version

(1) To adopt an active defense in Russia; so far as possible by limited offensive actions in Russia to improve her own position and, should she unexpectedly attain successes leading to a weakening of Russian military strength, to make a final effort to destroy the Russian Armed Forces, and, at the same time:

a. Maintain the Tunisian bridgehead in order to defend Italy and the Islands, remaining elsewhere strictly on the defensive with the main line of resistance along the shores of the "Fortress of Europe," or

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success leading to a weakening of Russian military strength, to make a final effort to destroy the Russian Armed Forces; on all other fronts to assume the defensive and to retain the Tunisian bridgehead as long as possible.

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By RSP, NLR, Date

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(J.C.S. 287/1)

May 8, 1943

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(1) J.C.S. 287

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

References: (a) J.C.S. 272
(b) J.C.S. 76th Mtg., Item 1

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
this date.

J. R. DEANE,

F. B. ROYAL,

Joint Secretariat.

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STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

1. A brief discussion of the Strategic Plan for the Defeat of JAPAN is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The plan is based upon the following general tasks:

a. Until GERMANY is defeated, to maintain pressure on Japan; to retain the initiative; and to attain a position of readiness for the full-scale offensive against JAPAN by the UNITED NATIONS as soon as GERMANY is defeated.

b. As soon as GERMANY is defeated, to apply the full-scale offensive contemplated.

3. The indeterminate period during which task a. is effective, prevents dividing the plan into definitely coordinated phases. With this reservation in regard to timing and coordination, the plan is expressed as follows:

PHASE I

a. CONTINUE AND AUGMENT EXISTING UNDERTAKINGS IN AND FROM CHINA.

Chinese Forces assisted by U.S. Forces.

b. RECAPTURE BURMA.

British Forces assisted by U.S. and Chinese Forces.

c. OPEN A LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS TO THE CELEBES SEA.

United States Forces.

PHASE II

a. OPERATIONS TO OPEN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND TO COMPEL WIDE DISPERSION OF ENEMY FORCES.

British Forces.

b. RECAPTURE THE PHILIPPINES.

United States Forces.

c. PREPARE TO CAPTURE HONG KONG.

Chinese Forces.

PHASE III

a. CONTINUE OPERATIONS TO OPEN THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND TO COMPEL WIDE DISPERSION OF ENEMY FORCES.

British Forces.

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- b. SECURE CONTROL OF THE NORTHERN PART OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA, AND ASSIST IN THE CAPTURE OF HONG KONG.

United States Forces.

- c. CAPTURE HONG KONG.

Chinese Forces.

PHASE IV

ESTABLISH AIR BASES IN JAPANESE OCCUPIED CHINA FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH AN OVERWHELMING BOMBING OFFENSIVE AGAINST JAPAN.

Chinese Forces, assisted by British and U. S. Forces.

PHASE V

CONDUCT AN OVERWHELMING AIR OFFENSIVE AGAINST JAPAN.

U. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.

PHASE VI

INVADE JAPAN.

U. S. Forces, assisted by British and Chinese Forces.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN

4. Objective of the plan.

The UNITED NATIONS war objective is the unconditional surrender of the AXIS Powers. The accomplishment of this objective may require the invasion of JAPAN.

5. Most probable Japanese courses of action.

JAPAN'S most probable courses of action are to direct her major effort toward securing and exploiting the territory she controls, and eliminating CHINA from the war.

6. The invasion of JAPAN.

Since the invasion of JAPAN is a vast undertaking, it should not be attempted until Japanese power and will to resist have been so reduced that favorable conditions for invasion obtain. Under these conditions the invasion of JAPAN is considered feasible.

It is probable that the reduction of JAPAN'S power and will to resist may only be accomplished by a sustained, systematic, and large-scale air offensive against JAPAN itself.

7. An air offensive against JAPAN.

An air offensive on the required scale can only be conducted from bases in CHINA. The capacity of the Burma Road, supplemented by the air route from INDIA is inadequate. The seizure of a port in CHINA to augment the supply through BURMA is essential.

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throughout the PACIFIC and ASIATIC areas thus exposing them to attrition on an additional front in SOUTHEASTERN ASIA. This area is one of British strategic responsibility, and is a suitable and feasible undertaking for British Commonwealth Forces.

12. Control of the Seas.

Since control of the seas in the WESTERN PACIFIC by the UNITED NATIONS may force the unconditional surrender of JAPAN before invasion and even before JAPAN is subjected to an intensive air offensive, every means to gain this control will be undertaken by the UNITED STATES. The establishment of the line of communications to the CELEBES SEA will be used as the vehicle to gain this end. The selection of intermediate objectives which will compel the enemy to expose his naval forces will be the greatest single factor in determining the enemy positions to be seized.

Attrition of enemy shipping, air, and naval resources will be a continuing objective. Raids on Japanese lines of communication, and carrier-based air raids on Japanese positions extending to JAPAN itself, will be implemented as our naval strength increases.

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(J.I.C. 80/1 - 2d Draft)

March 5, 1943

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(1) J.I.C. 80/M
(2) J.I.C. 80/1

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

JAPANESE STRATEGY, 1943

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure is in the form adopted by the Committee at its 54th Meeting. It was prepared in response to a request from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee.

A. SIDNEY BUFORD III,
Secretary.

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J.C.S. Regrading Memo 29-73

By RT Date MAY 23 1973

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ENCLOSURE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. As of 1 March, 1943, the probable Japanese intention for the current year is:

(a) To remain on the strategic defensive and conduct operations to maintain the island barrier while, by limited objective operations, forestalling United Nations' attempts to penetrate Japan's strategic barrier;

(b) To carry out attritional tactics against United Nations' forces, bases and outposts;

(c) To attempt to sever the supply line to and consolidate her position in China in order to deny bases for an attack against Japan Proper.

2. The existing military situation in the Pacific and Asiatic theaters indicates that Japan will endeavor, for the time being, to improve her relations with Russia, and will exert military, economic, and political pressure to bring about a cessation of hostilities with China. Events in the Southwest Theater during the past few months strengthen the belief that Japan intends to consolidate and develop her defenses in this area as well as the rest of her strategic barriers. Meanwhile, Japan is feverishly attempting to expand transportation and industrial capacities in order to exploit the raw materials of the occupied areas and thus achieve an economy self-sufficient for continued hostilities over an indefinite period. To accomplish this purpose, Japan apparently intends to remain on the strategic defensive, thus conserving manpower and military strength for future operations.

3. Considering the possible courses of action in 1943 in the light of the existing situation in the Pacific and Asiatic Theaters, it is believed that they may be arranged in the following order of likelihood:

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(a) To remain on the strategic defensive, carrying out limited offensives and operations designed to cripple United Nations' striking power when opportunities permit, particularly against the islands along the lines of communication to the Southwest Pacific and, at the same time, to improve present positions by limited offensive operations in one or more of the following areas in the order named:

- (1) New Guinea.
- (2) The Solomon Islands.
- (3) Southwest China (Yunnan Province)*.
- (4) Other areas in China.*
- (5) Northern Burma-Assam.
- (6) The Aleutian Islands.

(b) To undertake major offensive operations in the order named against:

- (1) The Southern Solomons, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa groups.
- (2) Northern Australia.
- (3) India and/or Ceylon.
- (4) China.*
- (5) Siberia.
- (6) Midway-Hawaii.

ARGUMENT

4. Japan's basic aim is to achieve complete control of the Far East. This includes Asiatic Russia (East of Lake Baikal), Manchuria, China, Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, the East Indies, the Philippine Islands, Australia, New Zealand, and all islands in the Melanesian, Micronesian, and Polynesian groups (including Hawaii). Ultimately Japan hopes to achieve domination

* In the event of a substantially increased tempo of military operations in China on the part of the United Nations this would be given a higher degree of probability.

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of a wider area, including India. In carrying out this basic aim it is only recently that she has encountered such serious military opposition as to force her to conform her strategy to various limitations of short term necessity.

5. At present the initiative basically lies with the United Nations, except in China, but commitments in the European theater prevent full exploitation of this situation. The pattern of Japanese strategy will be determined in large part by that of the United Nations.

6. The greatest present threat to Japan is in the Melanesian area, which will probably be her chief preoccupation during 1943. The Treaty of Amity with Russia, Russian commitments in Europe, and the pressure of large Japanese forces in Manchuria are believed sufficient to insure, for the time being, the strategic security of Japan from that flank. Her task elsewhere will be to exploit, consolidate, and strengthen the defenses of the present occupied areas in order to sustain prolonged hostilities. Japan will, in addition, support her strategic defense by limited offensives and operations designed to cripple the United Nations' striking power.

BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

7. Relationship to the Axis.

Regardless of the alliance between Japan and Germany, neither will adopt any line of action which it does not consider likely to further its own basic aims and strategic policies. German attempts to induce Japan to attack Russia, as well as reported Japanese attempts to bring about a Russo-German peace, have so far been unsuccessful.

8. Strategic Position.

From no point of land outside of the strategic barrier (Kiska-Karafuto-Manchuria-Occupied China-Burma-Malaya-East Indies-Melanesia-Mandates) can effective bombing attacks be launched

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against Japan Proper except from Eastern Siberia and limited areas in China. Terrain and supply conditions in Burma and supply problems in China favor Japanese as against United Nations' ground forces. With the Japanese Navy in virtual control of the Western Pacific north of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, submarine and air attacks against Japanese lines of communications, and possibly naval raids are probably the only effective United Nations operations feasible in that area until a shift of the balance of naval power occurs.

9. Limitations Upon Striking Power.

Japan will not be limited by a lack of ground forces in any strategic operations she is likely to undertake. But air and shipping limitations will prevent her from simultaneously embarking on operations against Russia, India, and Australia or even against any two of them. Japan's naval strength, while probably sufficient for her present commitments, must be carefully husbanded, and all-out naval engagements by her main fleet (or large task forces of it) within range of United Nations' land-based bombers will have to be avoided if sufficient strength for successful defense of Japan Proper is to be retained. Japan's extended lines of communication entail a large commitment of and a serious drain upon naval strength, particularly escort vessels for the protection of her shipping. These factors are believed to limit the possibility of major offensive operations to only one area.

10. Time.

The full exploitation of territories now occupied by Japan would in time enable her to develop a self-sufficient war economy. Strengthening the defense of these areas is making their recapture by the United Nations increasingly difficult in proportion to the delay involved.

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11. Economics.

Japan is attempting to expand transportation and processing facilities to take advantage of a greatly strengthened raw materials position. Under the most favorable conditions her over-all war production might be increased 10% to 15% by the end of 1943. Shipping and processing are, however, vulnerable to hostile action. Japan at present is concentrating industrial development in Japan Proper, Korea, Manchuria, North China, and Formosa and building up in these areas stockpiles of materials obtained from the areas conquered in 1942. This would indicate Japanese preparation of a strong secondary defense area in the event of a German defeat in Europe and a consequent concentration of the United Nations in the Pacific. If Germany's position deteriorates further in 1943, Japan can be expected to place still greater economic emphasis on the northern areas.

12. Morale.

Japanese military and civilian morale is high and Japanese psychological characteristics are such that no break in morale can be expected before Japan's complete and irretrievable defeat in battle.

13. Prestige.

Japanese prestige among the natives of the occupied territories is maintained by military rule. The very clannishness which unites and strengthens the Japanese prevents them from winning the loyalty of the conquered (the Japanese say, "liberated") peoples. Actual Japanese occupation is generally followed by the disillusionment of the natives although these people are mostly passive folk from whom no violent or organized resistance to Japanese rule is to be expected. Future military reverses would lower Japan's prestige among these peoples and would make necessary larger garrisons for policing purposes.

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14. Personal Factors.

The institution of the Emperor in Japan symbolizes that mystic sense of divinity and special unity which has characterized the Japanese race. The loyalty of the Japanese people is to the institution of their God-Emperor, however, rather than to any individual Emperor. Therefore if Hirohito should disappear, the loyalty of the people would be transferred without abatement to his imperial successor.

The actual power in Japan is in the hands of the militarists. The recent changes have so concentrated administrative authority in the hands of one man (Tojo) that the succession to his post might be open to dispute within the military cliques. While the fall of Tojo or even a reshuffling of the cabinet might entail a modification of the immediate strategic plans, such change would not alter Japan's determination vigorously to prosecute the war.

15. Negotiated Peace.

A negotiated peace between Japan and the United Nations is highly improbable due to the wide discrepancy between the terms that might be acceptable to the two groups. A discontinuance of China's active belligerency cannot be regarded as an impossibility, but increased support of China by the other United Nations would minimize that possibility.

16. The Military Situation as of 1 March, 1943.

Japan nearly succeeded in perfecting her strategic barrier before the United Nations stopped her progress. Except for combat pilots, her personnel losses have not been important. Her losses in aircraft, and naval and merchant shipping have been heavy. She has sufficient troops in most areas to meet local needs. Reserves of ground forces are strategically located and are adequate in numbers and training. There is sufficient shipping to move these reserves to points where they may be needed but only at the expense of her present economic program. The reverses suffered by the Japanese at Midway, in Papua and Guadalcanal, while they do not constitute a major

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defeat, must certainly indicate to Japanese leaders that the days of easy victory are over, and the increasing strength of the United Nations must be the cause of serious concern.

17. COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO JAPAN

As long as the situation in Europe undergoes no basic change, the following are the major courses of action open to Japan for 1943:

- (a) Remain on the strategic defensive.
- (b) Intensify efforts to secure peace in China.
- (c) Adopt measures of attrition.
 - (1) Raids or attacks on military, naval, and air bases, particularly in the islands along the lines of communication to the Southwest Pacific.
 - (2) Attacks on shipping.
 - (3) Attacks on naval forces.
 - (4) Sea-borne raids on coastal points (India, Australia, and North America).
- (d) Improve present positions by limited offensive operations.
 - (1) In New Guinea.
 - (2) In the Solomons.
 - (3) In Southwest China (Yunnan Province).*
 - (4) In other areas in China.*
 - (5) In Northern Burma-Assam.
 - (6) In the Aleutians.
- (e) Undertake major offensive operations.
 - (1) Against the Southern Solomons, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa groups.
 - (2) Against Northern Australia.
 - (3) Against India and/or Ceylon.
 - (4) Against China.*
 - (5) Against Siberia.
 - (6) Against Midway-Hawaii.

* In the event of a substantially increased tempo of military operations in China on the part of the United Nations this would be given a higher degree of probability.

18. Discussion of each Course of Action.

The pros and cons of each course of action indicated in paragraph 17 are discussed below:

(a) Remain on the strategic defensive.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

a. If not seriously hampered by enemy action, Japan could strengthen her defenses and develop her war industries to such an extent that except for the threat from Eastern Siberia her defensive position could then be reduced only by long and extremely costly operations.

b. Because of her strong position in the Western Pacific, Japan can remain on the strategic defensive with a minimum expenditure of manpower and risk of materiel.

c. The insular portion of Japan's strategic barrier is suitable for effective defense, as it can only be breached by large scale amphibious operations.

d. It would avoid irreplaceable air and naval losses and other dangers inherent in large scale offensive operations.

e. It would avoid further extension of the present long lines of communication which would place an additional burden on an already tight shipping situation.

(2) Reasons against adopting:

a. A defensive strategy does not conform to Japanese military doctrine.

b. Japan would be unable to choose the theater of action.

c. The United Nations with their vastly superior industrial resources will be able to outstrip Japan in production.

d. The United Nations may acquire bases from which they can bring their superior forces and resources to bear more effectively upon Japanese lines of communication and vital centers.

(b) Intensify efforts to secure peace in China.

(1) Reasons for adopting:

If successful:

a. The military effect would be important. Japan could withdraw some portion of the soldiers now stationed in China. The use of air bases would be denied to the United Nations. Japan's hold over Burma would be strengthened.

b. It would have a profound psychological effect, encouraging the Japanese populace, discouraging the United Nations, and greatly aiding Japanese psychological warfare in India and in occupied areas.

c. Japan's economic exploitation of China would be greatly facilitated. Japan might secure adequate supplies of certain strategic materials, e.g., tungsten and antimony.

d. It would facilitate efforts to achieve closer and better relations with the Soviet Union.

(2) Reasons against adopting (in the sense that Japan would be unwilling to grant favorable terms to the Central Government for the following reasons):

a. Fighting in China gives Japanese troops a valuable training ground.

b. In any event Japan would be forced to keep a large number of troops in China to insure order and suppress guerilla warfare.

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c. Japan already controls those parts of China most suited to economic exploitation. Most of unoccupied China is only of minor economic importance.

d. Japan has tried unsuccessfully to bring about a separate peace and may have been discouraged from further attempts.

(c) Adopt measures of attrition.

No discussion deemed necessary. See paragraph

17 (c).

(d) Improve present positions by limited offensive operations.

(1) In New Guinea.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. The capture of Papua and control of all New Guinea would give the Japanese an additional base from which to launch raids or attacks on North Australia and would deprive our land forces and land-based air units of their most effective base of operations against Rabaul and other areas in New Britain of strategic importance to the Japanese.

2. The control of all New Guinea would enable the Japanese to strike effectively at Allied operations in the Banda and Arafura Sea areas.

3. The capture of Papua would regain for the Japanese some of the prestige lost by reverses suffered there in recent weeks.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Japanese losses in the Southwest Pacific have been high.

018L11

2. Further attempts would probably be very expensive to their ground, naval and air forces so long as the United Nations retain air superiority in that area.

3. Health conditions are poor with the result that the number of noneffectives becomes large soon after the arrival of troops in the area.

(2) In the Solomons.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. Capture and occupation of the Solomons would remove a dangerous threat to other Japanese bases in this area.

2. It would put Japan in a better position to move against the islands in the South Pacific along the United Nations' lines of communication.

3. As long as the United Nations remain in possession of bases in the Solomons they constitute a threat to the Japanese position not only in the Solomons but in the Bismarck Archipelago and New Guinea.

4. In addition to these important strategic considerations, the recapture of the South Solomons would tend to revive among the Japanese the myth of the invincibility of their military forces and restore lost prestige.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. The campaign in the Solomons has been particularly expensive to Japan in both men and materiel.

a18L12

2. Since the United Nations have consolidated their position and have air superiority, any further operations to regain control of the Southern Solomons would probably involve even greater losses.

(3) In Southwest China (Yunnan Province).

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. It would deprive China of Kunming, its second most important war production center.

2. A Japanese occupation of Kunming would cut the present air supply route from India to China.

3. It would seriously handicap the operations of the American Air Task Force in China.

4. It would strike a serious blow at Chinese morale and might result in a collapse of Chinese resistance.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Japanese forces at present in Burma cannot afford to divert any large force for this operation.

2. Except for a Japanese division now in Thailand, any additional troops would have to come from French Indo-China or beyond.

3. It would require a diversion of air strength from other areas.

4. All routes leading to Kunming are mountainous and the area is infested with malaria.

5. Supply problems would become progressively more serious.

218L13

6. Chinese forces in the area have been reinforced.

(4) In other areas in China.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. To remove the possibility of the United Nations using certain air and naval bases in China as a base for attacks on Japan Proper, occupied areas, and lines of communication.

2. To occupy strategic and economic centers vital to the Chinese war effort.

3. To obtain certain additional strategic bases (particularly air).

4. It would strike a serious blow at Chinese morale and might result in a collapse of Chinese resistance.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. It would lengthen Japanese lines of communication.

2. It would require additional ground and air forces.

(5) Northern Burma-Assam.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. Occupation of this area would increase the isolation of China by cutting the air route.

2. The further isolation of China might demoralize the Chinese to the point where they would cease to resist. The Japanese would be in a far better position to deny to the United Nations the possible future use of China as a base for operations against Japan.

Q18L14

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. It would be a long and costly campaign over difficult terrain.

2. It would extend Japan's already extremely long lines of communication.

(6) In the Aleutians.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. Japanese attacks on our forward bases in the Aleutians would hamper American attacks on Japanese bases in the western Aleutians.

2. More extensive operations might deny to the United Nations the use of waters north of the Aleutians and would restrict the use of the Arctic Sea route to Russia.

3. It would provide bases for the Japanese control of northern Pacific waters, for raids or attacks on the mainland of Alaska, and would increase security for the Japanese fishing fleets operating in northern waters.

4. It would impede a possible future junction of American and Russian forces in the North Pacific and would hamper attacks on Japan Proper via the Aleutians.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. A Japanese attack on our western bases would necessitate using at least a division supported by air and naval forces.

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2. This would necessitate initially 150,000 tons of shipping and thereafter 37,000 tons monthly for maintenance.

3. This long line of communication would be vulnerable to our submarine, air and surface attacks.

4. Frequent rains, high winds, and fogs among the Aleutian Islands seriously interfere with air operations in summer and winter.

5. There are no local supplies or resources in the area other than fish.

6. Persistent attack from American forces can be expected.

7. Because of our occupation of some of these islands, surprise could not be completely effected.

8. The important objectives are far apart.

(e) Undertake major offensive operations.

(1) Against the Southern Solomons, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa groups.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. The present line of communications between the United States and Australia and the Southwest Pacific would be severed. Even a partial success in securing some of these islands would increase logistic difficulties of the United Nations (particularly on the air ferry route).

a18L16

2. Capture of New Caledonia would improve Japan's position regarding nickel and would deny a source of nickel to the United Nations.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. It would place a much greater strain on Japan's already extended lines of communication.

2. It would necessitate further dispersion of her troops and further expenditure of shipping and equipment which would be very difficult to replace.

3. The capture of some of these islands would be almost prohibitive in cost.

4. Action in force in this direction would weaken the naval defenses of Japan Proper.

(2) Against Northern Australia.

a. Reasons for adopting:

Possession of Northern Australia would help consolidate the Japanese position in the Southwest Pacific and, by forcing the United Nations to defend Southeast Australia, would divert United Nations' strength from possible offensive operations against the southern island barrier.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. It would require large forces and probably entail heavy loss to invade Northern Australia in the face of land-based aircraft and ground opposition. It is highly improbable that Japan can spare the necessary aircraft and shipping.

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2. There are no economic advantages to be gained by invading Northern Australia. Over a thousand miles of difficult terrain lie between Northern Australia and the industrial and agricultural centers of population of the Southeast.

(3) Against India and/or Ceylon.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. This operation would give Japan a powerful outpost on her western flank and deny the Bay of Bengal to the shipping of the United Nations.

2. It would provide Japan with a base for the interception of hostile shipping along the west coast of India and in the Indian Ocean.

3. It would give Japan control of the Calcutta area, the vital industrial center of India, with a steel production equal to one-fifth of Japan's total steel capacity.

4. It would damage Chinese morale and cut the air supply route to China with the possible result of forcing China into a cessation of hostilities.

5. The unstable Indian political situation facilitates this course.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Operations against India would meet determined resistance from the air and ground forces of the United Nations.

a18L18

2. All routes from Burma into India are difficult and would limit the size of the land force that could be concentrated promptly for effective operations.

3. It is probable that at least 8 to 10 divisions would be necessary for a successful attack on India.

4. Operations against Ceylon would be extremely hazardous so long as Allied naval and air strength in the area remains formidable.

5. An attack on India or Ceylon would further lengthen Japanese lines of communication and require large air, naval, and shipping commitments which Japan is believed unable to make at this time.

(4) Against China.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. A successful general offensive against China would eliminate the Chinese as an organized factor in the present war.

2. It would remove the possibility of the United Nations using Chinese territory as a base for effective attacks on Japan.

3. It would eventually release some Japanese troops for use in other areas.

4. It would have a profound psychological effect in Japan and among all Asiatic peoples and would have an adverse effect upon the morale and prestige of the United Nations.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Terrain and lack of routes of communication in China make military operations difficult.

2. It would require an increase in the number of Japanese troops initially used in China.

3. The lines of communication would be greatly lengthened.

4. Even if Japan were successful in conquering the remaining areas in China, a period of chaos or confusion would result and the immediate economic and industrial gains would be small.

5. Limited offensive operations resulting in a cessation of hostilities between China and Japan might accomplish virtually the same results.

(5) Against Siberia.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. Seizure of a most favorable opportunity for military action against an arch enemy. Russia would be hard pressed to fight on two widely separated fronts and reinforcements to Siberia are virtually precluded under present circumstances.

2. It would eliminate the possibility of United States-Russian military and naval collaboration and encirclement of Japan in the North Pacific.

3. Japan enjoys on land a superiority in strategic position, manpower, supply lines, and most types of military equipment. Naval superiority is overwhelming although air strength is limited.

21820

4. It would remove the weakest spot in Japan's strategic barrier. Russian and possible United Nations air, naval and submarine bases in this area constitute the greatest potential danger to Japan's inner zone.

5. It would be of great assistance to the Germans.

6. It would impede the flow of Lend-Lease goods from the United States to Russia by the Alaska-Siberia air route.

7. It would afford Japan additional bases for operations against Alaska.

8. Japan would gain oil and additional security for her northern fisheries, and some lumber, coal, lead, zinc and gold.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Disinclination of Japan to embark upon a new major offensive in view of existing commitments elsewhere.

2. It would expose most of the essential and highly concentrated centers of Japan to the danger of attack by Russian and Allied bombers.

3. It would expose Japanese naval units and some of Japan's most essential shipping lanes to attack by Russian submarines, other naval vessels, and aircraft.

4. Russia's preoccupation in Europe practically assures Japan of immunity from attack by Russia.

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5. Japan is confident that for the time being Russia will not grant to the U.S.A. use of her air or naval bases and that they are therefore neutralized.

6. Climatic conditions and geographic factors handicap operations during substantial periods of the year.

7. Respect for Russian strength in the Siberian area, learned at Nomonhan and Changkufeng.

(6) Against Midway-Hawaii.

a. Reasons for adopting:

1. The occupation of Midway and Hawaii would eliminate the United Nations' key base in the Pacific and extend Japan's strategic barrier east to a point from which it would be practically impossible to launch an attack on Japan Proper across the Pacific.

2. The occupation of Hawaii would give Japan a base for operations aiming to control the eastern as well as the western Pacific.

3. The occupation of Hawaii would destroy the present air ferry routes to the South Pacific.

4. The occupation of Hawaii would cut the present surface supply lines to the South Pacific.

5. American offensive and defensive operations in all parts of the Pacific would be seriously crippled.

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6. Japanese naval and air operations against Alaska, the Continental United States, and the Panama Canal would be greatly facilitated.

b. Reasons against adopting:

1. Japan has the necessary troops available for an attack on Midway and the Hawaiian Islands, but she could provide the necessary shipping only by a great temporary restriction of her economic effort and at a considerable risk to her entire war economy.

2. Her preoccupation in the Southwest Pacific would preclude any such widespread dispersion of her forces while she is engaged in a major effort elsewhere.

3. Since the nearest Japanese-occupied island is beyond the operating radius of Japanese land-based aircraft, any air operations against Hawaii would have to be made with ship-borne planes.

4. Inasmuch as a successful surprise attack on Hawaii is not believed to be feasible at the present time, the risks involved in attacking such a strongly held base would be very great.

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May 10, 1943

Pages 1 - 13 incl.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

OPERATIONS IN BURMA 1943-1944

Note by the Secretaries

The attached plan, prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee, is forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

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By N/A Date APR 13 1973

OPERATIONS IN BURMA IN 1943-44

Report by Joint War Plans Committee

1. A detailed study to determine the prospects of successfully completing ANAKIM (as based on the NEW DELHI decisions) in the next dry season, is contained in Enclosure "A".

2. The conclusions reached in connection with the successful completion of ANAKIM are:

a. That if the NEW DELHI tactical concept is adhered to, there is no reasonable chance of success.

b. That with tactical modification of the NEW DELHI plan, there is a reasonable chance of success.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

OPERATIONS IN BURMA IN 1943 - 1944

3. Problem

To determine the prospects of successfully completing ANAKIM (as based on the NEW DELHI decisions) in the next dry season.

4. Objectives of Operation in Burma

a. In order to sustain CHINA and insure its retention as a base for the full-scale offensive against JAPAN, effective and timely steps must be taken, not later than the next dry season, to improve the flow of supplies to CHINA by way of BURMA. BURMA occupies a strategically important position as an outpost or anchor to JAPAN'S defense line running through N.E.I., NEW GUINEA, and the MARSHALLS. JAPAN should not be permitted to consolidate and develop this naturally defensible flank position.

b. The minimum objectives of operations in BURMA should be to maintain pressure on JAPAN, retain the initiative in the theater, and maintain and improve the flow of supplies to CHINA. The conquest of BURMA would fully accomplish these objectives, but the requirements therefor might tax the presently available resources of the UNITED NATIONS to an unacceptable degree. In that case, it will be most important that sufficient resources be allocated to insure the accomplishment of more limited objectives which are in keeping with the urgency of the situation in this particular theater. Various actions short of conquering BURMA would secure these objectives in part or in varying degrees of completeness. The minimum acceptable degree of completeness is defined as follows:

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(1) Maintain pressure on the enemy and retain the initiative in the theater to a degree that interferes with JAPAN'S lines of supply and denies her freedom of action.

(2) Obtain a position that will permit rapid development of an all-weather route into CHINA.

5. Present status of ANAKIM

The failure to attain all of the objectives set for accomplishment before the monsoon of 1943 presages a low order of effectiveness in the ground operations of ANAKIM. The offensive against AKYAB was a failure, which was costly in prestige, morale, and troops. Operations from IMPHAL were disappointing, and control of the CHIN HILLS not accomplished. Little information is available regarding submarine action against shipping to RANGOON. One U. S. submarine was diverted to this area in accordance with ANAKIM. The air offensive was successful.

6. General considerations

a. The pertinent factors for consideration in arriving at a decision in regard to operations in BURMA in 1943-44 are:

(1) The Chinese are reluctant to participate unless assured that operations in this theater will be conducted on a scale which, as the Generalissimo said, would be "adequate to drive the Japanese out of BURMA."

(2) The UNITED NATIONS are faced by the practical necessity of opening land supply routes to CHINA. Only by such action is it considered possible for CHINA to continue in the war.

(3) From a practical standpoint, it appears that nothing short of a completely successful ANAKIM will meet our requirements. The road under construction from LEDO south to MYITKYINA, when completed, will have an estimated capacity of only 30,000 long tons per month. The Chinese divisions in this area (about 30,000 men) will require about 20,000

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tons per month to support them. This will leave at best about 10,000 tons per month for CHINA, much of which will be required to support Chinese forces in YUNNAN. The Chinese representatives at the CALCUTTA conferences (C.C.S. Memo #45) pointed out that "10,000 tons a month was only a very small percentage of their requirements." The air route to CHINA at this time has a capacity of about 2,000 tons per month with a target of 4,000 tons per month in the near future. The ultimate objective is 10,000 tons per month.

(4) If it becomes necessary to consider any modification of ANAKIM, its objectives and prospects of success should be weighed carefully to insure the attainment of our primary purpose: maintaining CHINA in the war.

7. Objectives before the monsoon in 1943

a. Navy. Submarine attacks on Japanese sea lanes to RANGOON.

b. Army.

(1) From YUNNAN - limited offensive operations to gain positions for offensive after the monsoon.

(2) From LEDO - limited offensive to cover road construction to be pushed as far as possible toward MOGAUNG.

(3) From IMPHAL area - advance to CHINDWIN between SITTANG and KALEWA, followed by raids east of the CHINDWIN to establish bridgeheads.

(4) Control of the CHIN HILLS.

(5) On ARAKAN Coast - capture AKYAB and RAMREE ISLAND.

c. Air. Continue employment according to present directive, i.e., attacks on enemy communications, shipping, port installations, and airfields.

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8. Outline plan for capture of BURMA next season. (1 November 1943, to 15 May 1944).

a. Phase I - November 1943.

Advance by ten Chinese divisions from western YUNNAN towards MYITKYINA, BHAMO, LASHIO, and eventually MANDALAY area. Chinese divisions are said to be ten thousand strong.

Advance by Chinese troops trained at RAMGARH from LEDO on MYITKYINA.

Advance by British Forces (three divisions) from ASSAM on PAKOKKU and MANDALAY area.

b. Phase II - December 1943.

Simultaneous seaborne assaults:

On KYIUKPYU, GWA, and SANDOWAY with the object of capturing airfields.

On TAUNGUP, in order to capture airfields and advance on PROME and RANGOON road, with a force of about one division, with the object of containing enemy forces and cutting communications between RANGOON and the north.

On ARAKAN coast opposite BASSEIN, with the object of capturing BASSEIN and its airfields, advancing in the direction of HENZADA and RANGOON, and containing enemy forces.

Continuation of British and Chinese advance in upper BURMA.

c. Phase III - January 1944.

(1) Direct seaborne and airborne assault on RANGOON, while operations in Phase I and II continue.

(2) A proposed variation in the above concept envisages shifting some of the forces from the RANGOON assault to an advance from the BASSEIN lodgement. Though difficult, this plan is the only one that holds out any prospect of taking BURMA in one season. The fact that it is a bold and hazardous operation may help to achieve surprise. If the RANGOON assault is unsuccessful, the BASSEIN bridgehead could still be developed as the main line of advance on RANGOON.

9. Comments on ANAKIM plan

a. Following a careful study of the ANAKIM Plan, it is concluded that Phase III, the frontal attack on RANGOON, is not feasible or acceptable and should be rejected.

b. By a change in the tactical concept and without any troops in addition to those set up by the NEW DELHI decisions, it is believed that the reduction of RANGOON can be effected by an assault in force from BASSEIN via HENZADA, taking RANGOON in reverse. The troops intended for Phase III in the ANAKIM Plan can be used to augment the forces assigned to the BASSEIN area in Phase II.

c. An assault in force on RANGOON from BASSEIN would probably be successful because:

- (1) It would tend to split the Japanese forces.
- (2) It would be based on the second largest port in BURMA.
- (3) It could be supplied by way of the BASSEIN river.
- (4) It would be taking RANGOON in reverse.
- (5) It could be easily supported by aircraft from landing fields on the ARAKAN coast.
- (6) It would threaten Japanese supply lines to north BURMA.
- (7) It would be over ground not easily defended.

d. It is believed that if the deficiencies in forces and equipment as indicated later in this study are made up, BURMA may be recaptured in the dry season of 1943-44, provided there is the necessary determination. The BASSEIN - RANGOON concept will offer an acceptable chance of success.

10. Possibilities of Meeting Requirements

a. Naval support for ANAKIM

(1) The British estimates of naval requirements (covering force and escort force), and that part which they now estimate can be assigned to the operation, are as listed below:

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	<u>Covering Force</u>	<u>Escort Force</u>	<u>British Estimate They can Assign</u>	<u>Balance Required for ANAKIM</u>
BB	5	-	2	1
OBB	-	-	2	-
CV	3	-	2	-
ACV	-	10	6	5
CA	4	-	2	2
CL	-	10	7 M & 6 Light	-
CL(AA)	-	5	-	5
DD	27	50	27	50
DE	-	50	3	47
AMS-DMS	-	25	33	-
SS	-	-	13	-

(2) The Japanese could bring superior naval strength against this force. However, since naval operations in the PACIFIC may be expected to contain the Japanese fleet and thus preclude interference with naval operations in the INDIAN OCEAN, the requirements in naval forces indicated above are considered excessive.

b. Shipping.

(1) In the preliminary discussions regarding ANAKIM, the UNITED STATES was requested to allocate shipping as follows:

(a) 25 sailings April, May, and June.

(b) 19 sailings July and August, or a total of 113 sailings.

(2) The U. S. shipping allocated and now planned, however, is as follows:

(a) 20 sailings April, May, and June.

(b) 15 sailings July and August, or a total of 90 sailings.

(3) The deficiency, based on C-2 cargo vessel capacity of 6,500 long tons of military stores, is as follows:

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Requested - 733,500 long tons

Allocated - 584,000 long tons

Deficiency - 149,500 long tons

(4) This deficiency should not affect the operation, provided proper selection of the required supplies is made. The deficiency can be made up during the third quarter.

(5) No data are available as to British shipping for ANAKIM.

c. Assault shipping and landing craft.

(1) Definite requirements of assault shipping and landing craft for ANAKIM have not been set up. However, based on the estimates in C.C.S. 164/1 of 21 January, 1943, it appears practicable to provide from other theaters any deficiencies in landing craft. Before deciding to divert landing craft from other theaters to ANAKIM, consideration must be given to the effect of such diversion on projected operations in those theaters.

(2) Tables showing landing craft requirements and deficiencies are contained in Appendix "A".

d. Ground and service forces.

(1) Army units which INDIA cannot provide

From the troops available in INDIA, there will be a shortage of three assault brigades and one parachute brigade for the RANGOON operation, and two divisions for the reserve in INDIA. It is also possible that there may be an additional shortage of two assault brigades, one of which INDIA may be able to supply, the other, however, can come only from the 70th British Division which is to be used in the BASSEIN operation.

(2) Army shortages in equipment

(a) As of February, 1943, only enough specialized equipment for four of the six assault brigades required had been ordered.

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(b) It is not considered feasible to deliver direct to captured ports and bases the necessary equipment for base construction, reconstruction of ports, and maintenance of forces. This equipment must be shipped via INDIA.

(c) Transportation equipment must be shipped early and even now cannot all be assembled within the time available.

(d) There is a shortage of small drums (2 - 4 gallon) for gasoline. If the operations are to be successful, it will be necessary to ship a drum manufacturing plant from the UNITED STATES by July, 1943.

(e) Among the administrative units, there is a shortage of equipment for a considerable number of engineer battalions, general hospital units, military police companies, etc. All of this must be shipped to INDIA. In addition, for anti-malarial control, seventy-five anti-malarial units must be ready. It is estimated that much of the anti-malaria equipment will arrive from the UNITED KINGDOM, but not before November, 1943.

(3) Army forces and their necessary equipment to be provided from outside INDIA present great difficulties, but these difficulties can possibly be overcome.

e. Air forces

(1) U. S. Army Air Force requirements, other than troop carrier, will be met by the diversion of one heavy and one medium bomber group from NORTH AFRICA at the conclusion of HUSKY. At the expense of future operations in the European-African area, 5 troop carrier groups could be provided to satisfy ANAKIM requirements in transport aircraft.

(2) Information is not available as to whether the British can meet their deficiency in about 90 heavy bombers and 120 fighters.

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11. Enemy capabilities for the defense of BURMA during the period November 1943 to April 1944.

a. Naval forces

(1) It will be possible for the Japanese to bring naval forces to bear as soon as the nature and scope of the BURMA operation is disclosed. The Japanese may decide:

(a) To send their fleet into the BAY OF BENGAL leaving a covering force in the PACIFIC, or

(b) To retain their fleet in the PACIFIC and send a striking force into the BAY OF BENGAL.

(2) In view of the threat offered by our PACIFIC Fleet, and the fact that the Japanese naval force in the BAY OF BENGAL area would be operating under the protection of shore-based aircraft, it is considered highly probable that they will retain their major naval forces in the PACIFIC and send a striking force into the INDIAN OCEAN area.

b. Ground and air forces

(1) The Japanese forces occupying BURMA total 4 infantry divisions, 1 armored regiment, and approximately 132 fighters, 132 bombers, and 36 observation type planes. The 33rd Division, with its headquarters at MANDALAY, controls the CHINDWIN RIVER valley. The 56th Division, with its headquarters at LASHIO, is disposed along the BURMA-CHINA border. The 55th Division, with its headquarters at AKYAB, is now in contact with British forces in the vicinity of MAUNGDAW and BUTHIDAUNG. The 18th Division, with its headquarters at MANDALAY, is deployed as follows:

1 combat team, vicinity of KENG TUNG

1 combat team, MANDALAY

1 combat team, MYITKYINA

The general reserve for the Jap Forces in BURMA is located in vicinity of RANGOON. Estimated strength, one-half division plus one tank regiment.

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(2) The Japanese capability of reinforcing this area is considerable because of the existing lines of communication across INDO-CHINA, THAILAND, and the MALAY PENINSULA, and the sea route through the STRAITS OF MALACCA to RANGOON.

(3) For Japanese ground force reinforcement there will be available 3 weak THAI divisions in the KENG TUNG area of BURMA, 1 division in INDO-CHINA, and 2 divisions in MALAYA. There have also been reliable reports of the formation of a BURMA Independence Army, allegedly numbering 40-50,000. The diversion to BURMA of Japanese forces from MANCHURIA, CHINA, or the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC would depend upon the situation existing at the time. Japanese reinforcements would probably be limited to increasing their forces in BURMA to a total of 9 divisions.

(4) Through the construction of a system of airdromes and airfields the Japanese are capable of rapidly concentrating air forces from other areas to support their troops in BURMA. However, the availability of air units is dependent upon the situation existing in the other areas at the time. They are capable of increasing the number of operational aircraft in BURMA from 300 to 650 within a period of 45 days.

12. Conclusions.

Assuming Operation ANAKIM is attempted by the methods and on the scale envisaged in the NEW DELHI decisions reached in February, 1943, it is concluded that:

a. U. S. commitments for mounting the operation can be met with the exception of 150,000 tons of shipping. This shortage can be met one month later than the required date.

b. A large part of the British personnel and logistic requirements must be provided from outside of INDIA. The difficulty of meeting these requirements can be overcome only by early and decisive action.

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c. The proposed direct assault on RANGOON, which envisages the attack force proceeding up the RANGOON RIVER with landings at or near the city, has no reasonable chance of success.

d. Should the attack on RANGOON from the South fail there would be insufficient troops in the BASSEIN area to reduce RANGOON and the time factor remaining would not be sufficient to effect the capture in one campaign season.

e. By changing the tactical concept, and without additional troops, the execution of an assault from BASSEIN via HENZADA - PROME to take RANGOON in reverse, has a reasonable chance of success.

f. Results of the pre-monsoon operations of 1942-43 presages a low order of effectiveness in ANAKIM Operations. Therefore, it is necessary that there be a marked improvement in leadership, calibre of troops, and that the major proportion of the amphibious troops be British.

g. If the difficulties enumerated above can be overcome, and tactical modification of the RANGOON assault to an advance from BASSEIN is made, ANAKIM, including the capture of RANGOON has a reasonable chance of success during the next dry season.

13. Recommendations.

In order to increase the chances of success, it is recommended:

- a. That additional air forces be made available.
- b. That sufficient combat personnel be diverted from British spheres of responsibility to offset present deficiencies. The reserve deficiency need not arrive in INDIA until 1 November, 1943.
- c. That carefully prepared cover plans be made and cover operations include demonstrations in force in the PACIFIC.

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APPENDIX "A"LANDING CRAFTI. Requirements for ANAKIM based on CCS 164/1 of 21 January 1943

<u>Required</u>	<u>To be made Available by British</u>	<u>Deficiencies</u>
1 HQS	1	0
9 LSI (L)	9	0
40 LST (2)	10	30
5 LSD	0	5
10 LCT(5)	0	10
120 LCM	100	20
40 LCP	40	0
100 LCA	100	0
16 LCS	10	6
20 Personnel ships }		
60 MT ships }		

II. Landing craft requirements based on ANAKIM plan (U.S.B. 23).

<u>Required</u>	<u>Available in India</u>	<u>Defi- ciency</u>	<u>Provided by British</u>	<u>Provided from other theaters</u>
336 LCA	180	156	100	56
36 LCS	20	16	10	6
320 LCM	120	200	100	100
190 LCP	101	89	40	49
18 LCT	0	18	-	18
25 LCI	10	15	-	15
18 MT Ships	30	0	-	-
27 LSD or G	5	22	-	2
15 River Steamers	0	15	?	?
0 LST				

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April 13, 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFSTATUS OF "ANAKIM"Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. In C.C.S. 155/1, dated January 19, 1943, Subject - Conduct of the War in 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed in Paragraph 6 as follows:-

"6. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC AND FAR EAST:

"(a) Operations in these theaters shall continue with the forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against Japan by the United Nations as soon as Germany is defeated.

"(b) These operations must be kept within such limits as will not, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, jeopardize the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any favorable opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

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"(c) Subject to the above reservation, plans and preparations shall be made for:-

(1) The recapture of Burma (ANAKIM) beginning in 1943.

(2) Operations, after the capture of Rabaul, against the Marshalls and Carolines if time and resources allow without prejudice to ANAKIM."

2. In the 65th Meeting, the Committee:-

"(a) Took note of C.C.S. 164, as amended, and agreed:-

(1) To approve November 15, 1943, as the provisional date for the ANAKIM assault.

(2) To approve the provisional schedule of forces laid out in Paragraph 3 of C.C.S. 164, recognizing that the actual provision of naval forces, assault shipping, landing craft, and shipping must depend on the situation in the late summer of 1943.

(3) To confirm in July 1943 the decision to undertake or to postpone Operation ANAKIM."

3. It is becoming increasingly apparent to the U. S. Chiefs of Staff that, if we are, in fact, to "attain (or maintain) a position of readiness for the full scale offensive against JAPAN by the United Nations as soon as GERMANY is defeated," it is imperative that effective steps must be taken during the next dry season to improve the flow of supplies into CHINA.

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4. Progress of the RAVENOUS operation has proved disappointing. The U. S. Chiefs of Staff feel that vigorous steps must be taken to get on with the preparations for ANAKIM. They request, therefore, that the British Chiefs of Staff cause a report to be made of the present status of operations, plans for ANAKIM, and preparation for ANAKIM.

5. It is further requested that a report be furnished the Combined Chiefs of Staff once each month until a final decision on the timing of ANAKIM is made in July, 1943.

6. In connection with the above, the U. S. Chiefs of Staff have already taken the initiative to provide shipping for the necessary ANAKIM build-up. The Air Transport Service to CHINA is being augmented, and it is planned to continue the augmentation of combat aircraft as indicated in C.C.S. 198. Further, two U. S. submarines have been temporarily diverted from more favorable operating areas to operate against the communications of the STRAITS OF MALACCA and RANGOON.

7. The Air Transport Service to CHINA, augmented as indicated above, requires support by operations to the southward in order that Japanese interference can be prevented. The follow-up of RAVENOUS by ANAKIM is important to this service.

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